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THE "PLATONISM" OF CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

ALBERT C. OUTLER

FIRST rate neither as a philosopher nor as a systematic theologian, Clement of Alexandria nevertheless occupies a crucial place in the process of what is often called "the hellenization of Christianity." To the interpretation of this process, involving as it does the propriety of a philosophical theology, much learning and not a little passion have been devoted.[1] The object of this essay is not, however, to consider this problem as a whole. We are here concerned merely with the examination of an incident within it. It is generally recognized that Clement went as far as any orthodox Christian ever did in his appropriation and use of hellenistic philosophical and ethical concepts for the expression of his Christian faith. Plato was his favorite philosopher. A brief study of his use and understanding of Plato ought to reveal, in some significant measure, his conception of the relation between Greek philosophy and Christian truth.

I

We know next to nothing about Clement's life. Epiphanius[2] reports that some people said Clement was an Alexandrine while

[1] Cf. Walther Glawe, *Die Hellenisierung des Christentums in der Geschichte der Theologie von Luther bis auf die Gegenwart* (Berlin, 1912), for an account and interpretation of this controversy among Protestant historians.

[2] *Panarion haer.* xxxii. 6 (ed. Karl Holl in *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller* [Leipzig, 1915], I, 445, 17–18): Κλήμης τε, ὅν φασί τινες Ἀλεξανδρέα, ἕτεροι δὲ Ἀθηναῖον.

others said he was an Athenian. Such hearsay is doubtful, for Clement's account of his wanderings[3] before coming to Alexandria suggests that he was not an Alexandrian by birth, and his express disavowal of interest in "trying to be Greek"[4] seems to indicate that he was not an Athenian. Whatever his origins, his writings show that he was educated in the usual disciplines of the hellenistic world and that even in his conversion to Christianity he never lost his love for the heritage of Hellas. We know nothing about his conversion except that it seems to have come after a period of search among the philosophic "schools" of the time and that it was followed by a sampling of a succession of Christian teachers, until at last he came under the influence of Pantaenus, then head of the catechetical school at Alexandria.[5] After a few years Clement succeeded Pantaenus and became, in a sense, the spokesman of educated Christianity in Alexandria. It was a difficult situation. There were the ὀρθοδοξασταί,[6] to whom philosophical learning was suspect; there were the ἁπλῶς πεπιστευκότες,[7] to whom it was a closed

[3] *Str.* i. 1 (all references to Clement are to O. Stählin, *Clemens Alexandrinus* in *Die griechischen christilchen Schriftsteller* [Leipzig, 1905–36], II, 8, 16—9, 8, hereafter referred to as *GCS*, with volume, page, and line numbers).

[4] *Str.* ii. 1 (*GCS*, II, 114, 8): ἔφαμεν δὲ πολλάκις μήτε μεμελετηκέναι μήτε μὴν ἐπιτηδεύειν ἑλληνίζειν.

[5] *Str.* i. 1: "My memoranda are stored up against old age as a remedy against forgetfulness, as near as possible an image and outline of those animated and vivid discourses which I was privileged to hear from some blessed and holy men. One of them, an Ionian, flourished in Greece; others of them lived in Magna Graecia: of these latter, one was from Coele-Syria, a second from Egypt. Still others I found in the East: among them was an Assyrian; another, in Palestine, was a Hebrew by birth. Finally, upon meeting the last of my masters (who was, in reality, the first in power) I attached myself to him and remained in Egypt in order to possess myself of his hidden treasures. True bee of Sicily that he was, he gathered the pollen of the flowers of the prophetic and apostolic meadows and deposited in the souls of his hearers an entirely pure and holy knowledge. These men, who preserved the true tradition of the blessed teaching of the holy Apostles Peter, James, John and Paul, as sons who received a heritage from their fathers (but who little resemble their fathers), have come down to us with the benediction of God in order to pass on to us the ancestral and apostolic doctrine." For our only important testimony as to the catechetical school at Alexandria see Eusebius *Church History* v. 10 and vi. 11.

[6] *Str.* i. 9 (*GCS*, II, 30, 17).

[7] *Str.* i. 9 (*GCS*, II, 298, 20).

book; there were the αἱρετικοί,[8] who had used it as justification in their alteration of the traditional Christian faith.[9] Clement tries to deal with each in the most irenic spirit. He anticipates the criticisms of the "orthodoxasts."

> I am not oblivious of what is babbled by some who, in their ignorance, are frightened at every noise and say that we ought to occupy ourselves only with what is most necessary and which contains the faith; and that we should pass over whatever is beyond or superfluous, which wears us out and detains us to no purpose, in things which conduce nothing to the great end, salvation.
>
> But I shall show .... that philosophy in a sense is a work of Divine Providence.[10]

With the "simple believers," Clement is very gentle. Like Plato, he believed that the inner temple of wisdom was not open to the common people, but, unlike Plato, he had no scorn for their stupidity or ignorance.[11] He could do very little to help them; he would do nothing to offend them. As for the heretics, he attempts no systematic refutation of their views, but he tries to make abundantly clear the profound contrast between them and the Christian gnosis of which he is expositor.

All his writings appear to have been addressed to Christian readers or at least to those who were favorably inclined to Christianity.[12] They deal with almost every conceivable phase of faith and practice, from the call to accept the gospel in the *Protrepticus* to the description of the perfect Christian in

[8] *Str.* iv. 18 (*GCS*, II, 61, 14–24).

[9] Tertullian, for example, saw an intimate connection between philosophy and heresy; cf. *Prescription of Heretics* vii (*Ante-Nicene Fathers* [New York, 1885], III, 246).

[10] *Str.* i. 1 (*GCS*, II, 13, 5–14).

[11] Cf., e.g., *Str.* v. 4 (*GCS*, II, 338, 16—339, 5) with *Republic* 490E–494A.

[12] The usual assumption that the *Protrepticus* was addressed to heathens in general should be re-examined in the light of the mood and method of the book itself. There is little or no effort at coercive argument, and the pagans are liberally insulted. Again, the whole discourse takes much of the Christian message for granted and assumes more familiarity with Christian teaching and symbolism than would seem likely in a purely pagan audience (e.g., cf. with Origen, *Contra Celsum*, Book i). Hence, it seems to me probable that it was intended as an evangelistic message to Gentiles already on the verge of conversion to Christianity.

Stromata vii. There is the famous discourse on good manners in *Paedagogus* ii; the problem of wealth is considered warily in *Quis dives salvetur;* and for an example of simple, genial Christian counsel, one can scarcely improve upon the exquisite little *Exhortation to the Newly Baptized.*[13]

Charles Bigg set the fashion for regarding Clement as a "Christian Platonist" in his Bampton Lectures of 1886.[14] This view was taken by Casey,[15] who analyzed Clement's writings and concluded that the result of Clement's eclectism was "a real philosophy of religion, controlled by the ontological and epistemological premises of Platonism, but also inspired by the less formal mysticism of early Christians like Paul and John."[16] This general position was then sharply called into question by Joachim Meifort,[17] who undertook to emphasize the contrasts between Clement and Plato. His conclusion is "dass genuiner Platonismus und Christentum hinsichtlich des Grundprinzips ihrer Denkweise nicht innerlich verwandt sind."[18] It is not difficult to see why, in Meifort's view, this is so. His Plato is a rationalist, preoccupied with epistemology and dialectics.[19] His Clement is a sort of Pauline Christian, absorbed in the quest for salvation and mystical exaltation.[20] Such an interpretation of Plato and of Clement, as well, can be called into question. Since, moreover, Meifort hardly notices the problem of the

[13] No other text of Clement is in any way comparable to that of Otto Stählin, already referred to: Band I: *Protrepticus* und *Paedagogus;* Band II: *Stromata* i–vi; Band III: *Stromata* vii–viii, *Excerpta ex Theodoto, Eclogae propheticae, Quis dives salvetur, Fragmente,* Band IV: *Register.*

[14] *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria* (Oxford, 1886). Bigg does not consider the problem in detail. Clement was influenced by Plato and Philo; Philo was a Jewish Platonist and Clement was, *pari passu,* a Christian Platonist.

[15] Robert P. Casey, "Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Platonism," *Harvard Theol. Rev.,* XVIII (1925), 39–101.

[16] *Ibid.,* p. 95.

[17] *Der Platonismus bei Clemens Alexandrinus* (Tübingen, 1928).

[18] *Ibid.,* p. 93.

[19] Cf. note on his understanding of Plato (*ibid.,* p. 11).

[20] Cf. *ibid.,* pp. 79 ff., 21, 28.

sources of Clement's "Platonism," the question cannot be considered closed, and this essay need not be a work of supererogation.

II

Clement was a bookworm, with a passion for *eruditio*. A cursory glance at a few pages of Stählin's text, with its excellent notes, will immediately impress the reader with the range and variety of Clement's literary sources. I have counted a few more than 350 authors to whom Clement refers. The question at once arises: Could one man, admittedly not a great genius, have achieved so wide a range of literary acquaintance at first hand? Extreme positive and negative answers have been given. The ancient church considered him a paragon of learning.[21] This judgment has been reversed in modern times by the great Hermann Diels[22] and others, who have thought him a diligent but uncritical plagiarist. The truth, doubtless, lies between these extremes. We cannot deny that Clement made free use of the "florilegia," the anthologies and cram books of the day.[23] At the same time, we must remember that ancient authors did not have the scruples in such matters which the modern scholar affects. If the majority of Clement's citations from various authors were cribbed from anthologies, it would not affect the more important fact that he does appear to know at first hand his favorites: the Scriptures, Plato, Homer, Euripides, and Sophocles. These he quotes with a fair degree of accuracy al-

[21] Cf. *GCS*, IV (*Testimonienregister*), 59–66.

[22] *Doxographi Graeci* (2d ed.; Berlin, 1929), p. 19: "Clemens Alexandrinus ipse fur callidissimus." For a discussion of this problem see Tollinton, *Clement of Alexandria* (London, 1914), I, 155–59.

[23] Cf. *GCS*, IV (*Citatenregister*), pp. 36, 37, 44, for references to *Florilegium Monacensis* and to Stobaeus, *Eclogae*. *Str.* vi. 2, which discusses plagiarism among the Greeks, looks very much as though it was taken wholesale from a florilegium. There are ten quotations from Plato in it, in addition to references to some 67 other authors. In *Str.* v. 2 (*GCS*, II, 335, 3) Clement speaks of his own πλεῖστα φιλοτιμούμενοι συναγεῖν, which suggests that he may have been a sort of florilegist himself. In this chapter there are four citations of Plato (*Crito* 48B, *Phaedrus* 247E, *Symposium* 206C, *Theaetetus* 150BC), which have little correlation.

though his memory plays him tricks occasionally.[24] Let him who has never added an extra footnote for effect cast the first stone at Clement.

Next to Holy Writ, which is easily first among Clement's sources, stand the writings of Plato. There are some 140 direct quotations from the dialogues which were included in his *corpus Platonicum*. Besides these, Stählin has noted some 430 passages in which the thought or phrasing echoes a passage in dialogues which passed for Plato's in second-century Alexandria, and this count is not exhaustive.[25] The only genuine dialogue which Clement wholly ignores is the *Euthyphro*, a significant fact especially since the topic examined there is *θεοσέβεια*. He quotes the *Demodocus* with some misgiving;[26] there is no doubt in his mind about the apocryphal *Axiochos*.[27] His favorite quotation is from *Theaetetus* 176B, which appealed to him strongly because of the phrase *ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ*. If the undoubtedly spurious dialogues are excluded, more than two-thirds of the citations and parallels to Plato (approximately 70 per cent) are to six dialogues: *Republic*, *Laws*, *Phaedo*, *Phaedrus*, *Timaeus*, *Theaetetus*. Next most often quoted or referred to are the *Politicus*, *Gorgias*, *Symposium*, *Sophist*. Stählin finds echoes from the *Protagoras* and *Philebus*,[28] but no quotations.

[24] See below, pp. 223 f.

[25] E.g., Clement, in three separate passages defines, as the essential character of the soul, the power of self-motion (*GCS*, II, 480, 13; III, 217, 18, and 220, 17). This is more than an echo of a very important Platonic doctrine (*Laws* x. 896A: *ἡ δυναμένη αὐτὴν αὐτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν*). Stählin omits any reference to this.

[26] *GCS*, II, 59, 23–25.

[27] Directly quoted: *Alcibiades I*, *Apology*, *Axiochus*, *Cratylus*, *Crito*, *Demodocus*, *Epistles* ii, vi, vii (this Clement calls *ἡ μεγάλη ἐπιστολή* [*GCS*, II, 377, 15]), xiii, *Epinomis*, *Gorgias*, *Ion*, *Laws*, *Menexenus*, *Meno*, *Minos*, *Phaedo*, *Phaedrus*, *Politicus*, *Republic*, *Sophist*, *Symposium*, *Timaeus*, *Theages*, *Theaetetus;* echoes, but not verbatim quotations: *Alcibiades II*, *Charmides*, *Critias*, *Eryxias*, *Euthydemus*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, *Parmenides*, *Philebus*, *Protagoras*. Cf. *GCS*, IV (*Citatenregister*), 50–53, for a detailed index of the quotations from and parallels to Plato in Clement. This is an indispensable tool for any textual study of Clement's writings.

[28] In *Paedagogus* ii. 10 (*GCS*, I, 217, 20–23), Clement says: "Thus in the *Philebus* Plato, the disciple of barbarian philosophy, in mystical language calls those atheists,

Much more important than the number and distribution of Clement's quotations from and parallels to Plato is the way in which he makes his citations. A comparison of twelve of the longest quotations[29] with their originals indicates that Clement's readings are, in the main, faithful; the deviations can be explained as signs of carelessness rather than as proofs of ignorance. As a matter of fact, his citations of Plato are quite as faithful as is his use of Scripture.[30] In the parallels there are so many casual turns of phrase and thought which suggest long and intimate acquaintance with the dialogues themselves that the conclusion seems unavoidable: Clement read the Platonic dialogues at first hand.

It must be pointed out, however, that there are numerous errors in Clement's citations of Plato which are quite puzzling, although they do not require a revocation of our conclusion above. Some of these are interesting and important enough to be noted briefly. In *Stromata* i. 15[31] Clement quotes, as from Plato, a passage concerning the descent of good souls who leave the supercelestial regions and "suffer themselves to come to this Tartarus, assuming a body [*σῶμα ἀναλαβούσας*]. Thus they share in all the evils which are involved in birth because of their concern for the race of men." This citation, which I cannot locate

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who harm or pollute the god within them, the Logos, by participating in vice." This is certainly not in the *Philebus*. Stählin suggests *Rep.* viii. 549B; a closer parallel is *Rep.* ix. 589E, where vice is said to enslave *τὸ ἐαυτοῦ θειότατον*.

[29] *Theaetetus* 173C–174A (*GCS*, II, 391, 7–18); *Sophist* 246AB (*GCS*, II, 120, 8–15); *Laws* 630BC (*GCS*, II, 125, 7–13); *Politicus* 273BC (*GCS*, II, 204, 24–30); *Phaedo* 69CD (*GCS*, II, 59, 13 f., 16–20); *Republic* 328D–329C (*GCS*, II, 204, 10–14); *Rep.* 475DE (*GCS*, II, 59, 26—60, 4); *Rep.* 615E (*GCS*, II, 385, 27—386, 4); *Laws* 742E (*GCS*, II, 124, 8–12); *Epistle* vii. 341CD (*GCS*, II, 377, 15–19); *Laws* 838E–839A (*GCS*, I, 212, 3–5, 7, 12); *Phaedrus* 250BC (*GCS*, II, 419, 24—420, 8).

[30] Cf. the quotation of Mark 10:17–31 in *Quis dives salvetur* (*GCS*, III, 162, 19—163, 12); for discussion of this passage see P. M. Barnard, *The Biblical Text of Clement of Alexandria* in *Texts and Studies* (Cambridge, 1899), V, 32 ff., and also see comments of F. C. Burkitt, *Texts and Studies*, pp. i–xii. For another example cf. *Str.* v. 5 (*GCS*, II, 344, 5 f.). Here Clement says that the Word (Scripture?) says that tax-gatherers can hardly be saved; is this his understanding of Matt. 19:23?

[31] *GCS*, II, 42, 13–18.

in Plato, is joined to another, this one genuine, from *Timaeus* 47B, and the whole passage makes it clear that the coupling is not an accident. The significance of such a misrepresentation is that Clement apparently felt no incongruity in putting Pythagorean words in Plato's mouth.[32] Another curious blunder is to be found in *Stromata* v. 14,[33] where Clement cites a verselet of Parmenides concerning the transcendence of God and says it is to be found in Plato's *Sophist*. There is a verselet of Parmenides quoted twice in the *Sophist* (237A and 258D), but it is not the same as Clement's. The citation in Clement is listed by Diels as Fragment 8; obviously it deals with the Eleatic One and not God, as Clement takes it.[34] There are two references to Plato's Περὶ ψυχῆ, but the references are to different dialogues.[35] These and similar lapses[36] suggest two conclusions with respect to Clement's use of his Platonic texts. In the first place, he often quotes them from memory; in the second place, his cavalier handling of them does not indicate the disciple, treating the master's sayings with loving care, but rather the use of prooftexts to confirm views already held on other authority.

[32] Is it merely a stab in the dark to suppose that this might be a Pythagorean gloss on *Phaedr.* 248C–249C?

[33] *GCS*, II, 402, 6–9.

[34] For translation and commentary see F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides* (New York, 1939), pp. 36 f.

[35] *Str.* i. 15 (*GCS*, II, 43, 8–10) parallels *Rep.* 617D; *Str.* v. 8 (*GCS*, II, 362, 7–9) parallels the *Phaedr.* 247B.

[36] Sometimes Clement announces as a direct quotation what is really a mere paraphrase (e.g., *Str.* v. 14 [*GCS*, II, 418, 11–14]). Much more often he quotes Plato verbatim without acknowledgment, which shows that his use of Plato is not primarily for show of learning (e.g., *Str.* v. 1 [*GCS*, II, 332, 5–13], a mixed quotation from *Timaeus* 220E; note Clement's ἡμῖν for Plato's ὑμῖν). Cf., e.g., also *Paedagogus* i. 4 (*GCS*, I, 96, 19–21), an unacknowledged quotation from *Laws* vii. 808D; *Paedagogus*, 8 (*GCS*, I, 130, 14 f.). Examples of other lapses are *Str.* i. 8 (*GCS*, II, 26, 2 f.); *Str.* i. 11 (*GCS*, II, 33, 17); and *Str.* v. 9 (*GCS*, II, 365, 23). This last is interesting since Clement speaks of Plato's story "of the war between the Atlantini and the Athenians in the *Atlanticum*." Could it be that *Timaeus* 1–25 was circulated in Clement's time as a separate dialogue? The same story is introduced in the *Critias* 108E *et. seq.*

III

Let us now pass beyond the stage of textual analysis and ask the complex but more fundamental question: What relation exists between the ideas of the two men? On the evidence presented so far, we can see that Clement makes free and extensive use of Plato. But in what sense are his own ideas "Platonic"?

Throughout his writings Clement speaks of Plato in terms of warm approval.[37] He defends him from the "misrepresentations" of his thought by some of the Gnostics.[38] One fails to discover in all of Clement's writings any positive rebuke of Plato.

Clement and Plato have, as a broad common ground, the basic intellectual forms of Greek culture. They both assume, as axiomatic, the concept of nature as an organic whole.[39] The world, though complex, is intelligible in its deepest reality, and man has, in some degree or other, the capacity for coming to a knowledge of this intelligible world. And what is more significant, this idea of *κόσμος* had a deeply moral signification which invests the quest for knowledge with a basic religious meaning.[40] That knowledge of and wisdom about this world-order was a fundamental concern of Plato can be seen from every one of the

[37] Cf. *Paed.* ii. 3 (*GCS*, I, 178, 27): *ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ* Πλάτωνα *ἀποδέχομαι*. He calls him *ὁ πάντα ἄριστος* (*Paed.* iii. 11 [*GCS*, I, 267, 20]); *ὁ καλός* (*Paed.* ii. 10 [*GCS*, I, 212, 8]); *ὁ φιλαλήθης* (*Str.* i. 8 (*GCS*, II, 28, 3]); *Str.* v. 8 (*GCS*, II, 370, 20); *Str.* v. 12 (*GCS*, II, 377, 27); *οἷον θεοφορούμενος*, *Str.* i. 8 (*GCS*, II, 28, 4). He thinks him a great nature, with controlled passions, who somehow hit the target of truth (*Str.* ii. 19 [*GCS*, II, 168, 1 f.)]; this is, incidentally, a comment of Philo concerning Moses (*De vita Mos.* i. 22), which Clement applies to Plato.

[38] *Str.* iii, 2 (*GCS*, II, 200, 16) where Clement "explains" Plato's community of wives in contradistinction to the literal interpretation of Carpocrates; *Str.* iii. 3 (*GCS*, II, 200, 28—201, 5), where Plato is defended from Marcion's dualistic interpretation of him.

[39] This is the consistent theme of Greek philosophy from its beginnings. The pre-Socratics entitled their treatises *περὶ φύσεως*; cf. A. O. Lovejoy, "The Meaning of *φύσις* in the Greek Physiologers," in *Philos. Rev.*, XVIII (1909), 369 ff.

[40] That this is an old and important idea in Greek philosophic thought cf. W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (Oxford, 1939), p. 158.

later dialogues[41] and is hinted at in many another of the earlier ones. In Clement it is never quite so explicit but it is equally omnipresent.[42] There are important differences in interpretation which we shall consider later, but it is of utmost importance to see the far-reaching unity of point of view which this cosmological axiom afforded to both Plato and Clement.

Another important concept which Clement seems, in the main, to have shared with Plato is the moral significance of the soul.[43] Clement's definition of soul closely parallels that of Plato,[44] and although he seems to have, strangely enough, denied the pre-existence of human souls,[45] the nature, capacities, and destiny of the human soul is a central issue in his thought, as it obviously was in Plato's. Probably Orphic in origin, this concern for the well-being of the soul had become a common feature of Greek religious philosophy.[46]

[41] An exposition and defense of the interpretation of Plato which is presupposed in this essay is, for obvious reasons, out of the question here. A sufficient clue to it may be the confession that it begins by accepting the chronological analysis of the dialogues first proposed by Campbell, *Sophist* and *Politicus* (London, 1867), and worked out in detail by Constantin Ritter, *Platon* (München: Vol. I, 1910; Vol. II, 1923). Further, it regards the dialogues written after the *Parmenides* as being, on the whole, more important for Plato's own philosophy than those prior to it. Too much can be made of such an arbitrary distinction (e.g., the extreme views of Burnet, *Platonism* [Berkeley, 1928]). A brief but able exposition of the general point of view assumed here is R. L. Calhoun, "Plato as Religious Realist," in *Religious Realism*, ed. D. C. Macintosh (New York, 1931), pp. 195–251; a slight reserve with respect to Plato's idea of God will be indicated below (pp. 229 f.). Despite such professed allegiance, it is hoped that the ultimate ground for the views of Plato here proposed are based on the dialogues themselves. The texts of the "Loeb Classical Library" have been used throughout.

[42] Stählin notes 61 instances of *κόσμος* used in the sense indicated (*GCS*, IV, 519–20); cf., e.g., the long discussion on the source and nature of the world (*Str.* v. 14 [*GCS*, II, 386–97]), where Clement collects the testimony of the philosophers in confirmation of his own view. Again, *Str.* vii. 3 (*GCS*, III, 12, 24—13, 26), where the Gnostic conforms to the order in all things (cf. esp. *GCS*, III, 13, 25–26). In the opening section of the *Protrep.* (*GCS*, I, 5, 33—6, 1) is a beautiful figure of the Logos who composed "the entire creation into melodious order and tuned into concert the discord of the elements, that the whole universe might be in harmony with it." The case is the same with the concept of *φύσις* (*GCS*, IV, 801–2).

[43] For the source and importance of this idea see Jaeger, *op. cit.*, pp. 164 ff.

[44] See above, pp. 6 f.

[45] *Str.* iii. 13 (*GCS*, II, 238–39); *Ecl. Proph.* (*GCS*, III, 141, 19 f.).

[46] Cf. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, pp. 164–68.

Again and again Clement appeals to Plato's authority,[47] but there is a curious absence of any sense of discipleship. The fact is that, throughout, it is more true that Clement uses Plato than that he seeks to learn from him. Clement has read Plato at first hand, but he has interpreted what he has read from his own preconceived point of view. The result is that he ignores just those elements which are crucial for the Plato of the later dialogues. He is interested in the *Timaeus* mainly because he sees a parallel between the Demiurgos and the Logos-Christ. His favorite quotation is from *Theaetetus*,[48] but there is no equal interest in the epistemological problems which constitute the real theme of the dialogue. His chapters on number-symbolism[49] reveal how little there is in Clement of the objective, scientific, mathematical interests of Plato. The last book of the *Stromateis*[50] pretends to treat logical questions but is, for the most part, pompous and obscure jargon. The master of the Academy—mathematician, logician, and ethical philosopher par excellence—does not appear in Clement, and no multiplication of references alters the fact that Clement takes from Plato only that which he wishes to find, that which is in accord with a position derived in part from his hellenistic education and in part from his Christian convictions.

What this position is and how it compares with the developed thought of Plato will appear from a consideration of a few of the crucial elements in Clement's "system." Let us begin with the conception of God, the *fons et origo* of any religious thought. There are many passages in Clement which expound the doc-

[47] E.g., the doctrine of matter as "non-being"; cf. *Str.* v. 14 (*GCS*, II, 385, 5–16) with *Timaeus* 48BC and *Sophist* 258DE; rejection of terminism, cf. *Str.* i. 10 (*GCS*, II, 31, 22–27) with *Politicus* 261E and *Theaet.* 184BC; the limitations of the written word, cf. *Str.* v. 11 (*GCS*, II, 377, 15–19) with *Ep.* vii. 341CD. In *Str.* v. 14, Clement speaks of Plato's "exhibition of the Christian life" (*GCS*, II, 391, 5 ff.; cf. *Theaet.* 173C–174A).

[48] 176B. This passage is, significantly enough, a part of an excursus in the dialogue not directly related to the epistemological theme (cf. A. E. Taylor, *Plato* [New York, 1936], pp. 334–36).

[49] *Str.* vi. 11, 16.

[50] Cf. esp. chap. xv.

later dialogues[41] and is hinted at in many another of the earlier ones. In Clement it is never quite so explicit but it is equally omnipresent.[42] There are important differences in interpretation which we shall consider later, but it is of utmost importance to see the far-reaching unity of point of view which this cosmological axiom afforded to both Plato and Clement.

Another important concept which Clement seems, in the main, to have shared with Plato is the moral significance of the soul.[43] Clement's definition of soul closely parallels that of Plato,[44] and although he seems to have, strangely enough, denied the pre-existence of human souls,[45] the nature, capacities, and destiny of the human soul is a central issue in his thought, as it obviously was in Plato's. Probably Orphic in origin, this concern for the well-being of the soul had become a common feature of Greek religious philosophy.[46]

[41] An exposition and defense of the interpretation of Plato which is presupposed in this essay is, for obvious reasons, out of the question here. A sufficient clue to it may be the confession that it begins by accepting the chronological analysis of the dialogues first proposed by Campbell, *Sophist* and *Politicus* (London, 1867), and worked out in detail by Constantin Ritter, *Platon* (München: Vol. I, 1910; Vol. II, 1923). Further, it regards the dialogues written after the *Parmenides* as being, on the whole, more important for Plato's own philosophy than those prior to it. Too much can be made of such an arbitrary distinction (e.g., the extreme views of Burnet, *Platonism* [Berkeley, 1928]). A brief but able exposition of the general point of view assumed here is R. L. Calhoun, "Plato as Religious Realist," in *Religious Realism*, ed. D. C. Macintosh (New York, 1931), pp. 195–251; a slight reserve with respect to Plato's idea of God will be indicated below (pp. 229 f.). Despite such professed allegiance, it is hoped that the ultimate ground for the views of Plato here proposed are based on the dialogues themselves. The texts of the "Loeb Classical Library" have been used throughout.

[42] Stählin notes 61 instances of *κόσμος* used in the sense indicated (*GCS*, IV, 519–20); cf., e.g., the long discussion on the source and nature of the world (*Str.* v. 14 [*GCS*, II, 386–97]), where Clement collects the testimony of the philosophers in confirmation of his own view. Again, *Str.* vii. 3 (*GCS*, III, 12, 24—13, 26), where the Gnostic conforms to the order in all things (cf. esp. *GCS*, III, 13, 25–26). In the opening section of the *Protrep.* (*GCS*, I, 5, 33—6, 1) is a beautiful figure of the Logos who composed "the entire creation into melodious order and tuned into concert the discord of the elements, that the whole universe might be in harmony with it." The case is the same with the concept of *φύσις* (*GCS*, IV, 801–2).

[43] For the source and importance of this idea see Jaeger, *op. cit.*, pp. 164 ff.

[44] See above, pp. 6 f.

[45] *Str.* iii. 13 (*GCS*, II, 238–39); *Ecl. Proph.* (*GCS*, III, 141, 19 f.).

[46] Cf. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, pp. 164–68.

Again and again Clement appeals to Plato's authority,[47] but there is a curious absence of any sense of discipleship. The fact is that, throughout, it is more true that Clement uses Plato than that he seeks to learn from him. Clement has read Plato at first hand, but he has interpreted what he has read from his own preconceived point of view. The result is that he ignores just those elements which are crucial for the Plato of the later dialogues. He is interested in the *Timaeus* mainly because he sees a parallel between the Demiurgos and the Logos-Christ. His favorite quotation is from *Theaetetus*,[48] but there is no equal interest in the epistemological problems which constitute the real theme of the dialogue. His chapters on number-symbolism[49] reveal how little there is in Clement of the objective, scientific, mathematical interests of Plato. The last book of the *Stromateis*[50] pretends to treat logical questions but is, for the most part, pompous and obscure jargon. The master of the Academy—mathematician, logician, and ethical philosopher par excellence—does not appear in Clement, and no multiplication of references alters the fact that Clement takes from Plato only that which he wishes to find, that which is in accord with a position derived in part from his hellenistic education and in part from his Christian convictions.

What this position is and how it compares with the developed thought of Plato will appear from a consideration of a few of the crucial elements in Clement's "system." Let us begin with the conception of God, the *fons et origo* of any religious thought. There are many passages in Clement which expound the doc-

[47] E.g., the doctrine of matter as "non-being"; cf. *Str.* v. 14 (*GCS*, II, 385, 5–16) with *Timaeus* 48BC and *Sophist* 258DE; rejection of terminism, cf. *Str.* i. 10 (*GCS*, II, 31, 22–27) with *Politicus* 261E and *Theaet.* 184BC; the limitations of the written word, cf. *Str.* v. 11 (*GCS*, II, 377, 15–19) with *Ep.* vii. 341CD. In *Str.* v. 14, Clement speaks of Plato's "exhibition of the Christian life" (*GCS*, II, 391, 5 ff.; cf. *Theaet.* 173C–174A).

[48] 176B. This passage is, significantly enough, a part of an excursus in the dialogue not directly related to the epistemological theme (cf. A. E. Taylor, *Plato* [New York, 1936], pp. 334–36).

[49] *Str.* vi. 11, 16.

[50] Cf. esp. chap. xv.

trine of divine transcendence. The formal statement of this idea[51] begins with a well-known quotation from the *Timaeus:* "To discover the Father and Maker of this universe would be a task indeed and if he were discovered it would be impossible to speak of him to all men."[52] Clement then goes on to speak of God as the One, Indivisible, Infinite, without form and name. Such names as "the One" or "the Good" or "Mind" or "Absolute Being" or "Father" or "God" or "Creator" or "Lord" are not properly to be used as predicates but as mere *ἐνδεικτικά* of Omnipotent Power. This is the formal language of transcendence, which may be duplicated in Philo,[53] Moderatus,[54] Plutarch,[55] and others in the "Platonic" tradition. In the *Protrepticus* God is called the "the good Monad."[56] In the *Paedagogus,* Clement outdoes himself by declaring that God is "beyond the One and above the Monad itself."[57]

Despite the frequency of such assertions of transcendence, there is another and even more important phase to Clement's thought about God. Clement's interest in God was first and last religious. The supreme truth about God is, indeed, that he is related to human life and that knowledge of him and growth in likeness to him are possible as the *summum bonum* of the Christian life.[58] When Clement is speaking of religious experi-

[51] *Str.* v. 12 (*GCS,* II, 377–80).

[52] 28C. This is another favorite Platonic text of Clement's. Other quotations of it are in *Prot.* vi (*GCS,* I, 51, 28–30); *Str.* v, 14 (*GCS,* II, 386, 25 f.). There are indirect references in *Str.* v. 13 (*GCS,* II, 383, 5 f.); *Str.* v. 14 (*GCS,* II, 416, 17); *Str.* v. 14 (*GCS, II, 418, 10 f.).*

[53] E. R. Goodenough, *By Light, Light* (New Haven, 1935), pp. 11–30.

[54] Cf. E. R. Dodds, "The *Parmenides* and the Origin of the Neo-Platonic 'One,'" *Class. Quart.,* XXII (1928), 129–42. Dodds attempts to show that Moderatus, a Neo-Pythagorean of the first century A.D., was a significant link between Plato and Plotinus in interpretation of the One as Ultimate Being.

[55] R. M. Jones, *The Platonism of Plutarch* (Chicago, 1916), pp. 9–12.

[56] 9 (*GCS,* I, 65, 30 f.). This typically Pythagorean expression for the Ultimate is repeated in five other places in Clement's writings (cf. *GCS,* IV, 571).

[57] i. 8 (*GCS,* I, 131, 18 f.).

[58] *Quis dives salvetur,* 7 (*GCS,* III, 164, 14–23).

ence he repeatedly uses terms about God which involve inevitably a certain kind of immanence, although he expressly guards against pantheism.[59] To the hellenistic concept of God as pure Being, Clement adds the Hebraic notion, transmitted to him through the Christian tradition, of God as Creative Will.[60] Not only so, but men may become like him, ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ.[61] The concept of divine transcendence serves, after a fashion, to protect God from responsibility for this present evil world. When a formal statement of his doctrine of God is called for, Clement is prepared to offer one which rivals any and all the contemporary doctrines of transcendence. When it comes to a religious interpretation of this doctrine, however, there appears in Clement's writings the Christian Father-God, crucially related to the world-order and, particularly, to human salvation. Aloofness and accessibility are to be affirmed together.

Such a doctrine has certain obvious Platonic affinities. There are Plato's "articles of faith": "that God is good and the sole author of good to men and that he never changes or deceives."[62] This is a theological axiom with Clement.[63] At the same time it is clear that we are not here dealing with a replica of Plato's theology. One must speak softly in any discussion of this sort, if for no other reason than that Plato himself does not speak clearly. It is difficult to understand how anyone can regard Plato as a monotheist.[64] The Demiurgos of the *Timaeus* is hardly a religious object;[65] the "best soul" of the *Laws* is *primus inter pares;* "the cause of the Mixture" in the *Philebus* is telic but not

[59] *Str.* ii. 16 (*GCS*, II, 152, 6 f.).

[60] *Str.* vi. 12 (*GCS*, II, 484, 22–28); cf. also *Str.* i. 5 (*GCS*, II, 17, 35–36).

[61] This is, perhaps, the axis around which the whole of Clement's thought turns; this is the end of salvation; this is the culmination of the process of γνῶσις (*GCS*, IV, 398–99, 596).

[62] *Rep.* ii. 379BD.

[63] *Str.* i. 17 (*GCS*, II, 54, 14–16); *Str.* v. 14 (*GCS*, II, 418, 12–14).

[64] *Cf.* Burnet, *op. cit.*, *p. 118.*

[65] F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (New York, 1937), pp. 34 ff.

personal; and the idea of the Good in the *Republic* and *Phaedo* cannot be simply identified with the gods of the other dialogues. The *locus classicus* of Plato's theology is *Laws* x;[66] there is here little more than a refutation of materialism, atheism, and the thought that the gods are indifferent to human weal or can be bribed. Plato was a devoutly religious man, but it does not follow from this that he was a Christian, or even a Neo-Platonist! After the decline of classical philosophy, the Aristotelian concept of a transcendent God was fused with the Platonic concept of a benevolent one. Clement's thought had been formed in the matrix of this eclectic religious philosophy, but his Christian convictions had transformed his thinking, especially in the matter of explaining how God is related to and involved in human salvation.

There is hardly a place in Plato for a hypostatic concept of Reason. For Philo, whose Hebraic tradition emphasized the voluntaristic aspect of God's nature, the case is quite different. God is transcendent, but is related to the world by a multitude of intermediary powers, the chief of which is the Logos. Clement, like Philo, belongs to a tradition which emphasizes God's relatedness to the world, but with a profound difference. This difference, of course, lies in Clement's conception of Jesus Christ as the incarnation of Reason and Truth and saving power. This immediate, historic revelation is the essence of the Christian εὐαγγέλιον,[67] which is now the unique possession of God's "new people."[68] Clement uses conventional trinitarian language, but he does not hesitate to "confound the persons or to divide the substance."[69] There is a taint of docetism in Clement,[70] but his

[66] It is interesting to note that Clement has only two quotations from and nine parallels to this book.

[67] Cf. *GCS*, IV (*Wort- und Sachregister*), 429.

[68] For Clement's ideas about the Christians as ὁ λάος ὁ καινὸς καὶ νέος cf. *Paed.* i. 7 (*GCS*, I, 124, 14—125, 1).

[69] *Protrep.* i (*GCS*, I, 9, 9 ff.).

[70] Cf. *Quis dives salvetur*, l. 6 (*GCS*, III, 164, 6 f.); but match this with l. 32.

Christology is still traditional enough to mark him off from Philo, the Stoics,[71] or the "heroes" of the mystery cults.

At another crucial point Clement and Plato differ more fundamentally than they agree, namely, as to the nature and conditions of knowledge. Plato's epistemology is a matter of age-old dispute. It is possible, from the *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, and *Republic* vi, to make out a mystical theory of knowledge based on the concept of "a two-storied universe." Plato's developed thought, however, goes beyond this; there is no rejection of his primary interests in ethical values, but there is a marked emphasis upon logical and scientific inquiry. We know that the Academy's curriculum emphasized logic, mathematics, astronomy, and cosmology. Higher mathematics becomes a means of approaching the ultimate sanction of ethics, as we know from the reports on Plato's famous lecture on "the Good." Meifort, following Cassirer and Hoffman, seems almost to make Plato a Neo-Kantian; this is caricature, but it serves to remind one that the "mystic Plato" is a historic fiction. Plato's epistemology is directed at those permanent and valid relations between real entities which insure the truth of definitions, classification, and dialectic. In the *Parmenides* he rejects any naïve *Zweiweltenlehre*, and in the succeeding dialogues the theory of forms, although never explicitly stated, tends toward the view that "forms" are neither wholly separate from nor wholly immersed in the flux of perceptible things.[72]

Clement talks a great deal about knowledge, but it is quickly apparent that his words mean something quite different from Plato's. For Plato ἐπιστημή is reserved for wholly rational apprehension, the clearest example of which is the certainty which obtains in mathematical relations.[73] Anything less precise than

[71] E.g., *Str.* v. 1 (*GCS*, II, 329, 20–21), where ὁ λόγος προφορικός is rejected as modalistic.

[72] Cf. F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides*, p. 100, and Calhoun, *op. cit.*, pp. 226 f.

[73] Cf. the account of the works of reason in *Tim.* 30C–37C, and especially 37BC; see important comments on Plato's mathematics in Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, pp. 41–97;

clear and rational insight is δόξα,[74] either at the level of εἰκασία or at the somewhat higher level of πίστις.[75] In Clement ἐπιστημή is never used with the same stringency as in Plato. By comparison, his epistemology is quite naïve. His interest in the problem of knowledge is almost solely a religious one; hence he regularly prefers the term γνῶσις. It is with the regulative principle of Christian life that he is concerned. He is aware of the problems posed by skepticism,[76] but they do not destroy his preoccupation with the dream of the transformation of life by its progressive exaltation in the "knowledge" of God. It is here that we find the clue to Clement's delighted repetition of Plato's phrase, ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ.[77] This, together with the similar passage in *Laws*,[78] were prime favorites with the later "Platonists," but they were capable of meaning different things to different men. With Plato himself it is clear that the chief connotation of the phrase is the life of reason which, for him, is the life of true virtue. Clement reverses this relation. The life of ethical perfection is the life of reason. Hence, ὁμοίωσις invariably is discussed in terms of growth in Christian grace and love. The difference can be seen at a glance by a comparison of *Theaetetus* 176B and *Stromata* vii. 3.[79] Plato says: ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. Clement's γνωστικῆς ἐξομοιώσεως κάνονες are, likewise, threefold. They are ἡμερότης, φιλανθρωπία, and μεγαλοπρεπὴς θεοσέβεια. There is more difference here than nuance of phrasing. Ἡμερότης for Clement is a less rational and more emotional term than δίκαιον is for Plato. It might best

see also *Philebus* 55C–59D and *Epinomis* 976A–979D; cf. Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 503–16, 390–91, 320–48.

[74] Cf. *Sophist* 260A–261B.

[75] Πίστις is a judgment which may be sincere but is not certain; cf. *Rep.* vi. 511E. Shorey is right, I think, in claiming that πίστις never means, for Plato, "trust" or "commitment" (as in the later Christian sense of *fiducia*); cf. his note on the passage above (*Rep.* ["Loeb Classical Library"] ii. 117 and 205).

[76] Cf. *Str.* viii. 7 (*GCS*, III, 93–94).

[77] *Theaet.* 176B.

[78] iv. 716AD; cf. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 474.

[79] *GCS*, III, 10, 26–27.

be translated by Schweitzer's phrase, "reverence for life."[80] *Φιλανθρωπία* is more than conformity to divine law, which is what *ὅσιον* denotes. It is, indeed, a characteristic of God[81] and is the basis of man's social life; it might be paraphrased as "active love for persons." The third terms in these two trinities are significant. *Φρόνησις* is the supreme virtue of the cool head; *μεγαλοπρεπὴς θεοσέβεια* is the spontaneous response of the warm heart to the love of God. It is, however, worth mentioning that neither for Plato nor for Clement has this "assimilation to God" anything ecstatic or esoteric about it. There are many other similar passages in which the ethical character of this notion may be found.[82] In Clement's thought about the ground of the concept of Christian perfection Gen. 1:16 is clearly of more fundamental importance than *Theaetetus* 176B.[83]

We have already said that Clement's doctrine of knowledge is rooted in this yearning for salvation.[84] *Γνῶσις*, not *ἐπιστημή*, is his concern. But this gnosis is the end point of a process, the beginning of which is faith. As in almost all Christian literature from the Fourth Gospel on,[85] *πίστις* has a double meaning for Clement. There is, in the first place, the meaning of intellectual assent (this does not correspond altogether to *πίστις* in Plato). The most consistent and important connotation of *πίστις* for Clement, however, is commitment.[86] The object of faith is God

[80] Cf. "The Ethics of Reverence for Life," *Christendom*, I (1936), 238–39. For Clement's interpretation of a similar idea, see *Str.* ii. 18 (*GCS*, II, 162, 13–19); note that Clement refers to Pythagoras as having had a similar concept.

[81] Cf. *Quis dives salvetur*, 3 (*GCS*, III, 161, 30); *Str.* vii. 14 (*GCS*, III, 61, 17); see further *GCS*, IV, 786.

[82] *Paed.* i. 11 (*GCS*, I, 149, 21–22); *Protrep.* 11 (*GCS*, I, 82, 19–27); *Str.* ii. 19 (*GCS*, II, 166, 1–5 ff.), where it is urged that assimilation involves self-restraint, fortitude, righteous living, purity, generosity, and benevolence; *Str.* ii. 22 (*GCS*, II, 187, 3–10), it is identified with the life *πρὸς τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον*.

[83] Cf., e.g., *GCS*, IV (*Citatenregister*), 1, 1.

[84] *Str.* iv. 22 (*GCS*, II, 308, 25—309, 6).

[85] Cf. W. H. P. Hatch, *The Idea of Faith in Christian Literature* (Strasbourg, 1925), pp. 37 ff.

[86] Cf. *Str.* vii. 10 (*GCS*, III, 42, 3–15); see also W. R. Inge, *Faith and Its Psychology* (New York, 1910), pp. 25–30.

or, alternatively, Jesus Christ, the Logos of God. In any case, faith in this sense has a knowledge value. To believe in the Logos-Christ is an act of faith; its immediate consequence is progress in γνῶσις.[87] Indeed, in one place Clement speaks of τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν πίστιν.[88] There is a progress in faith, which overpasses opinion, proceeds toward, and finally reposes in truth.[89] Again and again,[90] Clement speaks of knowledge in terms which echo Plato, but always with an obvious difference of meaning. The goal of the Gnostic is not knowledge, in the scientific sense, but rather salvation.[91] The items of the intellectual life are, for Clement, always suffused with religious feeling.

Meifort magnifies unduly the contrast between Clement and Plato on the question of the body-soul problem, principally because he too closely identifies Clement and Paul at this point.[92] Neither Plato nor Clement thought of the body as evil in itself, but both taught that the body ought to be subordinated as the proper organ of the soul. The gist of the long description of the fashioning of the body in the *Timaeus* is that, by design, it should be "the vehicle of the soul."[93] Similarly, in more than one place, Clement speaks of the body as the inferior but necessary organ of the life of the whole man.[94] The difference between Clement and Plato at this point is one both of emphasis and of object. Plato mistrusts the body because its αἰσθήσεις give

[87] *Str.* v. 1 (*GCS*, II, 326, 3–20).

[88] *Str.* viii. 3 (*GCS*, III, 82, 17).

[89] *Str.* ii. 4 (*GCS*, II, 119, 20–26).

[90] *Str.* ii. 23 (*GCS*, II, 312, 21–31); *Str.* vi. 12 (*GCS*, II, 482, 1–7); *Str.* vi. 17 (*GCS*, II, 510–11); and *Str.* ii. 17 (*GCS*, II, 152–53).

[91] *Str.* iv. 22 (*GCS*, II, 308, 29–30); γνῶσις τοῦ θεοῦ is exactly equivalent to σωτηρία ἡ αἰώνια.

[92] *Op. cit.*, pp. 21 ff. How far Paul's body-soul dualism went is a matter of controversy; in any case he is more of a "rigorist" than Clement (cf. K. E. Kirk, *The Vision of* God [London, 1932], pp. 80 f., 316 f.).

[93] 69C.

[94] *Paed.* ii. 4 (*GCS*, I, 182, 26 f.); *Str.* vii. 11 (*GCS*, III, 45, 4–5); *Str.* iv. 26 (*GCS*, II, 321, 16–24); *Paed.* i. 13 (*GCS*, I, 151, 22); the body is συμφὸς καὶ συναγωνιστός to the soul; cf. *To the Newly Baptized* (*GCS*, III, 222, 23—223, 20), one of the finest bits in Clement.

only appearance and not reality. Knowledge is direct rational insight, and sensual pleasures or pains hinder this.[95] Clement, not nearly so concerned with scientific error, is aware that the passions and feelings of the body may corrupt the soul's desire for perfection. Therefore, the body must be rigidly controlled. The object of the body's subordination is, for Plato, ἐπιστημή; for Clement, γνῶσις.

Clement refused to abandon the term "gnosis" to the heretics. Indeed, he deliberately sets forth his ideal of perfection in his description of "the Christian Gnostic."[96] Here again we see much that is similar to and much that is different from Plato. Clement compares the Christian Gnostic to Plato's philosopher in their superiority to external circumstance.[97] Both belong to the élite and are far superior to the average man. In Plato this aristocratism issues in a genuine snobbery.[98] In Clement, however, the Gnostic must be perfected in love, which makes him a true brother to the simplest believer.[99] Plato's philosopher is a critical, objective man of science, who feels deeply his responsibility for social well-being but whose greatest joy is the life of the mind.[100] Clement's Gnostic is, for all his ἀπάθεια,[101] an ardent soul. He is not an intellectual but a devotee, not a rationalist but a man of "splendid piety."[102]

In the sphere of ethics, the transformation of hellenistic thought by Clement's Christian faith is clearly seen, as Meifort has rightly urged.[103] Plato's is an autonomous ethic, although it

[95] Note, in the hierarchy of values in the *Philebus* 62C–67B, that the pleasures allowed are almost exclusively intellectual.

[96] *Str.* vii; see esp. chaps. viii–xiv.

[97] Cf. the long quotation in *Str.* v. 14 (*GCS*, II, 391, 7–18) with *Theaet.* 173C–174A. This is also an interesting example of Clement's use of his sources.

[98] In *Phaed.* 248E the δημοτικός is next to the lowest of all souls.

[99] *Str.* vii. 12 (*GCS*, III, 49, 21–25).

[100] *Epistle* vii betrays Plato's sense of frustration at his taste of practical affairs at Syracuse.

[101] *Str.* vii. 14 (*GCS*, III, 60, 5). This is a case of borrowed rhetoric, as an examination of the passage will show.

[102] Μεγαλοπρεπὴς θεοσέβεια; see above, p. 232. [103] *Op. cit.*, pp. 27 ff.

is anything but anthropocentric. Its ultimate sanction is the form of the Good, and it is man's task to achieve and merit the rewards of the good life through the practice of virtue and the lifelong search for wisdom. For Clement, and for all Christians, there is what Meifort calls *eine Gnadenbewusstsein*.[104] The Christian ethic is theonomous; the virtues of the good life are not the way to salvation but rather the fruits of a life permeated by divine grace.[105] Salvation is a gift of God.[106] Man, however, remains free to accept or reject God's proffered blessings, "to choose between judgment [κρίσιν] or grace [χάριν]."[107] God never violates man's moral agency,[108] but it is not man who creates the initiative. God's evangelist is the Logos, calling men to repentance and offering them forgiveness of sins.[109] Such terms have no parallels in Plato. Repentance there is of a sort,[110] but not in the sense of contrition. There is no "forgiveness of sins," since that would involve indulgence with respect to the consequences of sin.[111] But for Clement the gospel is "good news," that life could be renewed[112] in fresh experiences of conscious reconciliation to God.

IV

Perhaps through this process of sampling of passages and ideas, enough has been said to establish the conclusion that Clement's "Platonism" is neither a direct nor a faithful reproduction of the Plato we know, either from the later dialogues or

[104] *Str.* iv. 9 (*GCS*, II, 282, 8–14).

[105] *Protrep.* 10 (*GCS*, I, 76, 23—77, 2).

[106] *Quis dives salvetur* 10 (*GCS*, III, 165, 28 ff.).

[107] *Protrep.* 12 (*GCS*, I, 86, 29).

[108] Cf. *Quis dives salvetur* 10 (*GCS*, III, 166, 1 ff.) and 21 (*GCS*, III, 173, 18–20).

[109] *Str.* ii. 3 (*GCS*, II, 118, 31—119, 3); *Protrep.* 10 (*GCS*, I, 67, 31).

[110] *Rep.* 577E; note the term μεταμέλεια; cf. Astius, *Lexicon Platonicum* (2d ed.; Berlin, 1908), II, 319.

[111] Cf. the prayer, in *Critias* 106A, that penalties be imposed for sin; cf. also *Laws* 860B f.

[112] *Protrep.* 11 (*GCS*, I, 81, 32—82, 8); *Str.* vi. 12 (*GCS*, II, 483, 6–13); *Paed.* i. 6 (*GCS*, I, 120, 19); *Str.* ii. 12, 13 (*GCS*, II, 143, 6–29); cf. *GCS*, IV (*Wort- und Sachregister*), 429: εὐαγγέλιον.

from Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.[113] At the same time, it is important to observe that Clement's estimate and use of Plato give no indication that he was aware of any distortion or novelty in his interpretation either of the man or of the dialogues. This suggests inevitably that Clement understood Plato in accordance with views long current in Alexandria and the hellenistic world. Now, we know that from the time of Antiochus of Askalon, the Academy had been noted for its eclectic religious thought[114] and had been deeply influenced by Pythagorean religious and ethical ideas, on the one hand, and by the Oriental mysteries, on the other.[115] This religious Platonism undergoes manifold modifications at the hands of such men as Philo, Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, Celsus, and also Numenius of Apamea.[116] It is difficult to resist the hypothesis that Clement, before his conversion to Christianity, had been deeply influenced by this general form of interpretation.

It is easy to see how such a tradition appealed to Clement.[117] He was an avowed eclectic himself.[118] His greatest ambition was to show the unity of the truth of the Christian faith and that of

[113] Thus far I would agree with Meifort's conclusion (*op. cit.*, pp. 92–93). However, the contrast is not the simple one of the paganism of Plato and the Christian faith of Clement. Although Clement's Plato was different from the man we know, he was a very real and important religious forerunner who had given a pre-Christian "exhibition of the Christian life," an "exhibition of the Father and the Son" and a "demonstration of freewill," who had been a foremost recipient of that truth of God which had been vouchsafed to the Greeks (*Str.* v. 14 [*GCS*, II, 391–421]).

[114] Cf. Zeller, *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy* (13th ed. [rev. by Nestle and Palmer]; London, 1931), pp. 253, 284 ff.

[115] Cf. Goodenough, *op. cit.*, pp. 3–5.

[116] For a valuable survey of the history of religious Platonism, with especial reference to the theology of Origen, Clement's greatest student, see E. de Faye, *Origène, sa vie, son œuvre, sa pensée* (Paris, 1927), Vol. II: *L'Ambiance philosophique.*

[117] Casey urges that Christianity "had to make its choice between the *materialism* of the Stoa and the *immaterialism* of Plato" (*op. cit.*, p. 45, italics not in the original). To accept this statement of the case requires a meaning for materialism different from that in Democritus and Lucretius and also from modern counterparts. Actually, the tendency of Stoicism was pantheistic; the tendency of Platonism was theistic. The Christian philosopher naturally accepted a view in which God could be related to man and the world by intention rather than by essence.

[118] *Str.* i. 7 (*GCS*, II, 24, 30—25, 2); note the inclusion of "Epicurean."

Greek philosophers.[119] But his eclecticism has a definite and conscious focus: his understanding of the Christian tradition and the Christian faith.[120] He is fascinated by the thought that philosophy was the Greek propadeutic to Christianity just as the Torah had been for the Jews.[121] Each, however, was only partially true, and the Christian revelation is the completion of their truth.[122] Christianity is superior to Greek philosophy in extent of knowledge, certitude of commitment, and moral power.[123]

Clement nowhere professes discipleship to Plato or to any other Hellenic philosopher. Instead, he speaks of "the barbarian philosophy which we follow."[124] This is for him the great thesaurus of all philosophic truth.[125] Moses was its human founder,[126] but he was only the bearer of divine revelation.[127] The prophets and sages of the Jews are its spokesmen, and there is even one quotation from Matt. 7:7 (Luke 11:9) cited as "bar-

[119] *Str.* i. 5 (*GCS*, II, 18, 8 f.); cf. Jerome *Epistle* 704 (Migne, *Pat. Lat.*, p. 667); for extended discussion see E. de Faye, *Clément d'Alexandrie* (Paris, 1906), pp. 162–74.

[120] *Str.* i. 20 (*GCS*, II, 62, 23–29); ἡ ἀλήθεια ἀπαρεγχείρητος is to be found only in the teachings of the Son of God (*Str.* vii. 2, 3 [*GCS*, III, 5–15]). Note the deliberate emphasis upon the Christian tradition in *Str.* i. 1 (*GCS*, II, 8, 16—9, 10).

[121] *Str.* i. 5 (*GCS*, II, 18, 1–5); *Str.* i. 7 (*GCS*, II, 24, 8); *Str.* i. 20 (*GCS*, II, 63, 19–21); *Str.* vi. 17 (*GCS*, II, 513, 31—514, 10).

[122] *Str.* i. 1 (*GCS*, II, 6, 10–32): Hellenic philosophy is like a nut; it is only the Christian who can distinguish kernel from shell; *Str.* i. 20 (*GCS*, II, 63, 27–30); *Str.* vi. 10 (*GCS*, II, 473, 14–19).

[123] *Str.* i. 20 (*GCS*, II, 63, 2 ff.); cf. also *Str.* vi. 18 (*GCS*, II, 518, 1–18), where it is argued that Christianity's amazing diffusion in so short a time and its power to endure persecution and political interdiction prove its divine origin and superiority to Greek philosophy.

[124] *Str.* ii. 2 (*GCS*, II, 115, 9 f.).

[125] *Str.* v. 14 (*GCS*, II, 384–91). The term "barbarian philosophy" is used in more than one sense as, e.g., *Str.* vi. 15 (*GCS*, II, 494, 6–9), where it refers to the "heresies of the barbarian philosophy" (in this instance, presumably, the Gnostics); see also *Str.* i. 7 (*GCS*, II, 29, 23). In other places Clement speaks of Hindus, Scythians, and Egyptians as barbarian philosophers (cf. *Str.* vi. 4). The context of any passage, however, shows unmistakably when he is speaking of the Jewish-Christian tradition.

[126] *Str.* i. 23–26.

[127] *Str.* i. 26 (*GCS*, II, 104–5).

barian philosophy."[128] Pythagoras and Plato were disciples of this tradition,[129] and from it, Clement believed, they gained their fundamental religious insights. The culmination of all philosophy is in the truth as it is in the Christ, the Son of God.[130] This "true philosophy" is said to be grounded in faith,[131] and the context of the passage makes it plain that Clement means Christian faith. It is this "true philosophy" which Clement takes for his norm, and it is in terms of this "philosophy" that he interprets all others.

V

Our identification of Clement's "Platonism" must be in general terms, but this is sufficient for our purposes. Plato, says Clement, was indebted to Pythagoras.[132] There is no reference to or restatement of the views of such stricter Platonists as Theon of Smyrna or Albinus.[133] There are echoes of, but no explicit references to, Plutarch.[134] The nearest analogue to Clement's "Platonism" is that of Philo Judaeus. In mood and, to some extent, in method, here are two of a kind.

We must resist the temptation, however, to conclude that Philo is a direct source for Clement. Clement is conscious of no such indebtedness. There are many parallels, but Stählin finds only one direct quotation, and there are only five references to him by name in Clement's writings.[135] Incidentally, in one of

[128] *Str.* viii. 1 (*GCS*, III, 80, 9 f.).

[129] *Str.* i. 15 (*GCS*, II, 42, 26–29); *Paed.* ii. 11 (*GCS*, I, 217, 20 f.); *Str.* v. 14 (*GCS*, II, 388, 23 ff.); *Str.* v. 5 (*GCS*, II, 342, 20 f.); note in this last the parallels between sayings of Scripture and Pythagorean aphorisms.

[130] *Str.* i. 28 (*GCS*, II, 109, 5–29); *Str.* vi. 18 (*GCS*, II, 518, 4–24); *Str.* vii. 2 (*GCS*, III, 6, 8–28).

[131] *Str.* ii. 9 (*GCS*, II, 138, 26—139, 11).

[132] *Str.* vi. 2 (*GCS*, II, 443, 12 ff.).

[133] Cf. Zeller, *op. cit.*, pp. 287 f.; see longer account of each in Ueberweg-Praechter, *Die Philosophie des Altertums* (Berlin, 1926), pp. 540–45.

[134] Cf. *GCS*, IV (*Citatenregister*), 53–55, for a list of the parallels.

[135] *GCS*, IV (*Eigennamenregister*), 189.

these Clement calls Philo a Pythagorean.[136] In a writer like Clement, with his predilection for multiplying references to philosophers, this seems strongly to suggest that he is indirectly rather than directly related to Philo and that the similarities between them are due rather to a common tradition than to conscious borrowing on Clement's part. There are, moreover, differences between the two on points of fundamental importance. Without arguing the matter in detail we might suggest the contrasts in their concepts of Logos and the ideas of ἔκστασις and γνῶσις. Philo's is a rationalistic mysticism; Clement's is an ethical mysticism. Philo was a Jew; at bottom more Jewish than Greek.[137] Clement was a Christian; at bottom more Christian than Greek. They were both, however, in the same general mystico-philosophic tradition, perhaps the only one which Judaism and Christianity could have found congenial.

Clement lived in the "Interpreter's House." Into his "scrap-bag" he stuffed things old and new, from Scripture, from philosophy, from revelation, and from secular culture. Like all scrap-bags, the result is a jumble; yet, through it all, there is a recognizable unity which derives from Clement's rootage in the historic norms of Christian teaching.[138] In no essential respect does he alter his emphasis upon the primacy of Christian revelation, and this is unfailingly associated with the incarnation and teachings of Jesus Christ, the Son and Logos of God. He failed to achieve a philosophical theology that was consistent or complete, although he did prepare the way for the theology of Origen. Nevertheless, in his own right Clement stands as a symbol of that Christian humanism which holds that moral faith and high intellectual emprise are correlative.

[136] *Str.* i. 15 (*GCS*, II, 46, 17); cf. also E. R. Goodenough, "A Neo-Pythagorean Source in Philo Judaeus," *Yale Class. Studies*, III (1932), 115–64.

[137] Even Goodenough admits that it was never his intention to suggest the inverse of this; "Problems of Method in Studying Philo Judaeus," *Jour. Biblical Lit.*, LVIII (1939), 57 f.

[138] D. van den Eynde, *Les Normes de l'enseignement chrétien dans la littérature patristique des trois premiers siècles* (Paris, 1933), pp. 218–26, 299–304.

CAN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION BE EMPIRICAL?

EDWIN RUTHVEN WALKER

IN A recent issue of the *Journal of Religion*,[1] in an article under this same title, I treated criticisms of the use of the empirical method in religious thought that were more philosophical in character, including under this head such objections as these: the method results in abstractions; it is limited to sense data; it cannot deal with value; and it requires that all propositions be held tentatively. But there are a number of additional criticisms expressed in current theological writing which have in common the charge that the method does not sustain religious living. It will be my purpose in this article to state and evaluate these criticisms.

I

Several contemporary writers object to the use of the empirical method in religious thought because of the sharp differences which they claim exist between certain attitudes which this method involves and the attitudes that shape religious living. References to two of these differences in attitude are particularly common.

The first of these can be indicated as follows: The inquirer who uses the empirical method must assume a role of pure objectivity in his inquiry, while the religious man must give a devoted loyalty to the religious Object. Professor Aubrey finds this criticism occurring with sufficient frequency to justify his

[1] October, 1939. This earlier article contains a statement of what I consider the essential character of the empirical method and the assumptions upon which are based evaluations of the arguments against it. Significant criticisms of this article, made by George F. Thomas, John C. Bennett, and David E. Roberts, appeared in this *Journal* for April, 1940 (pp. 169 ff.). I believe some of these criticisms are answered in the present article.

including it in his survey of religious thought in our time and implies his own agreement with it in these words:

> The scientific method is accompanied by a typical scientific attitude, and it is here that the adoption of the scientific method has its most serious implications for religion. Religion is by nature an affair of participation. . . . . The scientific attitude, on the contrary, is essentially an attitude of detachment. To be sure, the scientist participates in the scientific quest but he views his materials not with sympathy but with objectivity.[2]

If religious living is understood as the dedication of one's self in complete and devoted loyalty to God by way of commitment to the work of God in the world, then the proposition that religious living is incompatible with an attitude of detachment is an assertion which is perfectly intelligible and can be established as true. But this is not to say that the criticism is valid, for it must be asked whether an attitude of detachment is essential to the empirical method. This question must be answered before the claims of a fundamental difference in attitudes can be evaluated.

The American pragmatists have kept to the fore their notion that all seeking of knowledge has the nature of problem-solving. And, since a problem arises as the result of some frustration (Mead's "inhibited act"), it follows that there must be an interest in the solution before inquiry will be undertaken. If the pragmatists are correct in this—and I think they are—then there is no such thing as purely disinterested inquiry in relation to any subject matter. One is never detached, no matter how remote from the concerns of the inquirer the subject matter of inquiry may appear to be. The researches of J. M. Montmasson lead him to the conclusion that all discovery is motivated by keen personal interest and culminates in intense joy. He goes

[2] *Present Theological Tendencies* (New York, 1936), p. 34. A similar view is made the basis for a criticism of D. C. Macintosh by George Thomas in *The Nature of Religious Experience*, ed. Eugene Ganett Bewkes (New York, 1937), p. 50; cf. also Bertrand Russell, *Philosophy*, p. 297, and *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 37; and John Baillie, *The Interpretation of Religion* (New York, 1928), p. 41.

on to point out the existence of a bias of intense interest in the discovery of just those data that confirm the hypothesis advanced. These conclusions are based on studies of the work of Darwin, Kepler, Gutenberg, Descartes, Newton, Pasteur, and Ampère.[3]

Recent studies in the sociology of knowledge[4] have proved that there are elements of bias in all knowing processes. The bias roots in the social setting of the knower. No person can escape the fact that he is a participant in certain social groups and shares with each group its assumed hierarchy of values, its set toward action, and its meanings and sensitivities. Because of this context he will be aware of some problems and ignore others, he will be peculiarly sensitive to some data and blind to others, he will find certain techniques and methods for use in solving problems, and he will be concerned with particular outcomes. But these studies go on to show that a bias need not invalidate inquiry. On the contrary, it may actually contribute to the search for knowledge, provided its existence is known and its structural character is made clear.

This review of studies in method is sufficient to remind us that "disinterestedness" and "detachment" are impossible with any method; on the contrary, a certain kind of bias is an important factor in the empirical approach to knowledge. This is true even when the method is applied in the natural sciences.

The fact that interest must motivate all inquiry must not be allowed to obscure the additional fact that the degree to which interest constitutes a bias varies with the subject matter being investigated, as well as with the social setting of the inquirer. When the object of inquiry is also the Object of religious devotion, the operation of a bias is more intense and more

[3] Montmasson, *Invention and the Unconscious* (New York, 1932), p. 189. This work is cited by A. C. Benjamin, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Science* (New York, 1937), p. 180.

[4] The most thorough of these is Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York, 1936), trans. Louis Wirth (see particularly the final chapter).

significant than in any other inquiry, both because religious commitment requires complete devotion to its Object and because the social setting of the religious man is a religious group established in a long religious tradition. This bias has in it the power of frustrating and rendering futile the search for knowledge on religious questions, but, if it is recognized and these potentialities are taken into account, negative results may be avoided. Moreover, this religious intensity of bias may heighten sensitivity to data and suggest lines of solution for problems which might otherwise be missed.[5] The empiricist in philosophy of religion can say with the fathers of Christian thought that faith[6] is an essential factor in knowledge of God. It seems, therefore, that a faulty understanding of method has led the critics to set up this contradiction between the religious attitude of sympathy and participation and the attitude of detachment alleged to be essential to the empirical method.

A second difference which some critics find between the empirical and the religious attitudes is indicated by the claim that an attitude of "exploitation and manipulation" always accompanies an attempt to gain empirical knowledge of an object, whereas the essential attitude in religious living is one of "submission and collaboration." Paul E. Johnson,[7] Edwin E. Aubrey,[8] and Charles A. Bennett[9] have each treated this contrast in recent publications, but Bennett extends the criticism beyond the other two. He points out that the empirical method must result in a naturalistic metaphysics and sets the contrast on that level.[10] In his view, naturalism seeks to "bend nature to the purposes of man," but religion "knows the gods are not to be lightly approached. Prayer and worship always exhibit a chas-

[5] Cf. Bernard E. Meland, "Religious Awareness and Knowledge," *Review of Religion*, III (1939), 17–36.

[6] Assuming a definition of faith as "a venture in commitment."

[7] "The Illusion of Religion," *Journal of Religion*, XII (1932), 337 f. [8] *Loc. cit.*

[9] *The Dilemma of Religious Knowledge* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), p. 6.

[10] *Ibid.*

tened mood." Moreover, "naturalism lacks humility because it has found nothing to reverence."

I confess that I am not clear as to just what Professor Aubrey means by his assertion that "the characteristic attitude of science is an attitude of exploitation." It may mean that the knowledge of nature which has been developed in the several natural sciences has been used to control processes in the environment to serve the ends of man. This is obviously true, but it is hard to see that this fact sets an essential limitation on a theory of knowledge. On the other hand, Professor Aubrey's statement may mean that some of the applications of the method have involved techniques of separating particular processes from their normal context and of "artificially" observing data in experiment. That is, he may be asserting that empirical method is always a laboratory method. The fact is that even some of the natural sciences find experimental observation impossible and must await opportunities for observation of data in the normal context of occurrence. Whichever interpretation of his statement is adopted, then it seems to me that Professor Aubrey is in error in making an attitude of exploitation and manipulation essential to the use of empirical method.

Bennett's allegation that "naturalism . . . . has found nothing to reverence" would be true of most naturalisms in the history of philosophy, but it is hardly valid today in the light of the work of S. Alexander, A. N. Whitehead, Jan C. Smuts, H. N. Wieman, and Charles Hartshorne.

II

The argument frequently made against the use of the empirical method in the philosophy of religion on the ground that it cannot be used to verify certain metaphysical ideas seems, on its face, to be a philosophical objection rather than an objection made on the ground of the method's religious inadequacy, but the contention is that these metaphysical notions are essential to religious living. Just what the essential meta-

physical notions are is not a matter of common agreement among the critics. (This fact alone is cause for suspicion of the claim that they are "essential.") When the whole list of ideas is compiled, it is a quite diversified one. I shall discuss only those four on which there is considerable agreement.

George Thomas states the first of these when he declares that affirmations "concerning the Whole and its Ground," given only by intuition, are essential to religion, but "scientific method" deals only with particulars, proceeding by analysis.[11] Paul Johnson finds that religion and art "deal with wholes" and "form" and "pattern," while "scientific method segregates."[12] This is what Archbishop Temple has in mind when he contrasts the types of categories used in "scientific philosophy" with those essential to religious affirmation.[13] Others affirm that the empirical method is incapable of dealing with the Whole; consequently it can never be used to provide the knowledge that will satisfy man's hunger for "at-homeness," which comes only as a result of "seeing life whole" and himself in relation to it.[14]

The idea of the supernatural is a second of the metaphysical notions indispensable to religion, according to John Oman, John Baillie, Reinhold Niebuhr, Charles Bennett, and many others. Oman speaks for the group in these words: "If this [empirical] method assume itself to be the only valid method of knowledge, it will already have ruled out the possibility that the universe has any supernatural aspect, or at least that this could have any significance for us."[15]

A third form of the criticism under review claims that absolute concepts are essential to religion and this cannot "be reconciled with our new enthusiasm for the empirical method."

[11] *Op. cit.*, p. 65. [12] *Op. cit.*, p. 338.

[13] William Temple, *Nature, Man and God* (London, 1934), pp. 45 and 52.

[14] Aubrey, *op. cit.*, pp. 34–35; cf. J. S. Bixler, "The Mystic and His Absolutes," *Journal of Religion*, XV (1935), 294 ff.

[15] *The Natural and the Supernatural* (New York, 1931), p. 108; cf. pp. 109 and 117; see also Niebuhr in *The Nature of Religious Experience*, pp. 120, 131, and 132–33; Baillie, *op. cit.*, p. 100; Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

D. S. Cairns holds that these absolutes are truth, duty, virtue, and ideal forms.[16] Professor Bixler emphasizes the last of these.[17]

Another metaphysical notion that is made a platform for the denunciation of empiricism is the idea of God as necessary ground of all existence. According to Thomas, there can be no empirical knowledge of God. Since God is "Ground of all objects," he can never be isolated as object of inquiry or even identified.[18] Cairns's variant of the concept of God as ground does not include all being, only the value absolutes.[19] Robert L. Calhoun[20] holds to the validity of the argument from contingent being to necessary ground which originated with Averroes and is mediated through Maimonides and St. Thomas.

Before taking up these allegedly essential ideas for separate evaluation, there may be value in pointing out that this group of arguments by empiricism's critics reveals the essential difference of an approach to knowledge of God by empirical inquiry from all other attempts to know God. The empiricist does not start with a complete definition of the nature of God and then seek an apologetic for that definition. On the contrary, he starts with only the identifying characteristic and seeks what else he may discover as to God's nature. Thus the empiricist could not agree, prior to inquiry, that any of these notions is essential to the idea of God. For that matter, aside from any consideration of which method is to be employed, a system of metaphysics is an outcome of inquiry according to some method of knowing. What propositions shall make up the system must await the processes of inquiry. The only alternative is simply to postulate certain metaphysical ideas and force all religious thought into the pattern of apologetics. To argue that certain

[16] *The Riddle of the World* (London, 1937), p. 94.

[17] *The Nature of Religious Experience*, p. 78, and "The Spirit and the Life," *Review of Religion*, I (1937), 113–35.

[18] *Op. cit.*, pp. 44, 45.

[19] *Op. cit.*, pp. 94 ff.

[20] *God and the Common Life* (New York, 1935) and a series of articles in *Christendom*, I–II (1935–37).

ideas have frequently, or even usually, been associated with religion does not alter this fact.

Coming now to the specific ideas asserted to be essential to religious living yet excluded by empirical method, it is true that the idea of the "Whole" as an ultimate concept is excluded by this method, since it cannot deal with finalities. But I cannot agree that the empirical method is limited to particulars only, for I understand an adequate theory of perception to yield a basis for the universal concept, since and in so far as the perceptual experience is of events in relation. Furthermore, none of those advancing this objection has undertaken a demonstration that the idea of the "Whole" as an ultimate concept is actually necessary to religious living. They have asserted it, but they have supported the assertion only by reference to the fact that it has been associated with the traditional metaphysics of Christian theology.

It is quite true that unless a method permits the derivation and verification of highly general propositions, which become elements of a metaphysical world-view, that method proves inadequate for acquiring knowledge of the kind that serves as an instrument in religious living. Is it possible to have an empirically grounded metaphysics? There are facts that have led to a negative answer to this question. It is evident that the widest use of the empirical method has been in the several natural sciences, and these sciences have not been concerned, explicitly, with propositions in metaphysics. Moreover, the sciences have confined their attention, each to its separate area of subject matter. In addition, the formulations of the method that have been positivistic are bound to the limits of the particular and the present, and such theories have attempted to meet these difficulties by advancing a fictionalist or constructionalist view of the universal concept and proposition. Thus the grounds for denial of an empirical metaphysics are understandable.

But what of the empirical method as it is widely formulated

by contemporary philosophers?[21] Can it be used to develop a metaphysics? If by "metaphysics" a system of ultimate concepts is meant, the answer is "No." Empirical method requires tentativeness in all affirmations; it cannot deal with ultimates. But, on the other hand, this method is not bound in a solipsism of the present, nor is it limited to atomistic descriptions of particulars. I find myself in agreement with Morris R. Cohen's analysis:

> Complete nature cannot reveal or exhibit itself in any moment or interval of time as far as that moment excludes other moments, but in so far as the meaning and context of each *here* and *now* necessarily involves some essence or character that is more than merely here and now, we *have a point of view in which the whole of time is included.* The point of view to which the whole of time and space has a meaning may be called the eternal (as distinct from the everlasting, which applies to what endures in time and space). It is true that in no moment or interval of time can we grasp or see as actually present to us the whole content of time and space which we call *the* universe. But in knowing the meaning of any fragment as a fragment we know the direction of completion.[22]

Thus, within the limits of empirical method, a metaphysics is possible that consists in the most general propositions confirmable at the present stage of advance in knowledge of the actual. And it seems to me that it is the only kind of metaphysics worth having, since it is the only Weltanschauung grounded in the actual. It is a pedestrian world-view, to be sure, but we are pedestrians.

It is extremely difficult to evaluate the claim that an idea of the supernatural is essential to religion, for the range of meanings associated with the word is very nearly limitless. The natural is defined for me by epistemology, that is, nature includes all that is knowable, actually or potentially, by normal processes of knowing. Nature includes mind, personality, and

[21] See the earlier phase of this study (*Journal of Religion*, XIX [1939], 315 ff.) for a sketch of the essentials of the method.

[22] *Reason and Nature* (New York, 1932), pp. 155–56. I am using the term "empirical" to designate a method identical in its principal features with what Cohen calls "rational science."

value, as well as the wider ranges of biophysical existence. According to this view, "supernatural" connotes the unknowable, the semantically meaningless; and, on the basis of this definition, I hold that the idea of the "supernatural" is not only unnecessary to religion but confusing and frustrating in any genuine attempt to achieve adjustment to the work of God in the world. I do not assert that empirical knowledge of God is complete and final; I do not deny that there is mystery and that which inspires awe; I do not assert that religious commitment is given only to that which is known with complete certainty. The critics of naturalism who attack propositions of this kind are shadowboxing with a mythical antagonist. No doubt, there are many who would feel that I have missed the essentials of their meaning of the supernatural in defining it as I have. This is quite probable, for I acknowledge my confusion when confronted with definitions of the idea as "the dimension of depth," the "beyond, behind, and above the observable," and "transcendence behind and beyond the temporal."[23]

The argument from contingent being to necessary ground can be based only on the assumption that the method of pure rationalism is valid. It proceeds by extending a series to its logical limits after the manner that is called extrapolation. Now the process of reasoning by extrapolation is a process of negation: concepts of perfect gases, perfect levers, and infinities are defined by denying that limits of actual gases, actual levers, and finite characters can ever be found. Such concepts, by their very nature, can have only logical and pragmatic meaning. They can never be known to designate the actual. The idea of a being as necessary ground, therefore, must be pure rational speculation. Such ideas have the value of completing the symmetry of a system of thought. But they cannot mediate interaction with any reality. Hence they cannot affect religious living and cannot be essential to it.

[23] Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, pp. 120, 132.

III

With the current recrudescence of obscurantist theology the claim is made with increasing frequency that revelation is the one method of gaining religious insight which may properly be called Christian. The relation of religious commitment to the heritage of the culture in which the religious man participates makes it necessary to consider this definitely theological claim. It is asserted that revelation is of the essence of Christianity.[24] For this reason it is claimed that the basis for religious commitment is sharply different from all natural knowledge: "Indeed Christian theology is built on a different foundation altogether. It is built on what it believes a revelation of God."[25] This is argued on the authority of the Hebraic-Christian tradition as it is preserved in the Bible and in the life of the church.[26]

Probably the most significant representative of this position among contemporary theologians is Emil Brunner, because of his consistency in maintaining the position at the center of his thought, because of the extent of his influence on other writers in Europe and America, and because he has been a mediator of the range of views loosely known as Continental theology.[27] Brunner begins with the assertion of the inadequacy of every form of natural knowledge in relation to God: "an objective, natural, or 'purely scientific' theology is a monstrosity. For genuine theology, theology that knows its business, is always born of the passion of faith."[28] Every form of natural knowledge is inadequate, because it fails utterly to show man the gulf separating him from God, not to mention its failure to bridge

[24] J. W. Buckham, "Shall It Be Christianity?" *Christendom*, II (1937), 104.

[25] Cairns, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

[26] *Ibid.*, chaps. vii–xi.

[27] See J. S. Bixler, "Brunner and the Theology of Crisis," *Journal of Religion*, IX (1929), 446 ff.; Harald Eklund, *Theologie der Entscheidung* (Upsala: University Press, 1936).

[28] *Philosophy of Religion*, trans. Farrer and Woolf (New York, 1937), p. 183; cf. also p. 13.

that gulf.[29] A complement to the evil nature of man is the nature of evil for man, neither of which can be known apart from God's perspective given in revelation: "Man cannot be truly critical by reason alone, since within its limits he cannot penetrate the character of evil, but is bound to underestimate evil, by holding fast to mere reason and letting it suffice him."[30]

For these reasons, then, Brunner holds all natural knowledge to be inadequate. But the positive argument for holding to the validity of revelation, and revelation alone, is based on the assertion of the unique character and content of that revelation:

> Christian faith . . . . does deny that the personal and living God can be generally known from possibilities that lie either in the world or in man's spirit as such. It contends that the living and personal God can be known only by a personal meeting, through His personal word, through that special event to which the Bible, and the Bible alone, bears witness, and the content of which is Jesus Christ.[31]

Brunner makes his position extremely difficult to criticize by declaring that "the only man who can look for some other foundation besides the *Deus dixit* is the man who withholds belief from the *Deus dixit* and wants, secretly, to replace revelation by symbol."[32]

It was remarked above that there is an indispensable element of belief in religious commitment, which is the present apprehension of the Object to which one gives devotion and loyalty. This belief element is, of course, made up of a system of symbols. For most men these symbols are derived from an undefined, but nonetheless real, combination of social processes. That is to say, the symbols, which are the content of belief, are usually given by social heritage. They are derived from the particular religious tradition dominant in the social groups to which the religious man belongs. In the typical American community these will be Christian symbols derived from home, school, church, and other groups. Furthermore, these common symbols of the religious tradition shape the cultus of the spe-

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 90.
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 15–16; see further pp. 71, 72, 75, and 82.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

cifically religious group, which serves as a conditioning agent (sensitizing and confirming) in religious commitment. To abandon these symbols, therefore, is to cut one's self loose from earlier stages of religious growth in his own life-history and to cut himself off from those connections with the religious group without which religious commitment becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible.

However, when the concepts derived by social heritage prove to be ineffective as instruments for relating one's self to God, then a critical examination of these concepts is in order. That is, their meaning must be tested in two directions. First, they must be tested formally by ascertaining if they are consistent with other concepts held to be true in that culture. Second, they must be tested semantically to ascertain what matter of fact they designate. This process of testing may mean a fundamental task of reconstruction of the essential meanings of the concepts. (The job of critical examination and reconstruction is the function of philosophy of religion.) But before these reconstructed concepts can serve religious living, another job must be undertaken, namely, they must be translated into the traditional symbols, or, perhaps a better way to say it, the traditional symbols must be reinterpreted in order to harmonize with the concepts whose content and nature have been subjected to criticism. (This job of translation or reinterpretation is the function of theology.) Unless this latter step is accomplished, there is serious difficulty. This, then, is the relation to the religious tradition from which it is derived.

The question is then raised: Is such a belief Christian? The answers to the question "What is Christianity?" have been extremely diverse. Some say Christianity is defined by an authoritative church, body of belief, or a particular type of emotional experience. The very diversity of these definitions of Christianity proves the inadequacy of each. To include all these, Christianity must be defined as a continuing socioreligious movement which stemmed out of Jesus' relations with a company of fol-

lowers. It began to take an institutional form in the Greco-Roman world and has become the dominant religious tradition of Western culture. Its wide diversity of forms exhibits only a few common elements, such as the claim to make the life and teachings of Jesus central, its sacred literature, and a few practices of the cult. Whatever arises within this continuum must be called Christian. This is not to say that all these are good. But we are dealing with facts in history and not with normative definitions of an ideal Christianity. Therefore, it can be claimed for no one method of knowing that it alone is Christian. The choice is between different Christian methods, and that choice must be made on the basis of their relative adequacy in performing their function of acquiring knowledge. Perhaps this is nothing more than a battle over honorific labels, a battle obscuring the search for truth. But the truth discovered must be symbolized in the frame of the religious heritage or else create some new cultus, if it is to contribute to religious commitment.

IV

I come finally to two criticisms of the validity of the empirical method in religious thought which are very closely related. The first of these is the assertion that religious belief does not actually arise from the use of this method but in "religious experience," hence the empirical method cannot yield knowledge that can serve religious living. One form of the argument is the contention by John Baillie that the justification of belief must be identical with its derivation: "The difficulty which we feel regarding this procedure arises from the clear realization that if the *valid* grounds for believing in God's existence are different from the grounds which have actually led the world to believe in it, then it is only by accident of coincidence that there is anything in the world's faith at all."[33]

It is necessary to recall some considerations raised above as a basis for evaluating this objection. Commitment, it was

[33] *Op. cit.*, pp. 94–95; cf. also p. 376.

stated, arises out of the nurturing processes of the social groups of which one is a member. The symbols, the sensitivity which is the condition of awareness, the attitude of readiness to respond—all these are generated within one's social heritage. It is quite true that religious commitment rarely, if ever, springs, in the first instance, from an individual's own achievement in getting knowledge of God. For inquiry, issuing in such knowledge is pursued in an attempt to solve a problem; and the problem arises only after one finds the familiar symbols inadequate. Empirical method then becomes a way for testing the meaning of these concepts and reordering their meanings in harmony with the results of inquiries.

If this analysis be true, Mr. Baillie's argument seems confused. As a matter of fact, it seldom occurs in any area of man's knowledge that the causes of beliefs are identical with their verification. At least, it is not essential to empirical method that origin and means of validation be the same. If one takes Baillie's position that beliefs do not need verification since the self-validating character of religious experience is assumed, then it is a "matter of accident of coincidence that there is anything in the world's faith at all." He seems to hold that beliefs should not be tested, lest, perchance, they might be proved illusions.

The second of these closely related criticisms is that though the method may be adequate for a few individual philosophers, it is inaccessible to the common man. Baillie elaborates this view, also.

> No view of religion can possibly be correct which makes it depend on learned and scientific inquiry; for history shows that those members of our race who are accounted as having the surest insight into religious truth could boast of little learning and of no science at all.[34]

The priest, the pastor, and the preacher must concern themselves with the question of the adequacy of a method for the common man. It is likely, however, that the common man will continue to do in religion what he does in all other areas—depend upon secondary authority for his knowledge. But the

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 105.

common man of our time participates in a culture that asks the assurance from its secondary authorities that the conclusions they offer be verifiable by a public method. Ours is not an age in which all men are philosophers, certainly, but it is an age very deeply rooted in the conviction that exploration is better than speculation. The common man, I suspect, is better satisfied with testable beliefs than with ex cathedra deliverances. Even so, it is hardly possible to determine the validity of a theory of knowledge by popular vote.

This review and evaluation of the criticisms that have been advanced against the adequacy of the empirical method in dealing with religious problems has not given a conclusive answer to the question of Burtt with which we began. To accomplish that it would be necessary to compare this method with others currently used in religious thought and either to undertake an inquiry with this method or to investigate the success of others in a similar enterprise. This study has sought to examine the cogency of the negative arguments and to clarify certain misunderstandings.

One of the chief of these misunderstandings has to do with the nature of the empirical method. Professor Aubrey's criticism of many past interpretations of empirical method as used in religious inquiry, on the ground that they have involved an overgeneralization of the method and a loose definition of it, seems to me to be entirely justified. The method of empirical inquiry as I have defined it is not the method of common sense. To be sure, it is to be sharply distinguished from it. To define the method as "revising one's expectations to conform to observed consequences" indicates some of its general features, but it fails to indicate those essential operations of elaboration of the hypothesis and verification which are its chief features, and in connection with which its chief problems arise. It is highly important, then, that we should have injected into current religious discussion a clear, analytical formulation of the empirical method.

ON USING CHRISTIAN WORDS

HENRY NELSON WIEMAN

SIMPLE Christian people use ancient Christian words without a qualm. "The living Christ," "the living and crucified Christ," "redemption," "salvation," "sin," "the Word of God," "the grace of God," "revelation," "the Word"—these and other symbols are used by them to quicken devotion and to guide into intimate community with sacred reality. They live devoutly by means of these words. There is no other way to live humanly save by means of words, whether it be in the field of religion, of politics, of industry, or of love. All life above the level of the lower animals is lived by means of words, and without the proper words it cannot be lived at all. Words are not trivial. Language is creative of the human mind and the human personality. This has become an established fact in social psychology.

I

But the use of ancient Christian words has become a source of sore perplexity to many who are not simple. By "simple people" in this context I do not mean individuals lacking either in intelligence or in secular education, but merely persons who have never made religion the object of critical analysis and historical research. Not all, indeed, who have studied religion in this way find a problem in the use of Christian words, but many do. For these a question of personal integrity is involved. When and if we use these words, what do we mean by them? Do we mean what our fathers meant? Do we perpetuate the significance which the words originally had? All who have reflected on the matter know that we do not. One cannot take a word or a sentence or a doctrine out of one context and put it into another and expect it to carry the same meaning. The context determines the meaning. The context is made up of all the

other ideas in the minds of men who at the time use the word or accept the doctrine. Since the total complex of ideas in the minds of men today is radically different from that of two hundred years ago, and this in turn vastly different from the mind of the first century, it is plain that the traditional Christian words cannot carry the same meaning in all these different periods. There may be some abstract line of meaningful identity running through the use of these terms in all ages, but in many cases this abstraction was not the important thing. To lift out this meager element of identity and make it the matter of supreme concern may sometimes result in the worst possible distortion of the meaning which enriched the lives of people in other generations.

Sometimes historians of thought, after elaborate research, claim to be able to tell us what men really meant when they used the great words in ages long dead. But these men of research are no more able to reproduce in themselves and make their own the beliefs, hopes, fears, purposes, and desires of a thousand or two thousand years ago than are we. The very fact that they are men of research, masters of the modern, scientific tools of historical investigation, is sufficient indication that they have the kind of mind which our age alone can give. The very thoroughness of their scientific training may separate them further from those other times than some of the rest of us are separated. For one thing, they know certain facts about an earlier age far better than did the men who actually lived in it. That in itself makes impossible their recovery of the three-dimensional totality of meaning which the traditional Christian words carried for those who first used them.

The three dimensions of meaning are the emotive, the designative, and the formal. In all words which, like religious words, shape and inspire human living, the three dimensions must each be present. Purely formal knowledge, like that of abstract mathematics, does not require the emotive dimension for understanding. But in religion, if one misses the life-transforming

significance of the word, one misses an essential part of the meaning. This emotive, biotic, or life-transforming power which the word possessed over personalities is precisely the aspect of meaning most difficult to recover in its distinctive, original character. One must live in the original context to get the original meaning in this sense.

Furthermore, religious words are inextricably involved with metaphysics, because they refer to what the people who use them think is most important for all human living. Otherwise, the words would not be religious. But metaphysics, both the learned and the popular, changes from age to age. So here again we see why we cannot use these traditional religious words with the same meaning which they carried for men of other days.

Many people who use these words most earnestly and devoutly today differ radically in the meanings they ascribe to them, each claiming that he represents the original significance. So extreme and so bitter have been these differences that men have been known to persecute one another because of their divergent interpretations. Today persecution is not in vogue, but controversy and denunciation are likely to arise whenever different groups of people try to state what they mean by the symbols which they all use.

Again, these words have been the bearers of gross superstition and still are in many cases. People have used them and do now use them to designate what we know to be false, as far as any available evidence can be relied on to indicate the truth. Some of the meanings which these words have carried have been so pernicious as to cry out for repudiation. Innocent old women have been burned or stoned to death as witches "in the name of Christ," and the tale runs on through horrors new and old. It should be noted that this characterization of emotive words does not apply to Christian terms only. All that has been said about religious symbols could be said with equal truth concerning the words of patriotism. The same applies to the words of love—sex love, filial-parental love, and neighbor love. All the

words by which men have climbed to the heights of achievement and value are open to this same criticism. The biotic dimension of meaning is the source of great evils as well as of great values. But we are limiting the problem just now to the use of Christian words.

II

What, then, shall we do with these ancient Christian words? Shall we use them, or shall we not? If we use them, we incur the danger—in some degree perhaps the inevitable consequence—of perpetuating evil practices, superstitions, misunderstandings, confusion, error. We run the risk of misleading others and of misleading ourselves. If we use them, we shall almost certainly at times wallow in the sentimentality of emotive words which designate nothing in particular and so do not guide either conduct or thought to any reality.

There are five courses which different groups adopt in respect to the use of traditional Christian language. Some religious persons are quite consistent in following one of the five to the exclusion of the others. Some vacillate between two or more.

One of these courses is to repudiate the use of the Christian words, as far as making any serious attempt to designate important reality by them is concerned, but to do so with piety. Those who follow this course may have great respect for the history of these symbols. They may stand with bared heads before the devotion and sacrifice which these words have inspired. At the very least they view them with the reverent curiosity one feels for the relics of a heroic past displayed in a museum. But, of course, say these people, it would be the height of folly to try to use these words with any serious intent to designate by them important, operative reality in the world today. The words may serve as objects of art, memorials of the past, or symbols expressive of the human heart and revelatory of history, but they do not point to anything actual which can command our respect.

Another alternative is to repudiate the use of these words but to do so with crusading zeal, because of the confusion, blindness, and pernicious practice for which they have been responsible. Unlike the first group, those who follow this way are not content to reject the words for themselves. They strive by means of ridicule, invective, and other devices to induce people generally to cast them out. They may oppose not only the use of Christian symbols but the use by modern men of all traditional, religious expressions, including the word "religion" itself, as designating anything in modern life that is worthy and good. They may do all this with religious zeal, not knowing that they are themselves religious in the doing of it.

A third course is to select a few of the words traditionally associated with religion, including the word "religion" itself, and to use these seriously, at the same time vigorously opposing the use of all other traditional, religious symbols. Just what words will be selected will, of course, depend on the individual or group concerned. Sometimes this selection takes the curious form of rejecting all *Christian* words, while yet using "religion" and certain religious expressions which are not Christian, as though these non-Christian, traditional, religious words were exempt from the evils that attach to the Christian.

A fourth way is to use these words for their emotive power but without any attempt to make plain what they specifically designate. Many religious leaders use the words as "stop" and "go" signals. "God" and "salvation" mean "go"; "sin" and "damnation" mean "stop." Religious leaders who follow this course use Christian words to control human behavior and attitude, to awaken responsiveness, and redirect human devotion, their own included. But they have no clear notion of any objective reality to which the words might refer. This practice is unconscious with some. Others have worked out a theology or philosophy to defend it. According to this defense, the object referred to is very real, is indeed the ultimate reality, but is

beyond the reach of all human cognition. Man can know this reality only by faith and revelation, not by human reason or other natural power of cognition.

Beyond this fourth way, however, there is a fifth. He who adopts this last alternative seeks to discover the most important realities which can possibly concern human living. Then, inasmuch as the ancient Christian words, when seriously and nobly used, were employed to designate what the users believed to be the most important realities for all human living, one can likewise use them in this way today. One's understanding of these most important realities will not be the same as the understanding of men one hundred years ago, and theirs will not be the same as those of earlier periods, and so on back to Paul and Jesus and the Hebrew prophets. But in two senses this usage of the modern man will be the same as theirs. He will be using these words, even as they, to designate the realities which, more potently, pervasively, and worthfully than any others, determine the destiny of man. Second—and this is of vital importance—he will recognize that any humanly achieved idea of these realities is fallible, inaccurate, limited, and biased, and therefore he will use the ancient Christian words to designate not merely his ideas of these realities, but the realities themselves which do not change with men's ideas about them. Precisely because men's intellectual apprehension of God, sin, salvation and the like must vary from age to age, we cannot, unless we use the same words, make clear that we along with our forebears of the same tradition intend to deal with what is most important for all human living. Certain realities grasp us continuously, however inadequate and changeable our grasp of them may be. How can we make plain that we intend to designate such realities under differing modes of apprehension, unless we use the same words? The very diversity in mode of apprehension makes more imperative some identity in words used.

III

The first two policies, which reject the use of Christian words, I hold to be mistaken. For one thing, as I have said, one cannot live religiously unless one uses religious words. One cannot live the Christian life without using Christian words. In one sense that is undoubtedly true, says the objector, for if one lives religiously at all one must use words in the conduct of his religious life, and those words become by definition religious. But, he asks, must one use the traditional symbols? Why cannot one use words of one's own fabrication or at any rate words which are developed for the religious purpose by common consent among modern-minded men?

This brings us to a rather complex fact about language. Religious words or any words used to conduct the process of human living must do more than designate some reality. They must incite to action, generate attitudes, and awaken sensitivity. It is not enough to know that war rages in Europe or Asia. The symbols that give the information must also inspire me to correct or restrict the evil, so far as I am able in my own situation. It is not enough to know that this is the day to vote. The symbols that give that information must also lead me to scratch a ticket at the booth. So it is with the symbols by which the presence and character of diverse realities are indicated. Symbols are worthless if they merely designate and do not likewise shape conduct and awaken responsiveness to the designated reality. Indeed, they could not even designate if they did not first shape conduct, for we come to know only by doing and responding. Nowhere is this fact about symbols more important than in the Christian religion.

But how do symbols get their power to shape conduct, generate attitudes, and awaken responsiveness? At the biological level they get it in the same way as the bell got it for Pavlov's dog, whose mouth watered when he heard the sound associated with food. But at the distinctively human level they get it

through social interchange: Symbols acquire emotive power for one individual as he associates with a group which responds emotively to them. Only as a group generates responsiveness in its members do symbols have power.

Where can we find the symbols used in common by a sufficient number of people for a sufficient length of time to have the emotive power required to orient human personalities toward the most important realities? There is only one answer to that question. The ancient Christian words are the only ones which meet this requirement among those of us who inherit the Christian tradition. It is true that little groups can formulate pet symbols of their own, such as, to select a frequent one, "progressive integration." But these groups can never be large and ancient enough to generate much effectiveness in their symbols. And, even if they could, the group that uses them cuts itself off from that larger religious community which it sorely needs and which needs it. When we use religious symbols peculiar to ourselves, our efforts to shape the religious life of others beyond our little group become relatively futile. Also the diversity of terms used in different groups becomes a source of confusion, conflict, and wasted energy.

Perhaps the greatest objection to this practice of constructing new-fangled terms to express religious reality in the conduct of religious living is that we thereby estrange ourselves from the deeps of history and the reach of the future. There is a stream of life which moves through history when the same emotive symbols are used, each child being reared in the midst of people who express their religious devotion with these words, and that child rearing his children in the same way. The biotic power of these symbols to transform human living and direct the depths of propulsion in human personality can in this way become cumulative. Obviously, a man who develops new symbols to express his religious devotion after he has reached maturity cannot possibly find in them the directive force which symbols

designating most important reality should have and which they do have when they shape the currents of life from infancy.

New, technical terms to designate religious reality do have their place in the intellectual labor of seeking truth about what is most important. Every field of inquiry should have such terms, and intellectual Christian seekers should be free to use them or invent new ones when the search would seem to require it. But these should always be translatable into the ancient words whereby people conduct their religious living. Otherwise, the intellectual labor is worthless, and the whole undertaking a miscarriage. Whatever truth may have been discovered is stillborn because it cannot enter into religious living.

Here we come to the difference between theology and philosophy of religion. Theology undertakes to do all its thinking and intellectual seeking in terms that are traditional. Philosophy of religion is free to use any terminology which the best thought of the day may provide or which experts in the field of philosophy of religion may devise for that time or for special problems. Both these disciplines have their own peculiar dangers and weaknesses. The weakness of theology is that its traditional terms are not always the best fitted for the intellectual problems which it undertakes. The weakness of philosophy of religion is that its terms will not always be fully translatable into the words by which people actually conduct their religious living. Therefore, we need both kinds of inquiry in the field of religion, and whenever theologian or philosopher disparages the importance of the other's work he is obstructing the good of Christian living.

As to the person who, adopting the third policy, selects a few of the symbols of the faith for serious usage but does not try to employ all for which he can find some important and intelligible application, I should say he is failing to serve the cause of religion to just that degree. Of course, some religious words and doctrines become obsolete, and there is no reason for reviving

them. Or, again, one may live in a community which uses certain symbols and not others, and, as far as one's service is limited to that community, one will not try to introduce terms strange and therefore ineffective, even though they may be used in other communities. For example, I move in a community where "the blood" has no emotive efficacy, hence I do not use it. But if I lived in a community where sincere and earnest Christian people lived their religious lives by means of that symbol, I should use it, seeking the most intelligible and important meaning for it I could find in the light of the value the symbol has always had in the life of the Christian community. To ignore or reject any of the Christian words which have biotic meaning for his community is a mark of weakness and incapacity on the part of the religious leader.

The fourth policy, using Christian words as "stop" and "go" signals, without assuming intellectual responsibility for making plain what the words designate in the way of objective reality, I would object to most severely of all. Such practice magnifies all the evils which religious words can engender. Besides, it provides a means by which one can control and exploit the religious devotion of the people who live by such words. Some men who do this try to justify their practice by the claim that the meaning of these words is beyond formulation by the human mind; that it is expressed by God through his own revelatory act in response to the faith which God puts into the believer. Thus the user of the words casts off all responsibility for discovering or clarifying their objective meaning.

"Revelation" is one of the ancient Christian words and has an important contemporary meaning, although to discuss it would lead us beyond our subject. But it must at least be pointed out that no appeal to revelation can deliver a man from responsibility for determining the designata and denotata of the words he uses, and no revelation from God can give to those words any meaning beyond what the context of their use

may determine. This fourth policy, then, is of the devil (which is another ancient Christian term).

IV

I come back to our basic question: What shall we do with the ancient Christian words? My reply is: Use them according to the fifth policy. Use them seriously; use them devoutly. There is no entry into the Christian way of living except by use of the Christian words. There is no entry into the Christian community, no participation in the stream of Christian history, no power that can transform ordinary human living into the noblest Christian living, no effective leadership, and no purifying and redirecting of Christian life except through the use of Christian words. We must use them, but we must also assume responsibility for determining their meaning. Furthermore, we must use them as they have always been used by the greatest exemplars of the faith, that is, to designate the most important realities of which all the resources of tradition and inquiry are able to make us aware. We must use them inquiringly, devotedly, faithfully, but with minds always ready to catch any intimation of a better understanding of what, in the light of modern thought and personal insight, the realities referred to may be. We must not use them with intellectual irresponsibility on the ground that revelation and God-given faith will take care of the consequences even when we do not know what we are talking about.

Many people have been so long alienated from any community which uses the Christian words devoutly that these ancient symbols have lost for them their emotive power. The question has been asked: Should we not, for these groups at least, form other symbols suited to their lives? Our answer is that where religious symbols are developed they should be respected and used; but the truth of the matter is that these groups have not developed any common, religious symbolism and very little

even that is uncommon. Besides, it would take ages to achieve that cumulative power which symbols used spontaneously and unconsciously in the nurture of children for successive generations possess. Finally, if such new symbols were adopted, the Christian community would be split wide open and at deeper levels than ever before. We would have different groups using totally different symbols and thus rendered nonparticipant in any common religious life.

The only solution of the problem is to march with the moving masses of simple, religious folk who still use devoutly the ancient Christian words. People for whom these words no longer have any meaning, either emotive or designative, must be reeducated. The words themselves must be rendered intelligible as well as potent for guiding the currents of life in the context of modern existence. This is the great task of Christian leadership which lies before us. There is no escaping it, and there is no other way. The sooner we see it, the better; and the sooner we organize our resources to accomplish it, the more effectively will it be done.

It is true that parents and teachers and preachers must be able to designate religious reality with modern words as well as with ancient symbols. I have not emphasized this because I assumed that it was understood. Christian leaders must be able to talk in spirit of religious devotion in language other than the distinctively Christian and be able to translate back and forth. This is required because modern men are caught in many cross-currents of tradition wherein their insight and motivation can be reached only by using the words suited to their background. Also most of modern life is not lived by use of Christian language. Christians themselves are not sufficiently homogeneous in their usage and understanding of it. Furthermore, the points of view from which we must deal with religious reality are changing too rapidly for us to hope that any one set of words can be always efficacious. We must use the word that will reach the hearer where he is. But we must be able to translate that

word for him and for ourselves into the language of Christianity.

We cannot find the designative meaning of Christian words, namely, the realities most important for all human living, until we have objective criteria for judging what is better and what is worse. The important realities mean those of greatest value, either positively because of their goodness or negatively because of their ability to deliver from evil. The problem, then, is twofold: the problem of truth and the problem of value. We must have criteria for ascertaining the existential nature of that which our words designate, and we must have criteria for ascertaining the value or importance of it. He who takes the responsibility which maturity demands of anyone who uses the ancient Christian words must know how to test the truth of his statements and how to evaluate the reality which is designated. He will make mistakes, of course, and some of them may be monstrous. But he must be able to recognize error when it is shown to him, and he must know how to go about correcting it. It is not likely that he will ever unveil the whole of that reality which is most important for all human living. But he can at least move in that direction, by uncovering some of the serious mistakes which we make in our thinking and our living. We need not ask more than this of Christian leaders, although some may give us much more. We dare not ask less if we are to be faithful to the great devotion.

NOTES AND COMMUNICATIONS

BETTER THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION

FIVE COMMUNICATIONS

DEAN COLWELL'S article "Toward Better Theological Education" in the April number of this *Journal* is to be welcomed both because of its frankness in analysis and because of its excellent spirit. Necessary limitations of space restrict me to commenting on the central proposal.

The initial proposition is that graduate research and professional training have become intermingled until each is dragging down the quality of the other. The arguments advanced carry weight, and still more could be said. Several remedies are possible. Dean Colwell's proposal is: Let the B.D. represent "a truly professional pattern," consisting of two years of junior college, three years in theological school, and one year of internship.

Much depends upon definitions of professional education as elaborated in actual practice, and upon the institutions which will use it. I assume that the theological curriculum as sketched in the article presents a working definition of professional education with the understanding that it rests on two years of junior college. It is not clear to me whether this is meant to apply only to institutions like the University of Chicago. Let me consider it, however, with reference to independent schools having no university affiliation, for these bulk large in the total picture of theological education.

By description, the humanities and the social sciences would be included in the second year of the theological curriculum. The suggestion is made that neighboring institutions might supplement the teaching of these subjects. In some instances this is feasible, but in many it is quite impossible, either because there are no such institutions or because a practicable financial arrangement cannot be made. In these cases one of two results would follow—work in the humanities and social sciences after Sophomore year in college would not be given, or it must be given by members of theological faculties. Neither prospect is inviting. In the first case, men are shut out from such acquaintance with many of the most important elements in human culture as is gained in the upper half

of college. In the second case, two questions become acute: Are theological faculties equipped to teach in a curriculum which has been broadened to absorb work now done in the upper two years of college? Are theological schools' libraries, already admittedly weak as a class even for their present task, in sight of adequacy for the enlarged task they would thus have to support?

If the proposal is inherently sound, many of these difficulties, real enough now, might eventually be removed. But is the proposal one which commends itself by its own worth? Of the many questions needing to be considered, I mention only three.

The first has to do with the year of internship. This is highly valuable when well administered and probably has significant values even when there is no supervision at all by the theological school. But in institutions not equipped to handle it wisely, it offers a temptation to rationalize the students' necessities and the faculty's short-handedness, to call the results "education," and to present them toward a diploma. Several institutions now offering a year of internship, probably because they recognize the experimental character of the undertaking, have added it to, and not substituted it for, existing elements in the curriculum. But, quite apart from its inherent value, if it is proposed to present a year of internship as one of six years in preparation for the ministry, the net result obviously is an increase in the proportion given the strictly professional element in a total course which has already been reduced from seven to six years.

But what will be the long-term effect of reducing the length of preparation for the ministry and at the same time subordinating two-thirds of the minister's entire preparatory career to the professional aim? Knowledge is increasing, society's problems steadily grow more complex, and one would suppose that increased, rather than decreased, time is required in preparation for a function as complex as that of the ministry in such a world; yet this abbreviates the preparation, and, as I understand it, the proposal would move theological education over toward the schools of a vocational type whose chief business is to train men in skills for the job. If our main purpose is to produce ministers who are vocational experts, this would seem a wise program, with the possibility that it could be shortened still more. In proportion as our aim is broader, however, one may ask whether such a policy does not become increasingly questionable.

Another alternative has recently been mentioned, though not yet sufficiently discussed. It has been suggested that public recognition be given to two levels or classes of theological education, one as a sort of "Class A,"

another as a "Class B," the latter with reduced requirements and offering a more frankly professionalized education. Perhaps such a plan will eventually commend itself, but thus far it has seemed objectionable to those who have studied its implications, for it raises difficulties at least as great as it promises to solve. One of the chief objections is the possibility that such a policy might create and then solidify artificial strata in the ministry and indirectly harm the institutions it would be designed to aid.

But in any case, now while such matters are fluid and we have open choices, it is an excellent time to open this question up fully: Is it the part of wisdom to ask theological faculties to take over three out of the five academic years during which a student prepares for the ministry? After all is said, we in the theological schools are churchmen in the sense that our interests are inevitably bound up with organized religion and its institutions. I assume that theological education, in the nature of the case, would be a sorry affair if there were no fire of vital commitment in it; yet I should like to cite two examples of what can happen when the ministry is taught *principally* from such sources. During the conflict from the second to the fourth centuries between the bishops and those independent Christian teachers who were not properly of the clergy, the independent teachers were submerged and then disappeared. Education for the ministry passed into the hands of the clergy and occupied itself almost wholly with the Christian tradition and learning the clerical functions. Other learning was minimized or got at second hand by the clergy from the clergy. The intellectual deterioration in the church of the fifth century and afterward is a familiar story. Certainly other forces were operative, for barbarians were ravaging the world. But this policy must have contributed to the intellectual decline at the very time when freedom of spirit and spiritual security were needed.

The second example is modern: the many "institutes" and "colleges" where—if Dean Colwell will forgive me—the program here contemplated has been substantially in force already for some years. Sincerity of motive in these institutions is not open to question. Indeed, they provide excellent examples of highly effective professional education sheltered from the free flow of ideas in the humanities and social sciences. Let inbreeding of faculties take place for a while under such circumstances, and will there not be an inevitable tendency toward a reliance upon the churchman's interpretation of science and history and a discounting of "secular" learning?

If we propose a shortened, heavily professionalized program for general adoption, are we not encouraging similar results elsewhere and lending weight to what Dean Colwell so aptly calls "the charge that divinity

education is flabby and soft, concerned more with piety than learning"? We have recently been invited from abroad to think in terms of the next thousand years of history, with some sight of what the first year of it is to be. As I write these lines, it looks as if much that we have valued most in civilization must go down in Europe. The Christian ministry may be one of the most urgently needed carriers of those values which lie in man's intellectual achievements, as well as in the ones we more specifically call "religious." It does not seem the most fortunate time, just now, to begin asking how much we can pare off from the preparation of ministers.

L. J. SHERRILL

Louisville Presbyterian Seminary

MY MAJOR criticism of Dean Colwell's exciting paper is his failure, in his proposal to eliminate the last two years of college, to take into account the time factor in education. The same criticism applies to President Hutchins' telescoping of the Bachelor of Arts degree. If the sharpening of the intellect, the acquisition of a body of facts, and the training in method be the aim of education, my objection falls. But knowledge is not the only goal of education. Insight and understanding are at least equally desirable. But time is an ingredient in the getting of wisdom. Theology may be the queen of the sciences, but it is not an exact science, like chemistry or biology. The Harvard Faculty Committee on Personnel, appointed last year by President Conant, states in its report that the average age of students receiving their doctorate in physics is about two years lower than the average age in the humanities and the social sciences.

Obviously, the two extra years in college will not insure the getting of wisdom by the prospective theological student. There is some point to William H. Sheldon's thesis that the study of theology be postponed until the sixtieth year. Nevertheless, the two years of late-adolescent growth which Dean Colwell proposes to eliminate can be a period of brooding, of becoming familiar with an increasingly complex body of experience, of general growth. The lack of it may not interfere with efficient craftsmanship in the ministry; I fear it may mean unripe spirits and impoverished minds.

Dean Colwell's proposal for a reorganization of the curriculum can, of course, be carried out without emasculating the college course. I like the bold simplicity of his first two units and the individualized program of Unit IV, although he seems to me to skimp on the study of the theory of arts of the ministry, which presumably are to be practiced in Unit III. I am not, however, prepared to admit educational defeat for the policy

of carrying on field work alongside of seminary work. For one thing the juxtaposition of the two kinds of activity presents exactly the problem the minister faces all his life. The seminary can help him solve it. I think the year's internship an excellent, but by no means a foolproof, device. (Ministers must be found who know how to teach their apprentices, give genuinely graded experience, and resist the temptation to exploit.) But I think Dean Colwell errs in describing as "specious" the claim for the educational value of practical training during the seminary course.

As a matter of fact, no theological school has yet made more than a gesture toward seizing the educational opportunity field work offers. I believe that some theological school will make educational history when it arranges for controlled and graded field work and provides adequate supervision. Let me point in the direction of what I here mean by "adequacy" by referring to schools of social work, where an instructor has a full-time job supervising a maximum of a dozen students doing case work. Where is the theological school which will move in that direction and, by linking theory and practice in a single concurrent process, ground the one and illuminate the other?

A. C. McGIFFERT, JR.

Pacific School of Religion

DEAN COLWELL has put us all in his debt by what he has said about the present state of theological education. "Something is wrong," he tells us, "with the way the seminaries are setting about their teaching." I believe that he is right in this. I believe further that he is right in his diagnosis of what is wrong. This he finds to be the seminary's failure to recognize the fundamental difference which separates professional from graduate study.

The characteristic feature of professional education is that it aims to train men to perform a special function in the life of the community. The characteristic feature of graduate education is that it aims to train men to be specialists in some particular branch of knowledge. Education of the first kind, if it is to be successful, must have constantly in mind the particular function for which it is to train men. It must choose its studies because of their contribution to this end and must be guided in its decisions by the bearing of the choices made upon the realization of this same end.

Graduate education, on the other hand, will vary in its method according to the nature of the particular specialty for which the individual student is to be trained. And since the subjects open to such treatment

are unlimited in number, it will carry specialization as far as the resources at the disposition of the institution make that possible. The present seminaries, with scarcely an exception, are applying the methods appropriate to a graduate school to professional education, and as a result are in danger of turning out graduates who are neither effective ministers nor competent professors. This is true, Dean Colwell believes, both of the independent seminaries and of those which are parts of universities or have university affiliation.

The remedy which Dean Colwell proposes for these chaotic conditions is a simplified and unified course. He would give the first two years of the course to comprehensive surveys: the first year, to the Christian tradition; the second, to the world in which the church must function. These would be followed by a year of internship in which the student would have no required work in the seminary but would spend his time in supervised practical work in some convenient parish. A final year would be given to a more specialized course, to be determined largely by the student's own interests and needs.

I am so fully in accord with Dean Colwell's criticism of present seminary methods that I need not take any further time in amplifying his diagnosis. It may be worth while, however, to consider how the present situation has come about.

While many different factors have helped to bring about the situation in which we find ourselves, I believe the determining factor is the doubt which has been thrown, by the revolutionary results of historical and critical study, upon the generally accepted view of the function of the Christian church. When there was general agreement as to the church's function and mission, it was possible to have a unified professional curriculum. When there was question as to this function, it was easy to fill the gap with specialized studies, each useful in its place but unrelated and so often as confusing as helpful.

I suggest, therefore, that the physician who would prescribe a remedy for the present chaotic condition of our theological education must first answer this question: Is the church a society with a definite gospel and a distinctive mission for which it is the business of the seminary to train men; or is it (as many people think of it today) just one among many welfare agencies ready to turn its hand to any job which may need doing—an agency, to be sure, with a definite historical tradition and certain powerful emotional associations but with no inner principle of unity other than the general desire to be of service, a desire which it shares with humanitarians of every kind?

Until this question has been definitely answered, it is impossible to

plan a seminary curriculum that will have the unity and definiteness which are necessary for successful professional education. One reason why so many seminaries have been ready to base their educational procedure on the model of the graduate school is that this is a convenient way of evading a frank facing of this central question. It is the unique service of Karl Barth that he has put this basic question into the center of theological discussion. One may disagree with Barth's own definition of the Christian gospel and yet agree with him that the seminary which is to train effective ministers must have a conception of their calling as definite and distinct as his.

I suggest, therefore, as a point of departure for any general discussion of the theological curriculum, the following principles: (1) It is the function of the church to witness to the Christian gospel; to point out its application, first, to the lives of its own members and through them to the society of which they are part, and to supply through worship the dynamic which will make these principles effective in conduct. (2) It is the function of the seminary to discover, to define, and to interpret the Christian gospel; to show its application to the life of the individual and of society; to bring together the evidence from past history and experience of its practicability for life and to fit the prospective minister to use in its application the special instrument which religion puts at his service, that is, worship, public and private.

Dean Colwell's statement does not make clear how far he would accept these principles as valid for his own program. There is nothing in what he has written that is inconsistent with them, but it would make a great difference in the way the basic courses of the first two years are treated if what may be implicit in his plea for a unified theological education is made explicit. The acceptance of these principles as the regulative feature in all theological education will determine the choice of specific subjects of study, the angle from which each is approached, and the proportion of time which is given to each. It will restore theology to its central place in the curriculum as the study which formulates the gospel to be interpreted and applied and will regard all the other studies in the seminary either as data for the determination of the content of the gospel or as helps in devising the methods of its application.

What I have written amounts to a plea for the restoration of theology in its historic sense, as the formulation of the principles by which the Christian lives, to its central place in the church and so in the seminary. The trouble with the old seminary was not that it put theology at the heart of its curriculum but that its theology was of the wrong kind. The remedy is not less theology but more of the right kind.

The events of the last five years have been demonstrating with terrifying insistence the world's need of a unifying gospel. We Christians profess to believe that we have such a gospel and that it, and it alone, can furnish the cohesive force which modern society needs if it is not to disintegrate. If this be true, we cannot think of theology as one only among many other studies in an overcrowded curriculum. It must be the very heart and center of our seminary concern, the organizing principle in the light of which everything else that is studied is given its appropriate place.

WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN

Union Theological Seminary

DEAN COLWELL'S article is full of pungent constructive criticism. At the outset he distinguishes between professional and graduate training and insists that "the fundamental character of the differences which separate them" be recognized. I agree with him that the large majority of the seminaries are not equipped to do graduate work of university standard. For this reason they should be strictly professional schools, limiting themselves to the three-year course for the B.D. degree, some of them offering a fourth year of extended professional training leading to the degree of Th.M. But this should not preclude the possibility of a few adequately equipped seminaries offering work on a high graduate level toward the Th.D. degree or (if they are affiliated with a university) the Ph.D. degree and at the same time continuing to give excellent professional training to the students who are condidates for the B.D. degree. Surely there is as great need for research in the theological disciplines as in any of those in the university. This research work must be done by the theological seminaries themselves, for the graduate schools of the universities are usually not interested and too often lack the necessary sympathetic understanding. Moreover, should not some provision be made for those students who desire to major along theological lines, rather than philosophical, and who wish to secure a Doctor's degree and ultimately teach in a theological seminary?

But what is Dean Colwell's specific prescription for better theological education? His first step would be "to begin the seminary program at the end of the junior college program." This is strange counsel indeed. In order to raise our educational standards in the ministry, we should require for entrance but two years of college instead of four! The complaint of most of the seminaries for years has been that college graduates are coming to them inadequately prepared. We do not believe that the solution is to turn to junior college graduates but rather to seek the full

co-operation of the standard colleges in giving the prospective theological students the best pre-seminary training possible. And by "the best" we mean a training that will provide a broad and comprehensive foundation. The danger of too early specialization is being recognized today in all professional fields.

One of the pressing tasks of the church is to win and hold college-trained men and women. Can she do this with ministers who have never finished college and who lack the broad cultural education of many in the congregation? Dean Colwell would shorten the period of training for ministers in order to lessen the danger of having their religious faith destroyed or at least dulled. The important factor here is not the time element but the vitality of the spiritual life of faculty and students. The seminary should provide activities "that would keep devotion deep and steady." It is further argued that to begin the seminary program at the end of the junior college course would make a larger number of interested students available. But the primary problem is the getting of not more men but better men and better-trained ones. To accomplish this, outstanding men must be encouraged through a presentation of the claims of the ministry. The weaker ones must be discouraged. The junior college serves as one sieve; we need the last two years of college as a second.

To Dean Colwell's "mythical seminary of tomorrow" we have several objections. There is space to mention but one or two. For years the American Association of Theological Schools has been speaking out against the practice followed by some colleges of offering for the B.A. degree courses which properly belong in a seminary curriculum. The proposal Dean Colwell makes is that the courses which properly belong in the college curriculum be offered in the seminary as partial fulfilment of the requirements for the B.D. degree. Even with the elimination of the present padding and duplication in the theological curriculum, three years would still be all too short a time to prepare men adequately for the ministry. Transferring college work to the seminary will only aggravate the problem. For the seminary staff to transfer this part of the work to a neighboring college or university would not lighten the *student's* work and in many cases would result in the university faculty undermining the faith which the seminary was endeavoring to build up.

What program, then, would I propose? For admission to the seminary, a B.A. degree from a fully accredited college, a degree which gives convincing evidence that a broad and sure foundation has been laid. During the first year in the seminary, survey courses would give the student a true perspective in the biblical, historical, theological, and practical de-

partments. In the second and third years the student, under expert counsel, would select many courses from prescribed "groups" and some from the free elective list. The course units of the curriculum need not be "isolated" and "insulated." Integration is essential and possible. While pursuing the course outlined above, the student (because "padding" and "senseless duplication" had been eliminated) could carry on, under careful supervision, a limited amount of outside religious work. In this way he would be able to see the bearing of the courses in the seminary upon the practical work of the ministry, to keep alive his religious faith through opportunity for expression, and to gain some actual experience before assuming his first charge.

EDWARD H. ROBERTS
American Association of Theological Schools
Princeton, New Jersey

EVERYONE associated with theological education knows that there is general dissatisfaction with the inherited theological curriculum. Independent seminaries yield to the temptation of imitating the methods of the university, with the result that their graduates are not too well prepared for their professional careers. Because of limitations of staff and library equipment and, we should add, denominational pressure, the average seminary is not in position to be an effective graduate school. Nor can it be made such by the simple addition of another year to the theological curriculum. The graduate would still be out on a limb, anxiously calling for a ladder to connect him with the contemporary environment. And the synthesis of the contents of his thirty courses would not have been provided. The graduate's confusion after another year of "more of the same" would be greater than at the end of the present course. The counts in Dean Colwell's indictment against the contemporary theological curriculum are more than sustained.

But when Mr. Colwell brings forward his plan for correcting these faults, the reader follows with greater hesitation. That plan calls for the student's transfer to the campus of the theological seminary at the end of his Sophomore year, a four-year seminary course (two years in residence, an internship of a year, a fourth year of individualized work in residence), and a further, three-year apprenticeship in the graduate's first pastorate.

One immediately recalls that some of the most successful contemporary ministers did not "feel called" until after graduation from college. Moreover, until the A.B. is generally conferred at the end of the Sopho-

more year, theological graduates under this plan might finally be able to secure a B.D. but would regret missing an A.B. Would they return for the fourth year and the B.D.? Coming to the seminary at nineteen years of age and entering internship at twenty-one, would they not promptly fall in love, get married, and steer toward a permanent pastorate? Does the plan recognize that, after two years in the average American college, the student has not done much in science, psychology, or philosophy? This plan would permit indoctrination to begin altogether too early and would result in immunization against the implications of modern culture, thus widening the gap between the minister and his age. Would not the graduate from the proposed seminary resemble the graduate from a parochial school?

The idea of an internship under an experienced pastor who will take supervision seriously is, of course, to be preferred to the existing "week-end supply." The individualized courses of the fourth year will prove a heavy burden to professors already teaching Units I and II (that is, surveys of the Christian tradition and of the contemporary world as the church must deal with it—the first two years' work) and will almost cancel research activity. The staff of the average seminary could not hope to accomplish this. The three-year postgraduate apprenticeship with guidance in reading and with educational and efficiency examinations will not prove too effective because of lack of control and the sheer impossibility of pastor and professor carrying so large a burden.

In its wider implications this scheme of theological education appears ominous not so much for the Divinity School of the University of Chicago as for American theological education in general.

Would not the transfer from college to the seminary at the end of the Sophomore year tend to seal hermetically the ministerial mind against what it most needs to know? In 1640 education was dominated by the church, was authoritarian in character, was static, not experimental. It regarded knowledge as revealed, perfect, and complete. It was deductive in method and consisted of memorization of what had been taught. The school was a department of the church and education was a preparation for life and heaven. The dogmas of the church were final. The principal objectives of the school were religious, and the personality of its students was suppressed and conventionalized. In 1940 education is personal in character, developmental in philosophy. Knowledge has become relative, instrumental, empirical. Experience is basic, and induction is the method of learning. The student is more and more being permitted to find his own way.

At the end of the Sophomore year the average American ministerial student has a Bible-school mind. It could be filled with dogmas and tradition and symbolism to such an extent as to make later adjustment to environment exceedingly difficult. And at the end of the four-year course, from the cultural point of view, our recently ordained minister would have the training of an A.B. college graduate. Would not this be setting the course toward fundamentalism and to a lower cultural level as well?

Moreover, this plan does not address itself sufficiently to the main problem in contemporary theological education, namely, bridging the gap between ancient and contemporary points of view. The cure for the theological chaos of today is not earlier indoctrination and greater cultural ignorance but a new synthesis which will not attempt to obscure facts. The graduates of theological schools must be able to discover permanent values in the Bible and in the Christian tradition generally and to articulate them with the religious needs of our contemporary life, must be aware of the shortcomings of our present civilization, and must be competent to pass stern judgment upon them and to get on with the task of building the City of God. This result is less likely if the period of preparational study is shortened.

Dean Colwell says nothing about the graduate Divinity School at the University of Chicago. We sincerely hope this does not mean less emphasis upon research. The United States has too many professional divinity schools now. What it needs is the genuine graduate divinity school devoted to exact scholarship and original research; for the graduate divinity school is engaged in thoroughgoing study of the documents of the Old Testament and the New Testament, in discovering the true course of Christian history, the rise and development of the theology, worship and organization of the church, and in a scientific investigation of the problems of the contemporary church. That the entire United States can boast only a few institutions of this sort is our shame, and it should be remembered that the Divinity School of the University of Chicago was founded in the interest of research. (See the data for this statement in *Colgate Rochester Divinity School Bulletin*, February, 1939, pp. 119–34.)

CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN

Colgate-Rochester Divinity School

[EDITORIAL NOTE.—In connection with Professor Moehlman's final paragraph it is important to note that Mr. Colwell's article laid equal emphasis upon research in religion and upon professional education. He insisted merely that the distinction between the two be recognized and maintained.]

CRITICAL REVIEWS

Man in Revolt: A Christian Anthropology. By EMIL BRUNNER. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939. 564 pages. $6.00.

Miss Olive Wyon has here translated another of Brunner's volumes, *Der Mensch im Widerspruch*, which appeared three years ago, and has done it with her customary skill.

The central idea of this book on human nature is that man is to be defined and studied as a responsible being: "Man's being is inseparable from his sense of obligation." This awareness of heights not yet attained, of response not yet vouchsafed, of knowledge not yet achieved, is the core of his life and places him in fundamental contradiction with himself—a contradiction from which he painfully but vainly struggles to free himself. Since that to which he is thus related is not lower but higher than he, a man is related not to an "object" which implies that it is lower but to another subject, to a "thou." The similarity of this to the thought of Buber and Ebner is acknowledged. It is the great merit of the present volume to have brought this idea to bear upon the whole range of Christian experience and thus to have given it systematic statement.

In this light the medieval problem of the relative primacy of will and intellect, the perennial question of freedom and determinism, the acute contemporary problem of individuality and community, the body-soul controversy, the issue between the temporal and the eternal—all receive treatment. In this sense the volume is a good testimony to the integral quality of Christian thinking: all the problems are mutually involved. It becomes clear here that Brunner is out of harmony with fundamentalism —he accepts *in toto* the scientific findings about man and frankly discards biblical myths which contradict evolutionary theories of the origin of man. But relative to his main problem, these scientific questions are of secondary import; and the "splendid outline by Plato and Aristotle" of a philosophical doctrine of man has triumphed over all attempts to understand man in purely physical terms. A Christian doctrine of man must be a statement of its faith as "an act of obedience, of decision, in face of the historical revelation. . . . . In this self-surrender man experiences the meaning of his own existence"—a self-surrender to our real origin in God. For this to be possible, says Brunner, "God had to become man, in order to restore to man his original existence and knowledge, his responsibility."

Therefore man really knows himself only through Jesus Christ. Here man is called to his proper destiny, which both frees and binds him; but which gives him his very meaning as "human," that is, as responsible and as dependent. Because man has in him the image of God he can respond. So far, Brunner refuses to yield to Barth's sharper distinction between man and God and goes on to show that the responsible relation of man and God is a relation of love, and thus a basis for, but far more profound than, ethics.

Sin is the destruction of this image and yet not of the relation of responsibility; for though man may deny his origin in the Word of God (i.e., in the revelation of God's own love in creation and re-creation in Christ), he cannot repudiate the source of his own existence. But this destruction is a perversion of man's own nature, for man has remained in community but has changed love into hate, thereby perverting human life in community. Law takes the place of that imaginative love which transcends law. Is man really human when he sins? Here Brunner answers yes, for man is still responsible, even when he abandons love. At this point he takes exception to much of traditional anthropology, as indeed he does repeatedly throughout the book. In sin human life loses its contact with the world, becomes unrealistic, and then spends itself in the effort to think its way through on false premises and is consequently in lasting contradiction. Only in the Word of God is the problem of human adjustment clearly seen.

The integration of human life is thus to be sought no longer within man but beyond him, and an immanental theism does not help with this. Reason cannot push its way through except in so far as it is opened in faith to that which lies beyond reason; and mysticism, with its reliance on feeling (*sic*) in ecstasy, overlooks the essential twoness of God and man which makes responsibility, and hence humanness, possible. By the same token the freedom of the Christian man cannot be autonomy but creaturely freedom in dependence on God: it must be willing obedience to God. Since man's value lies in his divine creation, the rights of the individual in society rest back on his relation to God, his solitary relation; and the inviolability of the individual depends on his God-given power of personal decision. At the same time community rests on the voluntary association which, born of man's freedom, relates him in common dependence to his fellow-creatures. This is *agapē;* and in this loving relation of distinct and mutually complementary persons is found the *communio sanctorum.*

Personal integrity, or character, is the totality of man "understood as a unified act of decision." But this decision is limited both by the condi-

tions of the world (i.e., by creation) and by his own negative attitude (i.e., by original sin); so that character is itself caught in ambiguity. The escape lies in accepting one's self from God rather than straining to be a particular kind of self. This discovery of one's self paves the way for one's identification with humanity, not in loss of individuality, for each is different, but in common relation to God. The old body-soul dualism is here abandoned in favor of the organic person, and thus we must view life in terms of inexorable death. Yet this is precisely what leads us to come to terms with the eternal, which is actually present in the temporal world. Not that man can overcome death by any decision which he makes, but that God can answer his decision with a call to eternal life. In this life man enters the Messianic Kingdom by becoming a member of the body of Christ, and this decision means that he is restored to his relation to God after passing through complete death as a self.

This last view, which Brunner apparently takes over from Schlatter, will strike many Christians as unorthodox; but this confirms the impression gained from the present volume that Brunner thinks in far greater independence of the tradition than formerly and much more hospitably to science than formerly. He is openly critical of orthodoxy at many points. What has produced this shift?

The volume as a whole is tremendously stimulating, both for its systematic survey of the anthropological problem and for its penetrating comments on historic theological views. At the same time there is a repetitiousness which renders the book tiresome by its too constant reiteration of the main theme, though this hammering at the point may serve to strengthen the impression created.

In his main thesis Brunner seems to me to be sound: the meaning of *human* living lies in man's responsible decision. This might be construed in two ways however: that man with his ideals faces the choice between inertia and creative action; and that man stands in the presence of a personal God who calls him to obedience. Here is the real crux of the issue of anthropological thinking today. Brunner's position is quite clear: he takes the latter view and holds the former invalid in so far as it implies human autonomy or an impersonalistic view of the cosmos. The personalistic view is assumed as the base for all Christian thinking; but this is precisely the query which is being put to Christian thinkers today. Except to say "Come in faith and accept the personal God as the creator and redeemer of your life," Brunner makes no effort to meet this anxious question. Perhaps that is the only answer to give. The main problem remains: Can reason lead us to accept a personal God as the basis for this whole

view of man? To speak of faith as "reason that is opened to that which is beyond reason" does not quite meet the issue, though it must be pointed out that Brunner has dealt with this elsewhere (e.g., in his *Philosophie und Offenbarung*). The challenge of the book is the old one: decide in faith and see.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

University of Chicago

The Gospel of the Kingdom. By FREDERICK C. GRANT. New York: Macmillan Co., 1940. xvii+204 pages. $2.00.

The Haskell Lectures for 1940, delivered in the Graduate School of Theology, Oberlin College, have been made available to a larger public in this stimulating book. Professor Grant is an acknowledged leader in the field of New Testament studies. By translations of German works on form criticism and by his own writings he has interpreted the new approach to the life and teaching of Jesus and has put all students of Christian beginnings in his debt. Perhaps the outstanding value of this book is its positive appraisal of the results of these recent studies in terms of his own Christian faith.

Broadly stated, these newer studies have taught us to see that the Gospels themselves, including the traditions they incorporate, are an integral part of the background which must be studied as a whole. The mistake of the older approach lay in isolating one strand of tradition—say the apocalyptic—tracing genetic relations with the other strands or rejecting them in favor of the preferred strand and then supporting the thesis by judicious use of background material. This resulted in various portraits of Jesus, the social reformer, the founder of the church, the ethical philosopher, the fanatical apocalyptist, according to the tradition thus isolated. We now see that all our sources and the traditions they use are interpretive. They represent the impact of a person and a movement upon varied minds and communities. Only when the student is delivered from bondage to some single pure source is he in a position to reconstruct Christian beginnings. We miss the woods because of our absorption in the trees. Professor Grant has stated this, the basic position of the new approach, with vigor and brilliance.

The opening chapter, "The Jesus of History," is not another attempt after the manner of Glover to see Jesus "as he really was" but to set forth the impact of the movement identified with his name upon contemporary history. Beginning with Tacitus and moving into the Gospels whose "interests are those of the church of their time, and [whose] method

is selective," he finds evidence that the "Gospel of the Kingdom . . . . was originally a this-worldly expectation. . . . . It was supremely religious; but it was not other-worldly, nor was it apocalyptic." Subsequent chapters develop the Gospel of the Kingdom by using the test of the total background.

It is impossible within the limits of this review to do more than suggest the conclusions of the author, which are, in the nature of the case, more open to question than the method he employs. Eschatology, writes Professor Grant, is the crux of New Testament research today. "Thoroughgoing eschatology" he holds to be the most vicious result of the mistaken, older approach. Jesus was the prophet of the Kingdom. This differentiated his message from that of John the Baptist, who was a preacher of repentance in view of the impending judgment. "The claim to be Messiah was, we believe, never made by Jesus," but it "appears to be the reflection of the early church's belief. . . . . The Kingship belonged solely to God. There was no room for a Messianic king; and to claim kingship for any human being, for example himself, would have been to deny the central emphasis in all his teaching, viz. the direct, immediate control of the universe and of every event and incident in it by God himself with his unlimited power, love and mercy. . . . . To put it plainly, for Jesus to claim himself to be the head of God's Kingdom, after all he had said in his public teaching about the divine rule, would have been nothing short of blasphemy." The overemphasis on apocalyptic eschatology "has opened the door to Barthianism, with its monstrous misinterpretation of the Gospel . . . . [and its] already antiquated formulae of 'tension,' 'crisis,' 'super-historical,' 'dialectic' and all the absurd lingo of theological nihilism."

Yet Professor Grant holds a high "Christology" which rests upon "better foundations, i.e., the adequacy and finality of Jesus' revelation of God. . . . . For out of all the countless millions who have lived upon this earth he was the one person who saw things as they really are, and with the eyes of God, whose own life, character, and spirit were the perfect medium of the divine life, the divine character, the very 'Spirit' of God, and whose will was completely one with the will of God." One may sympathize fully with such a statement of faith, as this reviewer is inclined to do, and yet be a bit perplexed as to how it is derived from the background studies.

The final chapter issues in a brief summary of the church's message to the modern world. What the author writes about pacifism may be singled out because of its timeliness. Jesus was a pacifist because resistance in first-century Palestine was perfectly futile. His pacifism is cited as an in-

stance of his "superb realism." He taught "non-resistance under persecution, non-resistance of national enemies when the odds are absolutely against you, non-resentment of persecutors and enemies alike. . . . . But it lies miles on the other side of modern 'pacifism' with its fatal principle of irresponsibility." One must confess amazement at this frank opportunism. What shall be the Christian's attitude when resistance is not "perfectly" futile but only "possibly" futile?

The lecture form of the book no doubt accounts for the frequent and rather lengthy summaries designed to carry the hearer with the speaker and for repetition emphasizing the lecturer's main theses, as well as for the omission of an index, although the book is certainly meaty enough to have merited one.

No student of the New Testament can afford to miss this important contribution to the study of Christian beginnings and their meaning for Christian faith.

A. C. PURDY

Hartford Theological Seminary

The Psalms: Translated with Text-Critical and Exegetical Notes, Vols. I and II. By W. O. E. OESTERLEY. New York: Macmillan Co., 1940. xi+599 pages. $8.00.

The many different kinds of interest presented in any adequate study of the Book of Psalms demand unusually wide and varied learning as well as maturity of scholarship. Few modern scholars meet these requirements as satisfactorily as Professor W. O. E. Oesterley. He has ranged widely over the whole field of Old Testament studies and has made the rise and development of Judaism his own special province.

The commentary opens with fourteen brief but remarkably succinct treatments of the major questions relating to the study of the Psalms. Four of the chapters are written by Professor T. H. Robinson. Of these, the treatment of the forms of Hebrew poetry is a model of concise statement. The suggestive and useful methods of G. B. Gray in *The Forms of Hebrew Poetry* are employed to good advantage. In the commentary proper the parallelism is presented in graphic manner, not always, to be sure, with pleasing effect. Naturally, the metrical judgments of neither Robinson nor Oesterley will command universal assent. The discussion of the text and versions is confined to but three pages, which reminds one again of the imperative need for more extended discussions of the Old Testament text.

Professor Oesterley devotes an admirable chapter to the use of the

Psalms in the Jewish church. The fresh discussion of the Maccabean Psalms concludes with the observation that they have nowhere been incorporated into our Psalter. The perennial question as to the "I" of the Psalmist is in the main answered judiciously. Here the liturgical emphasis of Professor Oesterley stands him in good stead. He relates the Psalms effectually to their function in worship. He makes discrete use of the idea of corporate personality, yet he recognizes also that there are psalms which are the expressions of the individual worshiper. Throughout the commentary the psalms are dated with few exceptions in a very general way, that is, "pre-Exilic," "post-Exilic," "the Greek period," and the like. The commentary does not lose by this want of precise dating, however, because of the prevailing emphasis upon the *cultus* and the excellent practice of comparing each passage with other Old Testament passages. Nowhere does this prove more felicitous than in the numerous references to II Isaiah. Professor Buttenwieser has called striking attention to the close kinship of many psalms with the great prophet, but Oesterley's explanation of this similarity as due to the influence of the prophet is far more convincing than the explanation of those who affirm identity of authorship.

The way in which Oesterley makes use of the literature on the Psalms points to one of the minor defects of the commentary. Many important studies are referred to, but never in a way that convinces the reader that a thorough study has been made of them. This is conspicuously true in the case of Mowinckel's important monographs and of Hans Schmidt's well-known work, *Das Gebet des Angeklagten im Alten Testament.* There is repeated reference to both, but the latter is never mentioned by title. This might seem hypercritical, were it not for the fact that the commentary as a whole is poorly documented. This may be due to exigencies of space, yet one misses the titles of important studies even in the Bibliography. In comparison with the work of Gunkel and Kittel and others, the commentary is hardly "full-length."

A striking difference between the approach of Professor Robinson, who supplies the commentary to some twenty-two psalms, and that of Professor Oesterley appears in the position taken by each toward *Gattungforschung.* Professor Robinson begins his comment almost uniformly by reference to the literary type and form of the psalm, by a clear statement of the *Sitz im Leben,* and by a recognition of literary style and literary affinities. Professor Oesterley frequently omits most of this discussion. On the other hand, his discussion is far richer in matters concerning the cult, the festivals, and the use of the psalm in later Judaism. In general,

the religious comment of both is stimulating and helpful. Only occasionally does the commentator take occasion to stress the superiority of Christian to Jewish attitudes. Messianic ideas seem to be completely absent from the Psalter, but there are more than faint glimmerings of a genuine hope for life after death.

Professor Mowinckel's influential monograph on the *Thronsbesteigungsfest*, while far from being the first to recognize the presence of "enthronement" hymns in the Psalms, raised the discussion of mythology, particularly that phase which concerns the enthronement of the deity, to a place of importance in subsequent discussions. Oesterley sees that Mowinckel greatly exaggerates the number and significance of these poems. He would confine the number of actual enthronement hymns to those where the expression "Yahweh is become King" is found (Pss. 47, 93, 96, 97, and 99). The reason for this is that he regards the ceremonial of enthronement of Yahweh as merely the initial ceremony performed at one of the great feasts. He holds that there never was an enthronement festival in Israel. All the many passages cited by Mowinckel, Gunkel, Schmidt, and others refer only to the larger festival of which the enthronement was one element. This occasion was of course the New Year's festival, and Oesterley recognizes the presence of the many features to which Mowinckel and others call attention in many of the psalms. He recognizes, too, the numerous affinities with Babylonian and Egyptian hymns. His discussion is not too clear, but it is helpful to remember that he makes a distinction between the actual ceremony of Yahweh's enthronement and the whole New Year's festival, and that in the latter he sees the features which others find in an enthronement festival. Like Mowinckel, Oesterley (contra Hans Schmidt) recognizes the presence of eschatology in the enthronement poems, but he parts company with Mowinckel in the latter's view that the entire eschatological drama has its source in the festival of Yahweh's ascent to his throne. He comes nearest to Gunkel in his view of the nature and growth of this eschatological interest, and where he does not follow Gunkel his criticism is weak. If there were originally secular hymns of the enthronement of the king, as Gunkel very plausibly holds, why do we not have any of them?

Of Oesterley's many useful books, this is probably the most useful. It is temperate where it is easy to be excessive, restrained where there has been want of restraint, judicious where careful discrimination is needed. It is not an exhaustive or even a thorough piece of work, but it is surprisingly comprehensive and well proportioned. There are many omissions in the literature cited, but it cannot be said that the value of the

commentary has been impaired. It is no mere reviewer's rhetoric to call this latest commentary on the Psalms the most useful, the most instructive, and in some respects the most attractive in English.

JAMES MUILENBURG

Pacific School of Religion

The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century. By PERRY MILLER. New York: Macmillan Co., 1939. 528 pages. $3.75.

One of the basic ills of American Protestantism today is that it is suffering from too much of the immediate and the contemporaneous. It is, indeed, almost completely bogged down in the mess in which the world now finds itself. As a result its most vocal leaders exude pessimism with almost every breath. Too much of our contemporary theology is coming out of the confused and tragic European background, and much of it has little practical application to our present American needs. For a long time American Protestantism has been crying out for an American theologian, worthy of the name, to lead in the creation of an American theology. But where is such a Moses to be found? True, we are in the midst of what seems to be a revival of interest in the history of American Christian thought, but it is an interest on the part of scholars in English literature and among historians and not among theologians. They are still looking for all their leads from across the Atlantic. The present volume is a worthy example of such an interest on the part of an English scholar. And may that interest grow, wherever it can find rootage, from more to more!

We are accustomed to thinking of the Puritan's theology as gloomy and of his conception of life as a tragic and brief sojourn in this vale of tears. But the Puritans never doubted the ultimate triumph of a righteous cause. They "remembered their cosmic optimism in the midst of anguish; they were too busy waging war against sin, too intoxicated with the exultation of the conflict to find occasional reversals, however costly, any cause for deep discouragement." Among New England Puritans the basic certainty was that no adversity could be so immense as to cause complete despair. The Puritan was sure that "God has set limits to every malignity," and the source of his confidence was that he believed "all things are ordered after the best manner, that serene and inviolate above the clouds of man's distress shines the sun of a glorious harmony." If I had to choose between the kind of Calvinism which guided the life of seventeenth-century New Englanders and the kind which is coming out of Europe today, I would, without a moment's hesitation, accept the New England variety. The first created a cosmic optimism, the latter a cosmic pessimism.

Piety, Mr. Miller points out, was only half of Puritanism. To the Puritan the "intellectual elements were adjuncts to faith." Among the attributes of God, he believed, was perfect rationality, as well as absolute will and sovereignty, and since man is created in the image of God he delights that his rational creatures should search after knowledge; that his ministers should propogate it; indeed, he expects them to be foster-fathers of knowledge; "faith must keep reason at heel" (p. 69). Hence the New England emphasis upon education. Though the New England minister simplified his sermonic explanations as much as possible and avoided the more abstruse issues, yet he did not hesitate to put his congregation through the most difficult dialectical paces and take them over lofty metaphysical hurdles impossible for modern congregations (p. 68).

The book is divided into four sections, each having four chapters, as follows: Book I: "Religion and Learning"; Book II: "Cosmology"; Book III: "Anthropology"; and Book IV: "Sociology." Since practically all early New England thought was the product of ministers, each of the above divisions is deeply colored by Puritan religious ideas. The bulk of the material upon which the book is based is made up of the sermons of the seventeenth-century New England clergy and their other writings. With these Mr. Miller has thoroughly saturated himself, and the product is a solid book of lasting value. The closing section containing chapters on the various kinds of covenants is particularly enlightening for the student of both religion and politics in New England.

With the publication of this book the author announces that he has begun a series of volumes to be devoted to the intellectual history of New England, which is to extend through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He therefore conceives the present volume as merely setting the stage for what is to follow. In this ambitious project the author has set himself a worthy lifetime task.

Most recent writers on New England have stressed the rebels and neglected the orthodox; Mr. Miller, however, has reversed the emphasis, for he has devoted his entire attention to the orthodox and has almost totally excluded the rebels. For instance, the names of William Pynchon and John Wheelright are not mentioned, while there are but four casual references to Roger Williams and only one to Robert Child. Mr. Miller's former study, *Orthodoxy in Massachusetts*, has doubtless led him in this direction.

The book contains no bibliography and the notes do not contain references to sources for the great majority of the quotations which abound throughout the book. One might wish that the author had been

more meticulous in this regard. One wonders why a book of such importance has been published in a format which gives it the appearance of a government document.

WILLIAM W. SWEET

University of Chicago

Religion for Free Minds. By JULIUS SEELYE BIXLER. New York: Harper & Bros., 1939. xii+247 pages. $2.50.

Professor Bixler has been provoked by the irrationalism of our day to make a strong restatement and reaffirmation of liberalism. He points out that since the last war there has been a "turn of the tide toward unreason," which has taken various forms. The escape of symbolic logicians from reality into a realm of pure ideas, the fear of ideas on the part of social scientists, the exaltation of the unconscious by psychiatrists, the surrealist movement in art, the naturalistic emphasis in literature, and the defense of violence in social conflict are all expressions of this tendency. But it is the unreason of contemporary theology, especially of Barthianism, which disturbs him most. He has no sympathy with the Barthian separation of nature from grace, the attack upon human reason, the preoccupation with sin and failure, the removal of faith and revelation beyond the reach of rational criticism. In short, he cannot see in this theology "anything but a hindrance to the honest seeker for religious truth."

The point of view from which Professor Bixler attacks the Barthian supernaturalism is not that of the naturalism and empiricism of Wieman and his followers but that of a provisional dualism. Spirit is irreducible to nature, and reason must interpret experience by a priori ideas and values. He is nearer to Platonic dualism than to Hegelian idealism in his conception of the relation of spirit and nature. Action and contemplation, impulse and ideal, are two aspects of a living process which should work together in fruitful tension. But this tension is never wholly resolved into harmony. Hence the emphasis of the liberal upon "continuous and renewed criticism," his sense that "things are on the move," his aversion to the dogmas and systems of rationalists. His philosophy must be one which takes account of the "free energies of men, which places them in the world of nature and accepts them as given data on which to build" (p. 10). It is because of William James's vivid realization of this that his philosophy is taken by Professor Bixler as "a starting point for the liberal." But since

James did not have a clear insight into the rational principles and spiritual ideals which should direct vital energies, his philosophy must be supplemented by Santayana's philosophy of aesthetic contemplation, Dewey's implicit conviction that social good is absolute, and Royce's proof that subjective purpose requires for its fulfilment objective truth. In other words, the religious liberal must recognize rational standards and absolute values if he is to discipline and refine natural impulses. The influence of Plato and Scheler at this and other points is at least as strong as that of the American philosophers who have just been mentioned.

In the suggestive chapters at the end of the book Professor Bixler argues that abstractions such as death, time, and mystery play an important part in religion, but that in high religion devotion to absolute values is central. Thus the mystery of God's holiness is interpreted by the prophets in terms of a goodness which is intelligible to men because it is continuous with their own moral ideals. God is thus transcendent as the "God of values," in that his goodness is absolute and beyond our achievement; but he is not "wholly other" than ourselves. But Professor Bixler is equally insistent that the "God of existence," who shows himself in nature, is limited in power. Indeed, if we take the problem of evil seriously, we must hold that there is dualism in God as there is in man. But in neither case is the dualism absolute, and religion is chiefly concerned with the living process by which impulse is brought into harmony with idea, nature with spirit. It is only as we actively acknowledge the claims of absolute value upon us and meet the demands imposed upon us by our actual situation, our *Existenz*, that we can know God. This does not mean that religion and moral effort are identical; rather, in religion there must be a rhythm, an alternation of action and contemplation, work and worship. Philosophers from Plato to Whitehead exemplify in their theory and practice the fact that dualism cannot be denied but can be overcome progressively by such an alternation.

The chief value of this book is that it vigorously defends the distinctive reality of the human spirit and its values and, at the same time, sees spirit in its dynamic relation with nature. Its chief weakness, perhaps, is its neglect of certain distinctive insights of Christianity, especially the depth of human sin in the will and the need of divine grace. Only these insights, I think, can save those of us who still call ourselves liberals from falling into the humanism and moralism with which the Barthians reproach us.

GEORGE F. THOMAS

University of North Carolina

The Book of Revelation. By E. F. Scott. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940. 191 pages. $2.00.

This book, I fear, is foredoomed to a sad fate, for the many people who should read it almost certainly will not, while those who will read it with deep appreciation—and they, too, will be many—will not need it and most certainly will find little new. Thus it will probably share the fate of most missionary endeavors. This is far less an adverse criticism of the book than of American Christianity. The volume is a convenient and, in fact, altogether admirable description of the precipitate or useful residue from the many experiments which have been performed upon the luckless Apocalypse.

It is an apocalypse and, as such, shares their qualities. "Probably there is nothing in Revelation which is to be taken quite literally"; in fact, "in so far as there is any direct prophecy in the book, it was only guesswork, and was falsified by the event." It drew its material from many sources—Jewish, Christian, and pagan alike—although the author knew why he chose what he did; yet he frequently did not know where it came from. It is not a Jewish apocalypse made over by a coat of four-hour Christian enamel. There is a temptation to make it too regular by lopping off everything which seems to mar its strict unity. It was written in the year 96 A.D. or shortly after. The number 666 clearly indicates Nero, while the variant 616 makes this identification certain. The author was a man named John and an Asian Christian; all else about him is highly speculative, save that he did not write the Fourth Gospel or the three enigmatic epistles. The seven letters in the early chapters are an integral part of the writing; the seeming discrepancies are accounted for when one sees that in the body of the book the church is contrasted with the world, hence all hands together against a common foe; in the letters it is contrasted with its own ideal and hence may, and should, be castigated. The apparent confusion and repetition in the book, especially in the central section, are due in part to the nature of the sources employed—the triple repetition of woes, each seeming utterly to denude the earth, represents the combination of three versions of the same series—and in part to the author's deliberate plan, for he delights to mingle scenes in seeming disorder. Thus he lengthens intentionally the middle section of the book, which is all of a character, to make the reader aware of the utter chaos which prevails at the breakdown of nature; but he interjects an interlude between each two series of woes to break the monotony. There is very little need to manipulate the various sections into a better order or to fear that the present text has been mutilated; the warning curse in the epilogue

has probably been as effective as that which rests over the bones of Shakespeare. The Revelation is not to be regarded as simply bizarre, a *rara avis* from the unenlightened past. Its main ideas are those which prevailed generally in the church at the close of the first century. Not only does it show amazing similarities, as well as differences, when compared with Hebrews and the Fourth Gospel, because all three were grounded in a common Christianity, but our New Testament would be conspicuously incomplete without it. Nor is it unwholesome to find one's self face to face with the fact and implications of judgment. It is so easy to stress the theme of mercy to such an extent that the Fatherhood of God lapses into an innocuous papahood. The book may be poor prophecy, yet in a deeper sense it is the truest of prediction because of the essential rightness of its main principles: the spiritual will triumph eventually over the material; tyranny will defeat itself; the blood of the martyrs will not always cry in vain; the cause of Christ must and will prevail.

When you find these emphases—none of them startlingly new, to be sure—couched in an interesting style, stated with perfect lucidity and without ill temper or rancor (Dr. Scott is still set for the defense of the Gospel in the midst of a world of critics gone wild, but not so conspicuously as in *The Validity of the Gospel Record*), and with the judgment and acumen which he possesses, you can be sure of a good book.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

Crozer Theological Seminary

A Sacramental Universe: Being a Study in the Metaphysics of Experience. By ARCHIBALD A. BOWMAN. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939. xxviii+428 pages. $3.00.

Perhaps the best thing in this book is the skill with which the author lifts into clear light the major issues emerging in modern thought. He discusses Santayana and Whitehead along with a number of others because he wishes to oppose the naturalism which they represent and which he regards as not only false but dangerous to all that is noble and good in human life. By naturalism he means the view which refuses to allow to spirit any ontological independence of matter or the physical. Positively stated, it is the view that the spiritual part of life is dependent upon the physical processes of nature and can have no existence apart from these, although these can exist apart from the spirit.

The constructive part of Bowman's book aims to demonstrate that spirit and the physical processes of nature are ontologically independent

and separable. Spirit, he declares, is just as autonomous as is any physical process of nature. There are, indeed, two kinds of reality, each ontologically independent of the other. One is made up of "subjective events," and this is spirit. The other is the physical, which he describes as "a self-contained and indefeasibly non-subjective system of functionally related particulars." "Any monistic prejudice which tends to obscure the absoluteness of the cleavage between these two ultimate modes of being (the spiritual and the physical) is fatal to an understanding of either" (p. 10).

According to Bowman, when these two independent modes of being unite they generate sensory and perceptual qualities. Out of this union comes a world that is not only both physical and spiritual but a world in which the physical takes on meaning, purpose, and value by reason of its connection with the spiritual. This connection of the physical with the spiritual, by which the spiritual acquires corporeality and the physical acquires meaning, purpose, and value, is what he means by a sacramental universe. When "nature reflects the life of spirit in meanings that spirit imparts to the inanimate and non-spiritual," nature becomes sacramental.

He confesses that in defending this dualism of physical and spiritual he is fighting against important movements of modern thought. Santayana, Whitehead, Bergson, Dewey, S. Alexander, S. B. Holt, and many others display the purpose "to exhibit reality and nature as one." They "ignore [more correctly deny] the cleavage between nature and spirit." Bowman then goes on to say that this endeavor to ignore or deny the cleavage is characteristic of the present era of thought. "Having purged the concept of reality, as far as possible, of every vestige of the non-natural, the philosophy of the present era proceeds to reinterpret the natural in terms that are saturated with suggestions of a spiritual significance." Bowman thinks this is a very dangerous procedure and has written his book to fight it.

What Bowman and others like him seem unable to appreciate in the work of Santayana, Whitehead, and other representatives of this "philosophy of the modern era" is that these men are doing their work under the control of a great insight. The insight is that there is a stream of the process of nature which is forever working, against great obstacles, to magnify the qualitative richness of conscious experience. Santayana might say that this stream works only in human beings and perhaps only in relatively few of them, but the others would go much farther than that, with Dewey in a somewhat doubtful position because of the ambi-

guity of his statements. But with all of them this qualitative richness is the goal of life. Their philosophies are attempts to reconstruct traditional ideas in such a way as to make this insight intelligible. Perhaps they have not succeeded. Perhaps their work to date is very inadequate, as accomplishment is likely to be in a new movement of the human spirit. But one should understand, at least, what they are trying to do.

Science had to throw off the smothering folds of naturalistic animism in order to get started and attain its present high level, says Bowman quite correctly. These new naturalists, says he, are trying to re-establish a kind of sophisticated animism. In the interest of science, religion, art, and all the achievements of culture, they must be stopped. This is Bowman's thesis.

HENRY N. WIEMAN

University of Chicago

The Elizabeth Day McCormick Apocalypse, Vol. I: *A Greek Corpus of Revelation Iconography*. By HAROLD R. WILLOUGHBY; Vol. II: *History and Text*. By ERNEST CADMAN COLWELL. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940. Vol. I, xxxviii+602 pages. 72 collotypes. 1 colored plate. $20.00. Vol. II, xiii+171 pages. 5 collotypes, 1 colored plate. $7.50. The two volumes, $25.00.

In briefest description, the Elizabeth Day McCormick Apocalypse is a copy, written between 1600 and 1650, of a translation of the Apocalypse of St. John into vernacular Greek by Maximos the Peloponnesian, together with a commentary which is in the main that of Andreas of Caesarea, and with sixty-nine illustrations. In these two volumes the translation and the illustrations are reproduced in full with most elaborate discussions of the history of the codex, of the text and commentary, and especially of the iconography, by two scholars equipped with special knowledge of Byzantine biblical texts and of Byzantine miniature art.

It may be asked: What is the justification for so sumptuous a publication of a seventeenth-century manuscript of a late Greek vernacular version of a single New Testament book? As a contribution to the textual criticism of the Bible its value is negligible. Professor Colwell's careful examination shows that the translation was made from a manuscript belonging to what Professor J. Schmid describes as "one of the most worthless groups of the Andreas text" of the Apocalypse. The commentary is mainly that of Andreas, well known from many better copies, with additions from Arethas. The codex has greater importance as a contribution to the history of the Greek vernacular Bible. Vernacular Bibles have never

been favored in the Greek church, but it is significant that the Apocalypse was not accepted in the Byzantine church as canonical until about the fourteenth century. Most of the Greek manuscripts of this book are of the fifteenth century or later. A translation of it into the common language of the day would, therefore, be less likely to arouse objections than a translation of the Gospels. The question then arises whether there is any connection between this version and the vernacular New Testament printed at Geneva in 1638 under the name of Maximos of Gallipoli. Professor Colwell is inclined to think that Maximos of Gallipoli may be identical with Maximos the Peloponnesian; but the evidence of identity is less than nil. The name Maximos is so common as hardly to furnish even a presumption of identity. The literary activity of the Peloponnesian seems to have ranged between 1600 and 1615, and since one of the four extant copies of his Apocalypse is dated 1601, the version itself must be not later than 1600, whereas the Gallipolite's version is dated about 1632. The two translations are, in fact, quite different, and the full preface of the Gallipolite makes no reference (as it well might have done) to any previous essay. The sole, and very shadowy, link is the fact that Cyril Lucar was associated with both men; but the Peloponnesian fell out of his favor about 1608, and there is no evidence that he ever came under the Protestant influence, to which the Geneva version was due. It therefore seems probable that the two men are distinct and the two versions unrelated.

But the main interest of the McCormick codex is not literary but artistic; and here it is unique. Dr. Montague James, who knew more about medieval iconography in general and about illuminated apocalypses in particular than any other man, stated in his Schweich Lectures for 1927 (published in 1931) that he had failed to find any indication that the Apocalypse as a separate book with pictures existed in Greek lands. There were illustrated apocalypses in Russia from the sixteenth century onward, and there are wall paintings at Athos and elsewhere of similar date; but these have nothing to do with the McCormick series. Professor Willoughby examines and describes most carefully every series of Apocalypse pictures, both Eastern and Western, and in each case the conclusion is the same, that they have no connection with the McCormick pictures. All other Eastern illustrations of the Apocalypse descend ultimately from a set of fourteen woodcuts produced by Albrecht Dürer in 1698. These were expanded by Lucas Cranach into a series of twenty-one, prepared for Luther's New Testament of 1522–23, which served as model for many editions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Their influence extended to the East, where they provided the basis for a set of twenty-one mural paintings executed toward the end of the sixteenth century at the Monastery of Dionysion on Mt. Athos. Here, though the style of painting is Byzantine, the disposition and treatment of the subjects follow Cranach. The Russian apocalypses also are obviously influenced by the Dürer-Cranach woodcuts, though they have Eastern features of their own.

The uniqueness of the McCormick series becomes, therefore, the more apparent the more it is examined, and it is very unfortunate that Dr. James did not live to produce the introduction which he had promised to contribute to this publication. Nothing, however, could exceed the thoroughness of Professor Willoughby's examination of every iconographic aspect of the codex, aided as he has been by all the resources of the Princeton Index of Christian Art and by many scholars with special knowledge. The illustrations are reproduced in full in collotype, with a frontispiece in color to each volume; and 378 pages are devoted to a detailed description of them, page by page. Artistically they are uneven in quality, some being crude in design (and one gathers also in color), while others show a higher sense of pattern and greater strength in execution. The second half of the codex is the work of a better artist than the first; the angel with the sickle (Rev. 14:14) is particularly effective, and the grouping is generally less confused and follows firmer lines of design. The whole cannot compare in splendor and inventiveness with the best of the great Anglo-French apocalypses of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; but it has the merit of being definitely Byzantine (whatever traces of Persian influence may be seen, which, in our judgment, do not amount to much) and is a creditable production of the Greek church.

It should be added that at about the beginning of the eighteenth century the manuscript belonged to Parthenios of Larissa, from whom it probably received its fine binding of stamped dark goatskin over beechen boards. Its discovery in our own day is entirely due to the perspicuity and enterprise of Miss McCormick, who (having been interested in Byzantine illuminations through a lecture given by Dr. Edgar J. Goodspeed on the Edith Rockefeller New Testament) noticed it in the window of a Parisian dealer in 1932 and promptly bought it and handed it over to the University of Chicago for examination, and eventually as its permanent possession.

There is a certain amount of repetition between the volumes, which makes reference for particular information a little difficult; but Professor Willoughby and Professor Colwell and their colleagues are to be thanked

for their full descriptions of the unique volume which adds a new chapter to the history of Byzantine art and, in particular, of the iconography of the Book of Revelation.

FREDERICK G. KENYON

Kirkstead, Godstone, Surrey, England

The German Church on the American Frontier. By CARL E. SCHNEIDER. St. Louis: Eden Publishing House, 1939. xx+579 pages. $4.50.

The subtitle of the volume reads: "A Study in the Rise of Religion among the Germans of the West, Based on the History of the *Evangelischer Kirchenverein des Westens* [Evangelical Church Society of the West] 1840–1866."

The story has often been told of the integration of European religious groups with American culture east of the Alleghenies and particularly during the eighteenth century. Rarely has that story been set forth for the Mississippi Valley and the first half of the nineteenth century. Now that we have come into a new appreciation of the West and its part in the development of a distinctive American civilization, it is important that our church historians should provide us with the narrative of the religious origins on those frontiers. Dr. Schneider's book is a valuable contribution along that line. For thoroughness of research and adequacy of interpretation it ranks with Stephenson's *Religious Aspects of Swedish Immigration.* It is to be hoped that similar volumes on other religious groups in the West will soon be forthcoming, to complete our understanding of this interesting chapter in the history of the American people and to equip the students of general history with the materials for a really adequate account of American culture.

As the subtitle indicates, this book is the history of the Evangelical Church Society of the West, which in 1877 united with several similar church organizations to form the German Evangelical Synod of North America, the body which in 1925 dropped the word "German" from its name and in 1934 united with the Reformed Church in the United States to form the Evangelical and Reformed Church. For the pastors and people of that church this vast array of facts, thoroughly documented, will have special interest. The charts and maps, carefully wrought out, will enable them to trace clearly the roots and ramifications of their antecedents in the Mississippi Valley during that middle period of the nineteenth century. This should be of particular value, as this group celebrates in 1940 the centennial of its earliest organization and estimates the fruitage of a century's growth and development.

But the book has much wider significance than a denominational history. It is a scholarly study of the sociohistorical aspects of our Western development. Dr. Schneider has not limited his view to the particular group of German religionists who formed the Evangelical Church Society. He has taken into account all the diverse German religious groups and social types which projected themselves on American soil and participated in the westward sweep of American culture in the nineteenth century. He even crosses the ocean and examines the European background of these various German elements—Lutheran, Reformed, Evangelical, the pietist and free-thinking liberal, the practical, and the theoretical. He sets forth the significant influence of German and American mores on the religious development of the immigrants and points out the functional significance of the frontier in molding the German culture in the West. Old World values were diffused in the New, and new points of view were acquired by the immigrants from the Old. Thus a synthesis was formed which enabled the German religious groups to survive the rigorous tests of adaptation to a totally new environment.

It is Schneider's theory that none of the religious bodies of the East, none of the churches of German antecedents, could have met the peculiar needs of the new German arrivals in the West during the first half of the nineteenth century. Only the founding of the Missouri Synod for the Lutherans and the founding of the *Kirchenverein des Westens* for the other Germans could solve the "Western problem."

The narrative runs through fourteen stately chapters. It is never tedious. It sets forth not only the formal organization of the frontier congregations but also their public worship and preaching, their educational projects, their response to the missionary challenge, their relations with other church bodies, their theological positions, their refinement of synodical organization, and their publications. The final chapter is a particularly thoughtful and suggestive essay on "The Americanization of the German Church." It shows how "historical continuity is preserved in the religio-cultural developments of immigrant Churches."

There are copious footnotes with abundant references to sources, fourteen pages of Bibliography, eleven appendixes, thirty-eight illustrations, two charts, three maps, and a detailed Index covering forty-seven pages. It is the sort of book that students of church history and students of American civilization in general will refer to frequently and with confidence.

Students of special denominational histories may point out a few inconsequential errors as to fact and may even question some of the judg-

ments expressed by the author, but all will probably agree with Professor Sweet when he says, in his Introduction to the volume: "The author of this volume is a good example of the trained historian in a church-history professorship, and this book an excellent illustration of the sound historical scholarship which is becoming increasingly frequent in American church-history writing."

ABDEL ROSS WENTZ

Gettysburg Theological Seminary

Protestantism's Challenge: An Historical Study of the Survival Value of Protestantism. By CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN. New York: Harper & Bros., 1940. 286 pages. $2.50.

Were this book entitled "The Challenge to Protestantism," the purport of the whole argument would be clearer, for the ambiguity of the title is continued in the content of the work. At times one is inclined to believe that it is written with direct bearing upon the question of (Protestant) church union; for there are significant suggestions that, better than the Lambeth Quadrilateral, are the Unitarian and Universalist "five points" affirmations (p. 62), and better than these, the ethical quadrilateral of Jesus himself—purity, love, heroism, humility (p. 26)—as a basis of the churches' "vital fellowship, adequate to the needs of the present age." If only the "modern churches could adopt a historical attitude toward their claims and also toward the New Testament"! But at other times one is led to feel that the author has in mind the solution of the dilemma of Donald Hankey's "average man," without any reference to the issue of church union: "Here I am at the most important moment of my life, when I am trying to make a clean start in a new sort of life altogether and I have to make a public and solemn profession of faith with all sorts of mental resolutions. Why can't I say right out what you and I really do believe?"

Perhaps the challenge is meant to attain even more objectives than these. At any rate, to assist the churches in getting a "historical attitude toward their claims," Dr. Moehlman proceeds, with immense scholarship and acute critical judgment, to sum up the decisions of modern biblical and church-history research upon the chief points of doctrinal contention among the denominations, chiefly the Protestant bodies. He succeeds in showing (for the thoroughly rational mind) "how serious the Protestant position has recently become and how it may escape its perilous position." The creeds, the two principal sacraments, the "myth of apostolic succession," the conceptions of the church, the earliest versions of the trial

and crucifixion of Jesus, the meaning of the Cross, the essential and unique teachings of Jesus, are examined, and the conclusion is reached that virtually none of the symbols, sacraments, and doctrines so stubbornly maintained today by the conservative Christian churches can be regarded as believed and practiced "semper et ubique idem" nor can any claim to be pristine or even apostolic. The "historical attitude" as interpreted by Dr. Moehlman discards so many venerable doctrines (for example, the Virgin Birth, Baptism, the Eucharist, the Apostles Creed) that even Acontius, Socinus, Grotius, and Locke, who long ago pleaded for a bare minimum of doctrinal requirements for Christian membership and unity, would stand aghast. Although the author is never radical in espousing critical views or in advancing his own, the total impression made by this frank, concise digest of modern research (did it commence as late as 1835 [see p. 3]? What of Simon, Meslier, Semler?) is staggering. Nothing seems left save faith in Jesus' "unique teaching" of a loving, forgiving Father (p. 22), the moral dignity of man, and Jesus' ethical quadrilateral given above, as the way of the good life to the Kingdom of God.

Dr. Moehlman leaves us to draw our own conclusion. What is modern Protestantism to do about it all? Announce all doctrines, symbols, sacraments, as adiaphora? Accept a Unitarian or liberal Congregationalist basis of church membership and interdenominational union? Agree upon a program of applied Christianity (that is, the "ethical quadrilateral") and subordinate theological tenets? But Dr. Moehlman fails to give us a survey of the "historical attitude" of the Christian bodies toward Jesus' teaching as applied to war and divorce; even a program of applied Christianity might receive no general assent! Nor does he trace the rise of clericalism and ecclesiasticism, always mighty factors in perverting the pristine gospel and promoting sectarian obstinacies and bigotries. Moreover, he takes too lightly for granted the rationality of the average Christian, who has usually preferred a romantic to a factually veracious faith. Nor are the satisfactions of sectarian exclusiveness to be underestimated. Then, too, it may well be that there are values in the transcendental Christ-loyalty, mystical church-consciousness, sacramental emotionalism, and creedal unison, which ought not to be surrendered. Neverthless, whether Protestantism accepts the challenge or not, it is well to be reminded in so competent a fashion that "facts are facts; the actual cannot be denied; a person who keepts faith with his soul . . . . must keep in touch with actuality in order to survive."

CHARLES LYTTLE

Meadville Theological School

Christianity Goes to Press. By EDGAR J. GOODSPEED. New York: Macmillan Co., 1940. 115 pages. $1.50.

In this book, which comprises the James W. Richard Lectures at the University of Virginia last October, Professor Goodspeed focuses his entire attention upon an idea with which he has been more or less concerned in several of his recent books—the importance of publication as a creative, formative factor in the history of early Christian literature. The result is a more unified, coherent, and fully developed treatment of what has already been and will undoubtedly continue to be a very fruitful idea. There can be no doubt both that publication (as distinguished from mere composition) was a matter of the greatest significance in the Christianity of the first and second centuries and also that contemporary New Testament scholarship is indebted largely to Dr. Goodspeed for its recognition of that fact.

After showing that the first extant Christian documents, Paul's letters, were true letters, personal communications meant only for the eyes and ears of the churches to which they were severally addressed, the author proceeds to argue persuasively that it was their publication as a two-volume work a generation after Paul's death which not only resulted in these letters becoming widely known among the churches but also stimulated other Christian writing, most of which from then on (as had already been true of Mark, Matthew, and Luke-Acts) was intended for publication from the start. This theme, familiar in its general aspects to readers of Dr. Goodspeed's *Introduction*, is here developed, particularly with reference to the importance which the publishing and selling of books had acquired in the Greco-Roman world. This importance is amply illustrated from the literature of the period. The discussion abounds in interesting suggestions such as, for example, that it was the fact that Antioch was not a great publishing center which perhaps accounts for Matthew's Gospel being unknown apparently to the author of Luke-Acts, and (to cite another example) that it may well have been the decision of some early Christian publisher to publish the four Gospels together which led to the adoption of the codex form as over against the usual roll, a practice which recently discovered paleographical materials give some grounds for believing had its origin among the Christians.

Although Professor Goodspeed makes no attempt to build up a case for positions which he has defended elsewhere, he assumes in this book the general position as to the function and character of Ephesians and as to the original occasion, place of publication, and contents of the Pauline corpus, which is familiar to students of his work. With that position I find myself disagreeing at only two points of any importance: I

am not persuaded that the publication of Luke-Acts served as the occasion for the publication of the letters, and I am not convinced that Philemon was ever published under the title of "Laodiceans." Mr. Goodspeed's general position is commanding, I believe, constantly wider assent and represents a permanent contribution of the greatest importance to New Testament scholarship.

A final chapter brings the story of the bookmaker's and the bookseller's services to Christian literature down to our own century.

The book is written in Professor Goodspeed's invariably clear and delightful style and would serve admirably to introduce a new reader of the New Testament to some of the most interesting problems in the study of that literature.

JOHN KNOX

University of Chicago

The Human Meaning of Science. By ARTHUR H. COMPTON. (The John Calvin McNair Lectures.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940. xii+88 pages. $1.00.

Professor Compton explores in these lectures the significance of science and technology for human life and thought. He believes that science and religion can and do co-operate in bringing about human progress. Together they create a society in which men realize that they must consider the rights of all in order to live together. Freedom of choice is more intelligible in the light of modern physics than it was when the mechanistic hypothesis was held, though Compton makes it clear that the principle of indeterminacy does not in itself prove freedom. Science gives support to the hypothesis that there is an intelligent, creative God behind and within the universe by disclosing the intricate orderliness of nature. Compton looks to the scientists and educators to discover the purpose of God, and he believes that men will surely respond to the opportunity to work with God.

These lectures are lucidly written and brilliantly illustrated. They give impressive testimony to the concern felt by scientists for the human significance of the world and the world-view which science has helped to create. Unquestionably the tension between religious interpretations of reality and the disclosures of science has lessened in recent years.

Professor Compton's principal theses will leave many still unconvinced. It is difficult to deal with his first proposition that "it is primarily through the growth of science and technology that man has acquired those attributes which distinguish him from the animals, which have indeed made

it possible for him to become human," for he does not maintain it consistently. In the same chapter he speaks of science and religion as both being necessary in promoting human progress and in one place says that Christianity is the major factor. But is science responsible for Christianity? One paragraph (pp. 22 and 23) suggests that Professor Compton means this; but I am not sure. His general claim is that science and technology have made men more interdependent, and that being interdependent they will necessarily recognize more fully one another's rights. "From evolutionary principles it is thus clear that the strength of cooperation and the weakness of antagonism in this closely interwoven society must lead eventually to a humanity in which love of one's neighbor is a dominant attribute" (p. 19). I cannot see the strength of this. That the growth of interdependence makes it necessary for men to take account of one another is clear, but one can take others into account without recognizing their rights. Look at the totalitarian states. To be sure, as Compton stresses, man is after all a very recent product and human history has a long time in which to run (p. 9). Perhaps if one looks far enough into the future one can see interdependence becoming brotherly love, but there is little evidence for it so far.

The same optimism appears in the treatment of man. The question is asked: "Who can fail to respond to the opportunity and challenge that are before us of working with the God of the universe in carrying through the final stages of making this a suitable world and ourselves a suitable race for what is perhaps the supreme position of intelligent life in His world?" (pp. 84 and 85). The answer would seem to be quite clear. Any man can fail to respond, and all men do fail in part, for men are sinners. On Compton's own view that man has freedom to choose, any statement about what inevitably must happen in history is impossible.

In the matter of the argument for the existence of God, Compton puts persuasively the point of the extremely complex order of nature which makes life possible. But the problem has never been, is there order in the world? The problem is, does order imply an Orderer? Kant's and Hume's doubts about the validity of this argument still remain.

One must disagree with Compton's view that Platonism retarded scientific development and that it was Aristotelianism which gave the impetus to modern science (p. 36). It was the mathematical philosophy of the Neo-Platonists which stimulated much of the investigation of light in the Middle Ages and which in Galileo and others furthered the development of modern mathematical physics.

DANIEL D. WILLIAMS

Chicago Theological Seminary

Jubilee Law Lectures, 1889–1939. SCHOOL OF LAW, CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA. Washington, D.C., 1939. 182 pages. $2.50.

This volume is a collection of eight lectures which were given in September, 1939, at the law school of the Catholic University of America to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of this leading institution of Roman Catholic tradition and learning in the United States. Dean Robert J. White succeeded in securing for this golden jubilee the leader of contemporary American jurisprudence, Mr. Roscoe Pound, formerly dean of the Harvard Law School and now university professor at Harvard University. Mr. Pound's four lectures on "The Church in Legal History" form the first part of the present volume (pp. 3–97). In bold outlines Mr. Pound traces the influence exercised upon temporal law by four great ideas of the Catholic Church of the Middle Ages, namely, the ideas of universality, authority, good faith, and law itself.

The history of Western civilization may be looked upon as a sequence of successive waves of unification and disintegration. When the unity of the Roman Empire was destroyed by the invasion of the barbarians and internal decay, the great task of the reunification of Western Christendom was initiated by the church, which preserved the authority of its leader, the pope, as the spiritual head of the Christian world through all the turmoil of the disintegration of the empire, and thus became one of the leading forces, if not the leading force, in the resuscitation of the idea of the unity of Christendom under pope and emperor. In the field of law the universality of the church was represented by the canon law, which, based upon the authority of the pope and controlled by the central courts of the Holy See, was one and the same in every country of western and central Europe. The uniformity of the law spiritual prepared the minds for the acceptance of the idea of a uniform temporal law based, from the twelfth century on, upon the rediscovered compilation of the laws of ancient Rome. When the unity of the church and of its law was broken by the Reformation, the way was prepared for the disintegration of the temporal law into the isolated legal systems of the national states of today.

The law of the church was built up as a coherent system in a process of interpretation of texts believed to be endowed with divine authority, especially of Holy Scripture and the patristic writings. Following this model of the canonists, the legists, i.e., the scholars of the temporal law, interpreted the *corpus juris* and established a coherent system of law which finally embraced every aspect of temporal life. The idea that a text could be endowed with authority of command and that its words

could contain a solution for every conceivable problem has gradually become the basis for the lawyers', medieval and modern, belief in the authority of statutes and precedents and for their belief that they can "unfold" the content of these sources through the process of interpretation.

The third contribution of the church to modern law is seen by Dean Pound in its influence on the law of contracts. The idea that men shall be held to their promises by force of governmental pressure is foreign to early law. The governmental machinery lends its aid only for the enforcement of promises which are made either in connection with the observance of some established ritual or under peculiar circumstances. When Roman law had just succeeded in overcoming this stage of "strict" law of contract, its development was cut off by the invasion of the barbarians, whose laws were, of course, influenced by the same, old, primitive ideas. The way toward a more general enforcement of contracts was opened by the church, which regarded it a sin to breach one's given word and to disappoint the expectations of a fellow-man who trusted the promisor's good faith. The temporal lawyers of Europe took over this idea, with the result that in modern civil law every promise which has been seriously given by one party and relied upon by the other is legally enforceable. In the common law of England and the United States, on the other hand, the older ideas still linger on in the form of the anachronistic doctrine of consideration. One of the reasons for this obsolete state of modern American law of contracts is found by Dean Pound in the fact that English temporal law cut itself loose from canon law earlier than the civil law on the Continent. Dean Pound could also have mentioned that this lack of contacts with the more progressive canon law might also be among the causes for the failure of the common law to develop an adequate theory of implied obligations. While on the continent of Europe courts are anxious to bind the parties by contract to render to each other whatever good faith and fair dealing may require under the circumstances of their peculiar relation, English and American courts are still inclined to fix their eyes upon the literal meaning of the words of the agreement without paying such great regard to the particular circumstances of the individual case.

The fourth and, probably, the greatest contribution of the church to legal life is seen by Dean Pound in the development of the idea that there is a "law" behind the "laws," that law is not a mere summation of disconnected governmental norms and commands but a coherent system of regulation of social life and that this system, in order to be binding upon rational beings, must be based upon reason and justice.

Dean Pound's lectures upon the history of these four great ideas of

universality, authority, good faith, and justice amount to a condensed survey of the main forces in the development of occidental law, a survey of its basic problems which is as fascinating to the lawyer as to the theologian or the layman.

The lectures of the four other speakers are centered around the theme of "The Function of Law in Society Today." Under the title "The Future of the Common Law," Mr. Daniel J. Lyne, of the bar of Boston, undertakes to find out what has become in modern American law of the two basic characteristics of the common law of yesterday, namely, its devotion to liberty and its protection of individual rights. He not only gives a brief and lucid survey of such modern phenomena as workmen's compensation laws, administrative boards, securities and exchange control, or the Labor Relations Board, but he also undertakes to evaluate the underlying trends and ideas.

The lecture of Mr. Grenville Clark, of the New York bar, on "Law and Civil Liberty" is a staunch defense of the admission of widest measure of free discussion of public affairs as an indispensable requirement for the formation of an informed and reasonably intelligent public opinion and, thereby, for the proper functioning of democratic institutions. It is noteworthy that at an official Catholic function a Catholic speaker emphatically states that the discussion of public affairs should be unrestricted except in the following two respects: viz., (1) no utterance should be permissible which "clearly oversteps current standards of decency"; and (2) "the same is true where the expression clearly threatens the safety of the community through the stirring up of violence—the 'clear and present danger' doctrine of the Supreme Court."

The lecture on "Natural Law and Positive Law" by Hector David Castro, of El Salvador, is a concise and eloquent restatement of classical scholastic doctrine on the relation between divine law, natural law, and positive law, and a defense of the postulate that the state must not encroach upon the natural rights of life, freedom of action, property, honor, family life, freedom of association, and freedom of religion. Some readers may doubt whether the speaker is consistent when he demands in the name of freedom of religion that "atheistic teaching should not be tolerated in any school whatsoever" and when he inveighs against discussions of communism, which he simply calls "a scourge of humanity."

The lecture on "Law and Ethics" by John J. Burns, of Boston, resumes, from a Catholic point of view, the theme of the fourth lecture of Dean Pound. It ought to be observed, however, that the rebirth of a new legal idealism after an age of legal positivism is not limited to Catholic circles. While philosophy of law was neglected by the lawyers of the

prosperous pre-war decades, the upheavals of our own days have resulted everywhere in a renewed interest in the great, fundamental problems of human nature, social organization, ethical evaluation, and justice. The moral-value judgments which lie at the bottom of our civilization are challenged by rival systems to which ideas and ideals are either "ideological superstructure" or "cowardice." There are still numerous believers in the democratic life who have not yet recognized that democracy is based upon a special set of ethical convictions about transcendental values, without which it loses its *raison d'être*, and who still revel in the luxury of denying the universal validity of these values. However, the number of those who are aware of the challenge and who believe that it cannot be answered in any way other than that of a return to the great tradition is increasing, and this answer to the challenge does not imply the necessity of a return to Rome.

MAX RHEINSTEIN

University of Chicago Law School

Paul: Man of Conflict. By DONALD WAYNE RIDDLE. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1940. 244 pages. $2.00.

The subtitle of this book reads, *A Modern Biographical Sketch*, and that is what it is. If written in German it might be called a *Psychographie*. The author has distinguished, more sharply than most earlier writers upon Paul, between the primary sources (his epistles) and the secondary (the book of Acts, that is, the second half of "Luke-Acts"). It is impossible to disregard Acts in writing the life of Paul or recounting the beginnings of Christianity; but Acts must be clearly recognized as of secondary value to the epistles.

Professor Riddle makes use of modern religious psychology and interprets Paul, the religious genius, in terms of the tensions of his earlier years, tensions somewhat released but not ceasing to exist when he became a Christian. It was the sensitive youth with a permanently troubled conscience who became the furious persecutor of the followers of Jesus and in turn the protagonist of the heavenly Lord Christ.

One of the basic questions for the interpretation of Paul is: How good a Jew was Paul? What type of Judaism did he profess? (See p. 22). The usual assumption has been that he was a typical Palestinian Jew, a Pharisee among the Pharisees (by his own confession); and since he sat at Gamaliel's feet (according to Acts), presumably studying for the rabbinate, it can even be argued that Palestinian Judaism in Paul's

youth was the type he professed, and later repudiated. But this hypothesis and the ascertainable facts will not fit. The first-century Palestinian Judaism we know from Jewish sources is something different. One wonders if Paul's Judaism was not more of the type represented by the "extreme allegorists" whom Philo criticized—men who retained the "spiritual" or allegorical "teaching" of the Law but rejected much of its halakhic element (see Professor Belkin's recent *Philo and the Oral Law*). If so, one more antecedent of Paul's interpretation of Christianity and of Christ may be found in his earlier adherence to the synagogue. And yet Paul himself insists that he was "blameless" in his personal observance of the Law. The shift from his early zeal for the Law to his later rejection of large parts of it (while retaining the allegorical or symbolic truth of the Law as a whole) was perhaps one intermediate stage in his development rather than his point of departure.

Without taking Romans, chapter 7, to be directly and exclusively autobiographical, Riddle is rightly emphatic in saying: "It is inescapable that in it Paul reveals an unhappy experience with Jewish legal custom" (p. 32). What Paul sought was emotional satisfaction, release, assurance, security in religion (p. 155). Instead, the Law only plunged his sensitive soul all the more deeply into morbidity, uncertainty, and introspection. Hellenism offered no escape: Paul's Jewish prejudices stood in the way—a further evidence of the strait-laced Pharisaism of his upbringing. (There *were* Jews who embraced Hellenism—Philo's nephew, for example, a case of conversion to paganism which Professor Nock might add to the scanty collection of such "conversions" outside Christianity.) Nor were the mysteries a way out of Paul's spiritual *cul de sac*. The mysteries had some influence upon him, perhaps, as upon every religious mind in the Greco-Roman world; but it was inconceivable that Paul should embrace one of these pagan salvation cults (p. 153).

Invaluable as Paul's letters are for the interpretation of Paul's religion, incomparably superior though they are in this respect to the secondary source, it must be recognized that they are inadequate when we come to consider the external events and the chronology of his life. Of course Paul was not writing his autobiograpny in any of his epistles. And yet it is extraordinary how many data of this kind these few letters contain; extraordinary, too, how a skilful biographer like Riddle can draw from them the last, faintest trace of implication as well as the broad statement of facts. Here again Acts is set aside for the time being, and the epistles come first. The chronology of Acts is not only questionable: it is even

doubtful if there is any such thing! Other writers—for example, Foakes Jackson—have recognized the impossibility of a chronological harmonization of Acts and the epistles; the next step is the one Riddle takes, namely, to disregard Acts and go ahead on the basis of the letters.

It is a further advantage that Riddle adopts the chronology (based on the epistles) which has been proposed by Professor John Knox. There is no question in my mind of the fundamental probability of that chronology, which dates Paul's conversion late, say A.D. 37 (see *JBL*, LVIII [1939], 23 ff.), and recognizes that the main period of Paul's evangelistic activity is also the period of his "literary" activity. It is impossible that a man like Paul should remain inactive after his conversion and sit with folded hands for some years in Arabia or Cilicia or go back to tentmaking or begin the life of a simple rural missionary somewhere north of Antioch! (Let alone retire to Cicilia for safety, as Acts 9:30 represents!)

The author also adopts the theory of an Ephesian imprisonment during which the letters to Philippians, Colossians, and Philemon were written. Ephesians he holds, with Goodspeed, to be a covering encyclical to accompany the Pauline corpus as collected in the nineties.

These are important matters and help to make the Paul of the epistles stand out clearly—a far more intriguing and significant figure than the Paul of the book of Acts. This is undoubtedly the authentic Paul, as the figure of Acts is not; and yet, with the Paul of the epistles before us we can see how the author of Luke-Acts went about his task, the measure in which he succeeded, and why he failed. Considering that he did not have the epistles before him, that he worked only with tradition (some of it perhaps already in writing), it is remarkable that he did not do worse. The measure of his success and failure with Paul, which we can check by the epistles, has a bearing, as Riddle points out, upon his probable success or failure in the Gospel, in the account of the Jerusalem church in "I" Acts, and elsewhere.

Professor Riddle's method is the right one, and the result is convincing. The narrower the base, the sharper the focus, the more lifelike the resulting image. Paul's biography, as far as it can be written at all, must be written primarily from the epistles. Back of the figure in Acts, the hero-martyr of ecclesiastical tradition and even legend, the Roman citizen, the urbane promoter of a philosophically defensible body of Christian doctrine, is the fiery, tense, imperious devotee of the epistles. He was not the "founder" of Christianity—even of gentile Christianity. Gentile Christianity was already a going concern when Paul came on the field. But he took a significant place in its growth. "It plainly appears that

he did, indeed, put some old wine into new wineskins, and some new wine into old wineskins. But it is also true that he put much new wine into new wineskins" (p. 181). That is the reason for his great influence upon the later church and helps to account for his perennial fascination. He had something of vast importance to say to Augustine, when the time came, and again to the men of the sixteenth century. And he has something to say to us today—for we have tensions too.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

Union Theological Seminary

RECENT BOOKS

BARCLAY, WADE CRAWFORD. *The Church and a Christian Society.* New York: Abingdon Press, 1939. 428 pages. $3.50.

Dr. Barclay has given the public in this volume the most exhaustive and competent treatment that has thus far appeared on adult education in the church. The discussion is detailed, well grounded in the supporting disciplines of history, philosophy, and psychology, and is well documented. While not "written down" to a "lay" audience, it is thoroughly readable. As the title-page indicates, it is a comprehensive discussion of the aims, content, and method of Christian adult education.

The orientation of the discussion is toward the concept of social reconstruction. The author sees the adult member of the church in his interrelation with society in every dimension of its complex functioning. Religion is to him not a separate and specialized compartment of life but a quality which potentially attaches to any and every experience which the adult encounters in meeting the actual and concrete situations which his participation in social living presents to him. While religion has for him its deeply personal aspects, it finds its supreme and creative expression in the reconstruction of social attitudes and processes in terms of social justice and Christian ideals.

The Church and a Christian Society is not a "how" book to which ministers, teachers, and laymen can go for ready-made "methods" for conducting adult classes. It is a book of ideas in the light of which the minister and adult leader may face a particular educational situation with insight, imagination, and creative inventiveness. Nevertheless, it is practical in that it is definitely directed toward improvement in present practice. One of the most practical features is a section in the Appendix for the leading of group discussion, consisting of inquiries to guide reading and thinking on each chapter in the book. There is also an excellent bibliography, arranged by chapters.

As the title of the book suggests, the author does not think of Christian adult education merely in terms of adult classes. He thinks of it in terms of the entire adult church seeking through inquiry and programs of action to give effective, practical expression to Christian motives and attitudes at the many and specific points at which the church as a fellowship confronts an un-Christian society.—WILLIAM CLAYTON BOWER.

BLACK, HAROLD GARNET. *The Way Out.* Chicago: Willett, Clark, 1939. xix+170 pages. $1.50.

Thirteen religious leaders of southern California have discussed various phases of the world-situation and the way out of our confusion and difficulties. It is interesting to note how the leaders of different denominations in the same locality express themselves on a common issue. It would seem that most of these men are rather pessimistic about the world-situation. They are also somewhat critical of the contribution which the church has been making. They believe the religion of Jesus, as expressed in

the Kingdom of God, is the only way out. They see evidences that the church is getting a new conception of its mission, and this gives them hope for the future. Apart from the religion of Jesus they see no hope.—A. W. FORTUNE.

BOUQUET, A. C. *A Lectionary of Christian Prose from the 2nd to the 20th Century: For Public and Private Use.* New York: Longmans, 1939. xxvi+390 pages. $3.00.

For several years Dr. Bouquet has been engaged in collecting and sorting materials for this volume. Its publication fills a long-felt need. It will supply those who stand definitely within the theistic Christian tradition with a rich body of readings, supplementary to the Scriptures which hitherto have held a unique place in Christian worship. Except for anthologies of Christian poetry, there has not been available heretofore a collection of lessons drawn from the whole range of Christian literature, comparable to the excellent materials which the humanists have enjoyed since 1913 in Stanton Coit's *Social Worship*.

Dr. Bouquet's taste has been catholic. His compilation includes selections from the Apostolic Fathers; the great theologians, such as Origen, Augustine, and Aquinas; medieval Anglo-Saxon homilies; the great mystics; the seventeenth-century Anglican divines; many modern and contemporary writers, such as von Hügel, Gore, Chesterton, Inge, Temple, and Whitehead; and a host of other greater and lesser lights of the church. There are many narrative pieces scattered through the volume along with expository and devotional passages. A fair sample of the choices made are the selections for Good Friday—from the martyrdom of St. Perpetua, William Law, F. W. Robertson, and George Bernard Shaw. The materials are arranged in groups of three or four under headings of the Sundays and feasts of the Christian year. A further criterion of arrangement has been the relation of topics of selections to the basic themes underlying the lectionary of the *Book of Common Prayer*.

An effort has been made to include only such passages as "lend themselves to reading aloud" and are "capable of annual repetition without growing stale." Naturally the largest share of contributions is from English sources, since translations do not as a rule make smooth reading. The type is large and readable; and the book is not large enough to be bulky and cumbersome. I noticed a few misprints, but these are rare. It is to be hoped that the book will find a ready and extensive use.—MASSEY H. SHEPHERD, JR.

BOWIE, W. RUSSELL. *Lift Up Your Hearts.* New York: Macmillan, 1939. viii+118 pages. $1.25.

This little book is a most helpful collection of prayers, meditations, and litanies which Dr. Bowie has prepared for personal and group worship. These are for special occasions and special needs. He has accomplished the two purposes set forth in the Preface: "I have wanted these prayers and services to breathe the aspirations, hopes, and faith which are not of one time only, but are timeless. In the second place, I have wanted to express these in a form which would not fall short of the rhythm and music of the classic books of worship, but yet in words which are natural and congenial to men and women and boys and girls of our own century." It is to be regretted that the book is not in a cheaper edition so that it might have more general use.—A.W. FORTUNE.

CARTWRIGHT, FRANK T. *At Trail's End.* New York: Friendship Press, 1939. 181 pages. $1.00.

Against the colorful background of Borneo and its people, Mr. Cartwright has set a fast-moving story of a boy's development under a great missionary.—A. G. BAKER.

DAY, ALBERT EDWARD. *The Evangel of a New World.* Nashville: Cokesbury, 1939. 160 pages. $1.50.

These five chapters were elaborated from the Sam P. Jones Lectures at Emory University. They indicate the sort of message which it is the preacher's opportunity to bring in our day. Our world is disillusioned because of unrealized utopias and programs which have proved inadequate. "The Evangel of Hope" is the Kingdom of God, which is not a plan or program but a transforming ideal. This is also an "Evangel of Judgment," condemning many things in our social order and in our individual lives. The evangel to meet the needs of our world must proclaim a God of love who is suffering with his children.—A. W. FORTUNE.

Die deutsche Messe. (Herausgegeben von der Hochkirchlichen Vereinigung des augsburglichen Bekenntnisses.) München: Ernst Reinhardt, 1939. 36 pages. Pfg. 70.

A German mass-liturgy sponsored by the High-Church movement in German Lutheranism. The compilers have been quite eclectic in use of ancient Christian sources. Notable features: the Pax comes immediately after the sermon, followed by a litany-intercession (from Eastern liturgies); an offertory prayer; omission of *filioque* in the creed; a *secreta* between Sanctus and Words of Institution; an anamnesis and epiclesis; the Aaronic benediction (typically Lutheran). One recognizes formularies from the *Didache*, and the *Book of Common Prayer*. How far they have come from Luther's *Deutsche Messe!*—MASSEY H. SHEPHERD, JR.

GIERENS, MICHAEL, S. J. (ed.). *Joseph Pohle, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik.* Paderborn: Schöningh, 1937. 599 pages. Rm. 11.

This is the ninth edition of the second volume of the well-established Roman Catholic theological textbook. It contains the discussion of the doctrines of Christ, salvation, grace, and justification. The excellence of the volume is due to the clear organization of the material and the masterfully extensive exposition of traditional Roman Catholic teachings. It must be noted that especially in connection with the doctrine of justification the Protestant point of view is taken into account. The criticism of it is one-sided primarily because the Protestant concept of justification is characterized as implying only a forensic imputation of justice.—WILHELM PAUCK.

GRENSTED, L. W. *This Business of Living.* New York: Macmillan, 1939. 187 pages. $1.75.

Here is a book by a professor of philosophy that is full of elemental common sense. It would seem that this eminent and prolific author, sensing the tragedy of modern life, responded warmly to the urge to speak a word to those who need guidance lest they be overwhelmed, and ended by writing a book.

It is brief without being sketchy; wise without being pedantic; and aggressively Christian without being stuffy or trite. "Life is not easy" is his first sentence. And the book ends: "If the cost seems to us great, when we bear with our friends, the cost to Him is infinitely more when He bears with us. This is the one real certainty which we have as to the nature of God. And it is enough." If that sounds like oversimplification, be assured that between those lines is compressed much solid wisdom that presents the problem of life, conventional remedies, the resources of science, art, and religion for its solution; and, finally, the way of the cross as the unique and effective answer that the Christian tradition provides. To those who need guidance, and for those who are called upon to offer guidance, this will prove a most helpful book.—EDWIN MCNEILL POTEAT.

HEARD, GERALD. *A Quaker Mutation.* ("Pendle Hill Pamphlet," No. 7.) Wallingford, Pa.: Pendle Hill, 1939. 49 pages. $0.15.

A critical evaluation of the Society of Friends by a popular writer on social questions. Special attention is given to the problem of education.—E. E. AUBREY.

JENKINS, BURRIS. *Where My Caravan Has Rested.* Chicago: Willett, Clark, 1939. 241 pages. $2.00.

This is a fascinating autobiography of a very interesting and useful life. Dr. Jenkins has not felt bound by traditions of any sort but has blazed trails of his own. Inasmuch as his work took him into so many fields of activity, the story of his career gives a very interesting picture of life in general during the period. Because of his independent spirit he is perhaps unduly critical of those with whom he does not agree and especially of his own denomination. Many in reading the book will wonder if he has not placed too much stress on the importance of merely getting people inside a church building.—A. W. FORTUNE.

LEVITSKY, LOUIS M. *A Jew Looks at America.* New York: Dial Press, 1939. 107 pages. $2.00.

I do not recall that the word "anti-Semitism" appears in this book. In the nine essays there is no discussion of this ugly theme of prejudice and persecution. Even in the reference to Hitler there is exclusive emphasis on the fact that Hitler is not a Jewish but rather a world-problem. Yet this little book is as complete and convincing an answer to anti-Semitism as I have ever seen.

What Rabbi Levitsky does is to take America as the type and symbol of our contemporary democratic civilization and show how perfectly the Jew fits into this society. His long training in democracy, his love of freedom, his trust in education, his family tradition, his deep-rooted moral sense, his instinct of religion, all these are the very materials out of which democracy must be built. There can be no question of the Jew's adaptation to American life nor of his invaluable contributions to it. Nor can there be question of the Jew's part and place in that New World commonwealth of which we like to think America the prophecy.

Rabbi Levitsky discusses few of the dark problems now besetting America, Jewry, and the world. He knows that "we all feel discouraged" these days. But he refuses to be dismayed, and by appealing to the precious traditions of the past and the high hopes of the future gives us reason for courage still.—JOHN HAYNES HOLMES.

MCCALL, OSWALD W. S. *The Hand of God.* New York: Harpers, 1939. ix+157 pages. $1.75.

This is no ordinary series of meditations. They belong acutely to our age and are couched in the language of modern man. A spirit of deep mature warmth permeates them despite the often unconventional phraseology. I have used the volume experimentally both in private and in public worship; it meets a real need. The title comes from Rodin's sculpture, "The Hand of God"; the book is divided into three sections: "The Hand," "The Fingers," and "The Thumb." It is essentially Christological in its emphasis but sufficiently comprehensive in its subject matter and lyric passages to give a genuine lift even to those who may not find the author's assumptions about Christ congenial to their own spirits. The ideas and treatment of them reveal a mature piety affirming itself in a hard time.—HOWARD THURMAN.

McCORKEL, ROY J. *Voices from the Younger Churches.* New York: Friendship Press, 1939. 114 pages. Paper, $0.50.

In this volume respected Christian leaders from China, India, Japan, Latin America, and Nigeria, respectively, tell us of the life of the church in their own lands—A. G. BAKER.

McKEE, ELMORE M. *What Use Is Religion.* New York: Scribner's, 1939. 260 pages. $2.00.

In these seventeen short chapters Dr. McKee attempts to answer some of the most important questions concerning religion and life that are being asked in our day. Problems are presented in a sympathetic manner, and the author's experience as chaplain of Yale University has enabled him to understand the intellectual struggles of a host of sincere people in our day. Having stated the problems, he presents his own faith. The presentation is so fair and undogmatic that it should be especially helpful to young people who are honestly seeking for light on the problems of religion.—A. W. FORTUNE.

MATHEWS, BASIL. *Through Tragedy to Triumph.* New York: Friendship Press, 1939. 195 pages. Cloth, $1.00; paper, $0.60.

Basil Mathews has earned the right to speak with authority on the world-wide mission of the church, and nearly a score of books are evidence that he has had a good deal to say. *Through Tragedy to Triumph* first strikes one as a rather pretentious title for another book in the same general field; but its subtitle, *The World Church in the World Crisis*, reassures us that it is a pertinent, fast-moving survey of what used to be called the "Foreign Missionary Movement."

The Madras conference gave impetus to Mathews' decision, formed four years ago, to write such a book, and he prepared this interpretation of the place of the world-church in the present world-crisis as lectures which were presented at Andover-Newton Theological School and Boston University School of Theology.

After reference to the tragic state of world-affairs and the element of torment it has introduced into the life of the Christian world-fellowship, Dr. Mathews moves swiftly to present, for the most part in simple and factual stories, the resources the church has for meeting the tragic need of the day.

The book is brief, readable, and fresh. It will offer much help to ministers and leaders of church groups who want a framework well filled with illustrative material to guide them in the presentation of the world-mission of the church. It provides also an excellent bibliography and list of suggested auxiliary readings.—EDWIN McNEILL POTEAT.

MENSBRUGGHE, A. M. VAN DER. *Anakephalaiosis: la récapitulation pro manuscripto.* Ghent: Unaca, 1936. 128 pages. Fr. 12.

This is a Roman Catholic argument for missions which runs briefly as follows: While the salvation of pagans seems to be impossible, God nevertheless wishes to save them and has, therefore, established the plan of salvation through Jesus Christ, who is the expiation of the sins of all men. It, therefore, becomes necessary to propagate the faith in order to help the salvation of the heathen, to give them moral assurance, to establish the Kingdom of God on the earth, and to sanctify human society.—E. E. AUBREY.

MICKLEM, NATHANIEL. *National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1939. xi+243 pages. $3.00.

During the last seven years the Catholic church, like the rest of the world, has been educated the hard way about National Socialism. In the "school of hard knocks" the

church has learned that National Socialism is a rival religion which grants toleration only on its own terms. The church has also learned that concessions solemnly made today may be revoked tomorrow by this regime whose lords and masters change the rules as they go along.

Dr. Micklem, "head of English Congregationalism's most important theological college," has told this story in about as satisfactory a fashion as can be expected at this point. His book is rich in detail culled from the German and the Catholic press. There is little systematic discussion of the philosophical and theological problems raised by the church conflict, for the author has sought in the main merely to "offer materials for their discussion, not the discussion itself." Yet Dr. Micklem gives some inkling of his own position. He sees the "positive Christianity" of the Nazis as another expression "in principle, though not in form" of theological modernism, and he seems inclined to find implied in this the bankruptcy of modernism in general—PAUL R. SWEET.

More Missionary Stories To Tell. New York: Missionary Education Movement, 1940. ix+182 pages. Cloth, $1.00; paper, $0.50.

Stories of modern missionaries in the various missionary countries selected by the Children's Committee of the Missionary Education Movement. A sequel to *Missionary Stories To Tell,* published in 1937.—A. G. BAKER.

MORTON, T. RALPH. *Today in Manchuria.* New York: Friendship Press, 1939. 128 pages. Paper, $0.50.

A brief description of what has been happening to the Christian Church in Manchuria during the last nine years since the new government was set up under Japanese control.—A. G. BAKER.

POWELL, NOBLE C. *The Post-ordination Training of the Clergy.* (The Twenty-fifth Annual Hale Memorial Sermon.) Evanston: Seabury-Western Theological Seminary, 1939. 26 pages.

The warden of the College of Preachers at Washington Cathedral outlines needs and opportunities of clergy for continuing theological studies beyond seminary days.—MASSEY H. SHEPHERD, JR.

ROBINSON, H. WHEELER. *Suffering: Human and Divine.* New York: Macmillan, 1939. 230 pages. $2.00.

This volume is the fifth in a series on "Great Issues of Life" edited by Rufus Jones. The editor confesses in his Introduction that he knew he was imposing on Professor Robinson the most difficult of all the subjects encompassed within the series. The author, in turn, accepted the assignment not in the hope of achieving an intellectual solution of the problem of suffering but in the confidence that there is a Christian solution that is found when the sufferer, discovering that God suffers with him, can "live it through" in his own life or in the lives of others.

The total effect of this study is to review and sharpen much of the customary treatment of the problem of pain; and to go further and show first how the idea of God's participating in suffering is philosophically supportable and second how God's suffering is redemptive, as it is revealed in the doctrine and the experience of the cross. Suffering becomes thus the bond of creative fellowship between God and all human sufferers.

It is an able and scholarly study, rich in allusion and warm in devotion and, in a

day marked for anguish as our own, ought to provide help in facing suffering and in "living it through" in an intelligent and thoroughly Christian fashion.—EDWIN MCNEILL POTEAT.

ROCHEDIEU, EDMOND. *La Personnalité divine: comment faut-il l'envisager?* Geneva: Le grand Lancy, 1939. 471 pages.

The volume falls into three parts. In Part I a review is given of the outstanding exponents of "la philosophie spiritualiste" in contemporary France, starting with their leader, Jules Lachelier, and adding Lagneau, Boutroux, Brunschvicg, Bergson, and—with more detailed treatment—Edouard LeRoy, on whom Bergson's mantle seems to have fallen. The method of exposition is uniform: First the writer's theory of knowledge is expounded, then his view of existence and reality, against this background his general conception of personality, and finally his attitude toward the personality of God. The conclusions are not encouraging: Either the philosopher reaches an abstracted conception of personality which is applicable to God, or he defines personality but finds it inapplicable to God.

Part II contains a similar survey of contemporary French Protestant thinkers—Jules Bovon, Auguste Bouvier, Paul Lobstein, Wilfred Monod, and Gaston Frommel. But the author finds little among them that escapes the difficulties of the philosophers.

Finally, M. Rochedieu makes his own observations on the problem: There is no need to insist on defining or describing the divine personality. It is sufficient to speak of the divine fatherhood in God and of the perfect personality in Jesus. Surely this is too simple a way out from so complex a problem! What is fatherhood apart from some notion of personality; and if Jesus is perfect personality, does this not raise once again all the difficulties about the analogy with human personality which is, by definition, a growing and imperfect thing?—E. E. AUBREY.

ROOT, E. TALLMADGE. *The Bible Economy of Plenty.* New York: Harpers, 1939. 198 pages. $1.65.

The first sentence in this book indicates the author's purpose: "Applied science has solved the problem of the production of wealth; applied religion, 'faith working through love,' must now solve the problem of distribution." Dr. Root says, "The present economy is built on the false principle of natural or artificial scarcity of which the strong take advantage." He insists that this must be displaced by an economy of plenty which will be to the advantage of all. The book condemns the "profit system" as contrary to biblical teaching. The first six chapters are based on biblical teaching, but one has the feeling at times that the author is using the Scriptures to state his own views. The last chapter, " 'Till It Was All Leavened," is an excellent statement of some of the fundamental principles which must form the basis of an adequate solution of our social and economic problems—A. W. FORTUNE.

SLATTERY, MARGARET. *One in Seven.* New York: Harpers, 1939. xii+133 pages. $1.25.

There is scarcely a need of our age more urgent than that of meditation. "Study to be quiet" is one of the most neglected admonitions of the New Testament. Miss Slattery's little book is an aid to meditation. It contains fifty-two readings, one for each week of the year. The meditations are exceedingly suggestive; though they are not all of equal worth, most of them show real insight.—HAROLD C. PHILLIPS.

SOHRAB, MIRZA AHMAD (comp. and ed.). *The Bible of Mankind.* New York: Universal Publishing Co., 1939. 744 pages. $5.00.

This large book is an anthology of selected writings from Hindu, Zoroastrian, Buddhist, Confucian, Taoistic, Judaistic, Christian, Mohammedan, and Bahai scriptures,

in that order. The Introduction gives the underlying purpose of the work: to show what one may of the unity of these nine religions; and the arrangement of the last four religions in it provides a sort of ascending scale of values, as the editor sees it.

The selections themselves are rather unsystematic, and in the Chinese sections particularly are of no great use to research students. As a popular work, commending itself to those who are unacquainted with the scriptures of the other great religions, it may be read with interest and enjoyment, provided the general reader realizes that it is a composition designed to advance the Bahai cause.

The 127 pages of material on Bahai writings will be useful to the investigator of this movement, since it is always the part of wisdom to include in a study of any group the representations which that group makes of itself and its own ideals.—PAUL G. MORRISON.

STAMM, FREDERICK KELLER. *The Conversations of Jesus.* New York: Harper, 1939. 285 pages. $2.50.

A somewhat romanticizing and modernizing treatment of material from the Four Gospels with a devotional purpose.—JOHN KNOX.

STÖHR, VON HERMANN. *Vom Wesen und Wirken der Auslandskirchen.* Stettin: Oekumenischer Verlag, 1939. 144 pages. Rm. 1.80.

It is remarkable how much informative material could be packed into this small book! With the exception of Germany, all the major ecclesiastical communions in all the continents of the world are accounted for. To be sure, the information is necessarily extremely sketchy, and occasionally the subjects treated are given disproportionate emphasis, as when one and a half pages out of five in the chapter on the churches in the United States are devoted to the history of Thanksgiving Day. Nevertheless, the information is on the whole reliable, and the dominant tone is irenic. It follows, in the briefest possible compass, the general plan of the extensive series of monographs on the present situation of the territorial groupings of churches of Christendom edited by F. Siegmund-Schultze under the title of "Ekklesia."—MATTHEW SPINKA.

STRICKLAND, REBA CAROLYN. *Religion and the State in Georgia in the Eighteenth Century.* ("Studies in History, Economics and Public Law," No. 460.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1939. 211 pages. $2.50.

Eighteenth-century Georgia has inspired much historical writing—general and special. But there was still room for this monograph, which, on the whole, is an excellent study. The author has made no startling revelations, but she has unearthed much interesting, and in some cases new, information. Careful and diligent research into practically all the available sources is evident in the footnotes and in the well-arranged Bibliography. In the choice of a title the author has chosen a timely topic, but she is to be commended for using twentieth-century terminology with restraint.

This study is about equally divided between the proprietary period and the era of royal government. Miss Strickland discusses at length the policies of the trustees in regard to religious and educational matters and makes clear that religion in the decade before the war was only a contributory factor to the revolutionary movement as a whole. But one might add that the author's own data reveal how irascible and irking some Anglican clergymen could be, and although their actions were not "official," they surely added to the social discontent in the province.

The general reader will find the author's description of the contemporary English political and religious scene and her references and comparisons (which she has made without invidiousness) to similar relationships of government and religion in other

colonies, especially the southern group, useful and informative. The record of provincial Georgia in matters of religious toleration was, in general, unique.

If at times repetitious ideas and sentences have crept in, they are probably due to the scarcity of information and the difficulty of organizing such a complicated subject. One might object to the tendency to focus on the Revolution, and the author's inclination at times to write ahead of her narrative (see pp. 100–101, 138, 164). Sometimes the concluding sentences at the end of each chapter are a bit abrupt, but these succinct statements are nevertheless useful. The four pages at the end of the study provide a good summary of the author's findings.—MARJORIE DANIEL COLE.

SWEET, WILLIAM W. *The Story of Religion in America*. New York: Harpers, 1939. vi+656 pages. $3.50.

Professor Sweet's *Story of Religion in America*, published in 1930, which has been so widely used and useful, now appears in what he styles an "enlarged edition," which will be even more useful. Twenty of its twenty-three chapters appear to be identical with those of 1930. Chapter xxi of the earlier edition, on "The Churches in the Age of Big Business," followed a chapter on the Reconstruction period and cited events of 1929. In place of this now stand three chapters which bring the chronicle to 1939. That is, the history from the eighties and nineties has been written on a larger scale and a decade has been added to the period. The longer perspective makes possible a more historical presentation of the period prior to the World War. For the later years all that can be done is to describe events and movements. It would be hard to mention any important development in recent American religious history which Professor Sweet does not treat, with his well-known competence, fairness, and power to interest.

It must be wished that the earlier chapters had been revised at one point. Professor Sweet has repeatedly said that the knowledge of the long-forgotten work for abolition of Theodore Weld, gained since his first edition, has made necessary the re-writing of the whole history of the antislavery movement. Yet in this edition Weld is not mentioned.

The new edition closes as did the former with consideration of the movement for Christian unity, and has a substantial advance in ten years to report.—ROBERT HASTINGS NICHOLS.

TITIUS, D. ARTHUR. *Beiträge zur Religionsphilosophie*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1937. 213 pages. Rm. 4.80.

At the time of his death, September, 1936, Professor Titius had been at work for about two years on a manuscript in philosophy of religion. When illness convinced him that he would not be able to bring the work to completion, he requested Fraülein Marie Horstmeier, a former student, to undertake it. She has attempted to carry out his plan for the work, editing the unfinished essays and, in some cases, expanding notes into complete chapters.

The volume consists of a collection of eighteen loosely related essays rather than a unified work on philosophy of religion. In fact, some of these can be included under the title only by a broad definition of *Religionsphilosophie*. For example, there is one study analyzing six methods of research in history of religions.

Specifically on the "problem" of philosophy of religion, as it is defined (p. 10), there are a number of brief studies: the nature of value, the philosophy of idealism and religion, religion and reason, faith and knowledge, metaphysics, causality, and mysticism. The point of view common to all these studies is that of his earlier work, *Natur und Gott*. He has found no reason to depart from the tradition of liberalism which descends

through Schleiermacher and Ritschl. The distinctive marks of Titius' position within this tradition are derived from Harnack; so it is not surprising to find essays on the psychology of religion and the sociology of religion included. Perhaps this general characterization should be qualified at one point: there is an increased emphasis on mysticism (pp. 112 and 127 f.).

There is little evidence that Titius was influenced very much by either the recent social movements in Germany or by newer theological developments on the Continent. One of the studies, "Gedanken über die Prägung und Ausbildung der Rasseneigenart nach ihrer geistigen, insbesondere religiösen Seite hin," would have furnished the occasion for making clear the extent of such influences, but, unfortunately, the editor had only scanty notes for this chapter, and it is largely her composition. A sentence from an essay composed a few months earlier is indicative of Titius' view. Under the heading, "Die Anfänge der Religion bei Ariern und Israeliten" he writes: "It is shown with decisive clarity that no physiological-psychological peculiarities of race have controlled the historical development of religion, but that out of largely equal beginnings have developed through history those marked differences of pattern, which lie before us."—EDWIN R. WALKER.

UPJOHN, EVERARD M. *Richard Upjohn: Architect and Churchman*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939. xvii+243 pages. 109 illustrations. $4.00.

An important contribution to the history of the Gothic revival in American church architecture, written by the great-grandson of the famous architect of Trinity Church, New York, and founder of the American Institute of Architects. A complete corpus of Upjohn's works is appended with 109 excellent illustrations of his most important achievements. Written with a mastery of critical evaluation and a command of technical knowledge.—MASSEY H. SHEPHERD, JR.

VASCONEZ, PABLO ALFONSO. *Síntesis*. Quito, Ecuador: Editorial Labor, 1939. 158 pages.

This is the final volume of a series which has included books entitled *Israel*, *El Verbo*, *Arabia*, *India*, and *El Tercer grado*. Its presuppositions, concepts, and vocabulary are those of theosophy. It would (perhaps) be more intelligible and convincing to one who had read the preceding volumes.—W. E. GARRISON.

WALSH, THOMAS. *The World's Great Catholic Poetry*. New York: Macmillan, 1939. 584 pages. $1.69.

This is the second printing of the 1932 revision of a work first published in 1927. George N. Shuster is the editor of the revised edition and has added a number of poems published since the original anthology appeared. Most of the poems are by Roman Catholics, but there is a section "Catholic Poems by Non-Catholic Authors." New Testament materials are, of course, included as "Catholic."—JOHN KNOX.

WARKENTIN, A. *A Harmony of the Kings*. North Newton, Kan.: A. Warkentin, 1939. 227 pages. $2.00.

This is primarily an arrangement of the biblical records of the Hebrew kings, from Saul to Zedekiah, in their proper sequence, in the parallels of the Books of Samuel, Kings, and Chronicles, when such occur; from the disruption onward a further parallel is employed with the accounts of the kings of the two realms set side by side on the same page. There is neither note nor comment, but only a very cautious effort to ascribe dates when possible. An unpretentious book that should be very useful.—W. A. IRWIN.

WEISS, KONRAD (ed.). *Meister Eckhart: Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke. Die lateinischen Werke*, Erster Band, 2 Lieferung. Stuttgart: Verlag von W. Kohlhammer, 1938. 80 pages. Rm. 2.

J. QUINT (ed.). *Die deutschen Werke*, Erster Band, 3 Lieferung. 80 pages. Rm. 2.

Previously published sections of this scholarly edition of Eckhart's works have been noticed in this *Journal* (XVII [1937], 364 f.; XVIII [1938], 454 f.). K. Weiss here continues Volume I of the Latin works, and J. Quint presents an additional eighty pages of the *Predigten*, bringing Volume I of the German works to page 256.—J. T. MCNEILL.

WICKS, ROBERT R. *One Generation and Another*. New York: Scribner, 1939. 190 pages. $1.50.

There is much homely good sense in this volume. Sophisticated university students of college age will find their match in the author. In an unconventional way he reaffirms the conclusions of the fathers in questions of sex, home, religion, worship, etc. The author deals admirably with would-be iconoclasts.—VERGILIUS FERM.

YOUNGHUSBAND, SIR FRANCIS. *The Sum of Things*. New York: Dutton, 1939. vii+150 pages. $1.90.

Not many people could get the sum of things into one hundred and fifty small pages, but Sir Francis has done many wonderful deeds before this. Some of these are referred to (with very genuine modesty, it may be said) in this little book, which is a kind of spiritual autobiography. Of his thrilling explorations in the Gobi Desert, and of his memorable expedition into Tibet he says very little; the major part of the book is devoted to a discussion of mystical experiences, the World Congress of Faiths in London (which he calls "the culmination of my whole life work"), his convictions that several of the heavenly bodies are inhabited by intelligent beings, and the general outlines of a religious philosophy. Perhaps "philosophy" is not quite the right word: "intuition" would be better. "I hold," writes Sir Francis, "that through the emotions we get a clearer insight into the ultimate nature of things than we could ever gain by the closest reasoning." *Gefühl ist alles!*—J. B. PRATT.

ZEITLIN, SOLOMON. *The Book of Jubilees: Its Character and Its Significance*. Philadelphia: Dropsie College, 1939. vii+31 pages. $0.60.

This monograph is a moderately comprehensive introduction to an important record of the early development of Jewish oral tradition. It is much more than that. Indeed, it is a trenchant contribution to critical literature in a difficult area. The author's main contention is that the Book of Jubilees was pre-Hasmonean and nonsectarian in origin. He does not blanch at pronouncing it a direct literary rebuttal to the Pentateuch itself—no less! If this position becomes established, then we must regard *Little Genesis* as no insignificant piece of literature, but as a document of prime importance from a most obscure period in religious history.—HAROLD R. WILLOUGHBY.

In This Issue

Empiricism

No area of theological inquiry holds problems of greater contemporary interest and urgency than that of Christian ethics. The reality of war over a large part of Christendom and the threat of it everywhere else, as well as the persistence of the social crisis of which it is a manifestation, raise many issues of peculiarly critical importance for the Christian conscience. The Oxford Conference on Life and Work, held several years ago, and the series of studies which both preceded and followed it, indicate something of the seriousness with which the church is taking the ethical problems of which our times have made us so acutely aware. The first article in this issue is an appeal for an "experimental Christian ethics" by one who regards himself as both a Christian and an empiricist. The author believes that the ethics of Christianity, according to the truest tradition, are experimental ethics. ROBERT E. FITCH has degrees from Yale, Union, and Columbia and has spent a year at the University of Paris. He is associate professor of philosophy and religion at Occidental College in Los Angeles.

One of the most interesting features of the *Journal* this year has been a discussion of the appropriateness and adequacy of this same empirical method in the philosophy of religion. Professor Edwin R. Walker began the discussion with an article in two parts, begun in the October issue of last year and concluded in the July number of this, "Can Philosophy of Religion Be Empirical?" Criticism of Mr. Walker's position was expressed in the April, 1940, issue by George F. Thomas, John C. Bennett, and David E. Roberts. In the current number HENRY NELSON WIEMAN, of the University of Chicago, undertakes to answer this criticism, particularly as voiced by Professor Thomas.

Religion in Middletown

ANTON T. BOISEN, lecturer and research associate in the psychology of religion at the Chicago Theological Seminary, contributes to this issue an article on the sociology of religion, or, as the subtitle of his paper says it, "a study in the natural history of organized religion." He has selected a particular county in southern Indiana and has subjected to careful analysis the organization of its religious life from pioneer days to the present year. The data so assembled prove exceedingly il-

luminating as to the way in which our present church situation has evolved. The study of Monroe County, Indiana, is more than the study of a county; it is the study of American Christianity in some of its important phases. The article is full of striking materials and insights, but of particular value is the light thrown upon the origin and significance of the Holy Rollers and similar emotional cults. Mr. Boisen is well known as the author of *The Exploration of the Inner World* and of many studies in the psychology of religion.

Articles and Notes

John Wesley is a figure of perennial fascination, but the last decade has seen a resurgence of interest in him and his influence. Books and articles, by authors Catholic as well as Protestant, have appeared in great profusion. FRANCIS J. MCCONNELL, himself the author of an important recent book on the founder of Methodism, contributes to this issue a critical survey of this literature. No one speaks about John Wesley with greater authority. Bishop McConnell presides over the New York area of the Methodist church.

LAURENCE J. LAFLEUR, the author of the highly suggestive article, "If God Were Eternal," is a graduate of Princeton and Cornell, and for seven years he has been on the faculty of Brooklyn College. Two other articles, "Time as a Fourth Dimension" and "Conceptual Relativity," were published this year in the *Journal of Philosophy*, and his "The Fluxive Fallacy" appeared in the *Philosophy of Science*. The provocative title of his first *Journal of Religion* article does not misrepresent the interesting character of its contents.

The note by CLYO JACKSON describing a modern case of pseudonymity should not be missed by any student of biblical literature. Dr. Jackson is professor of New Testament at St. Stephens College.

The Next Issue

Besides the articles referred to on another page, the next issue of the *Journal* will carry a symposium "on the use of Christian words." The principles governing the use of traditional symbols proposed by Dr. Wieman in an article in the July number will be discussed briefly by Professor J. B. Pratt of Williams College, Professor Roy Wood Sellars of the University of Michigan, Professor Paul Lehmann of the Eden Theological Seminary, and perhaps others.